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Abstract
The broad aim of this dissertation is to present an alternative approach to empathy research.
The three main questions raised are: What is empathy? How do its component psychological
processes become active and operate together? How did empathy evolve? In answering these
questions, most researchers have started from a conventional approach that can be described
as focusing on short-term phenomena “inside the head” of an individual, evidence that is
gathered exclusively in a laboratory environment, and neurocognitive processes that are
universally shared by all humans.
A problem with the conventional approach is that it makes social and normative issues in
empathy research very difficult to analyze, let alone resolve. Issue such as: which contextual
and social variables affect whether empathy occurs or not? Why do conflicting assessments
of when empathy has occurred arise? And how should we decide between them? Resolving
these issues on the conventional approach is hard because it ignores many important
variables affecting empathy. There is a need for rethinking empathy in way that will more
fully integrate the normative and environmental variables that affect its interactive
complexity.
My approach integrates three such variables. Namely, the environmental contexts of agents
and targets, their values, and the motivational stances they adopt towards each other. In the
first paper, I attempt to sort out disagreements about what empathy is. I then argue for an
account of empathy that emphasizes care and other values. In the second paper, I explore the
consequences of unconscious emotions for an account of empathy’s theory of empathic
accuracy. In the third paper, I criticise evolutionary psychological accounts of empathy, and
propose an enlarged theoretical framework that renders the account I develop in the first two
papers consistent with recent advances in evolutionary theory, computer science,
evolutionary biology, and philosophy.
The three papers of this dissertation present a more detailed causal explanation of empathy
that enables us to better predict when it will occur. It sketches a new evolutionary
explanation of empathy. And it creates a theoretical space for the analysis of normative and
environmental variables that will arguably be important for studying empathy going forward.
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1. Introduction
1.1 How does empathy work, and when does it occur?
The three papers of this dissertation present an alternative approach to analyzing and
explaining empathy. Imagine that you are walking down the street and someone standing
by a shop asks you for money. As you look into their eyes you feel their sadness, their
pain, their disappointment. You are aware of their concern for money. And you feel
motivated to help them. What is empathy in such a case? How do the psychological
processes that bring it about become active and work together? And how did empathy
evolve? The alternative approach that I develop seeks to answer these questions in a new
way.
The majority of accounts that answer these question start from a conventional approach
that is characterized by the following features. The conventional approach focuses on
short-term phenomena “inside the head” of an individual agent. It appeals to evidence
that is gathered exclusively in a laboratory environment. And it posits neurocognitive
mechanisms or processes that are (universally) shared by all humans. The conventional
approach to empathy needs to be rethought because it does not sufficiently take into
consideration important aspects of empathy. Namely, the values of both agents and
targets that influence how and when it occurs; their motivational orientations; and how
empathy is affected by changes in environmental contexts.
Conventionally, empathy researchers pay little attention to these factors. They mostly
answer the question of how empathy occurs by focusing on the nature or format of the
mental processes of the empathy agent (Goldman 1992; de Vignemont and Singer 2008).
I argue that researchers taking the conventional approach do not explain empathy in
sufficient detail, and that they are unable to predict when it is more or less likely to occur.
One reason for this is that, depending on the model, there are over a dozen different
phenomena to which the term “empathy” refers. And though some researchers have
begun to discuss the resulting conceptual difficulty (Batson 2009), most seem to regard
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this divergent usage as merely terminological, and therefore unimportant. But indeed this
variation is of great importance because different uses of the term “empathy” have
different consequences for what counts as empathic accuracy. Models of how empathy
works all employ the notion of empathic accuracy—which specifies the end-state criteria
for an empathizer to “get it right”. Accordingly, the question of how empathy works is
premature because the question of what empathy is has not been satisfactorily answered
(as is apparent in the diverse ways that empathic accuracy is used).
On my model, empathy is more likely to occur when agents are in a cooperative or
altruistic motivational orientation towards targets, and when targets are in a cooperative
or altruistic motivational orientation towards agents. A motivational orientation is an
agent’s disposition to “define, compare, and evaluate their behavioural alternatives not
only in terms of their implications for achieving [their] own preferred ends, but also in
terms of their implication for the outcomes that will be afforded to others.” (McClintock
1972, p 438). I argue that both agents and targets are more likely to be in cooperative or
altruistic orientations when they care for or value each other’s well-being. To more fully
explain how empathy works and to predict when it will occur, we should consider
motivational orientations that are associated with values, and how these orientations are
affected by changes in environmental contexts.

1.2 Why is empathy important and philosophically
significant?
We often think of empathy as sharing people’s emotions, taking their perspective, and
feeling motivated to help them with their concerns. To take another example, say a friend
tells me that they were recently fired from a job that they found fulfilling. I may share
their disappointment, their belief that they were dismissed unjustly, and I may feel
motivated to help them find a new job. I empathize with my friend by experiencing
emotions and beliefs similar to theirs, and by being motivated to help them in a manner
appropriate to their concerns. Accounts of empathy usually include three component
mental processes: emotional contagion, mimicry, and perspective-taking (Preston and de
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Waal 2002; Stotland 1969).1 These processes contribute to an empathizing agent having
similar psychological states as those of a target, and to an agent becoming aware of a
target’s concerns. Some accounts also take empathy to include an additional motivational
process that can cause an agent to help a target (Sagi and Hoffman 1976; Batson and
Shaw 1991).
There exist many philosophical and scientific accounts of empathy (Hoffman 1987;
Darwall 1998; Batson 1991; Gallese 2001; Prinz 2011a; Zahavi 2011). This interest is
unsurprising because empathy has been shown to be important to many social practices
and capacities. It is taken to be a key contributor to fundamental human social capacities
such as moral judgment and conflict resolution, and it also deemed essential to many
more particular social practices such as interviewing, field work, journalistic reporting,
clinical work, social work, legal judgment, advertising, and so on. It plays an explanatory
role in many scientific theories such as in psychological and biological theories of
prosocial motivation (Krebs 1970, 1975; Hoffman 1981; de Waal 1996; Sober and
Wilson 1998; Wilson 1998; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Newson and Richerson 2013).2
And in environmental ethics, it has been argued that empathy makes it possible to
understand that nonhuman organisms have intrinsic value and should, for this reason, be
preserved (Callicott 1986). Examining these practices and theories reveals that what
empathy is taken to be varies. For example, in psychiatry and psychology, a lack of
empathy is said to explain both autism and psychopathy (Kennett 2002). But clearly this
lack of empathy results in two very different classifications. This is partly because
researchers do not use the notion empathy consistently across all theories of autism and
psychopathy. It is also because they have not made explicit many important factors that
influence how empathy works differently in each case.
Empathy also figures prominently in many historical and contemporary philosophical
debates. The word ‘empathy’ was translated into English by the psychologists Edward B.
Titchener in 1909 from the German word ‘einfühlung’. The latter was coined by Robert
Vischer (1873) in his doctoral dissertation in philosophy. In the context of that period’s
1
2

A detailed description of these processes and their roles in causing empathy is in paper 1.
Although, in the cases of Sober and Wilson (1998), the explanatory focus is on altruism.
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philosophy and psychology, ‘einfühlung’ and ‘empathy’ were technical terms in debates
about the psychology of aesthetic experience that referred to the processes by which an
agent felt their way into a work of art in order to discover and create conscious states
within it.3 Eventually, it became used to refer to a process occurring primarily among
humans (as opposed to among humans and art objects or humans and non-human
animals). It was around this time that discussions of empathy became important in
debates about the problem of other minds—the problem of whether or not and how we
know that others have minds and how we know their mental states (Coplan and Goldie
2011, xiii). This is important because the side on which one fell in these debates had
serious implications for how to study the mind. Namely, if a researcher believed that it
was not possible know the mental states of targets, then that researcher might, by
entailment, be committed to behaviourism. On the other hand, if a research believed that
it was possible, by empathizing, to become aware of the mental states of targets, then that
research might be committed to mentalism.
More recently, in the 1980’s and 90’s, empathy was again prominent in debates about
how we attribute mental states to others (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Stich and Nichols
1992; Goldman 1992; Gopnik and Wellman 1995; Baron-Cohen 1995). The issue here
was about the cognitive format of the mental processes allowing us to make such
attributions. Researchers argued that we either simulated the mental states of a target in a
mental format akin to sensory imagination, or we created a theory of their mental states in
an amodal format. In these debates, empathy was equated with mindreading—“the
capacity to understand other minds” (Nichols 2004, p 8). Accordingly, it was often
mistakenly treated as being a process that does not involve any shared emotional
experience between agents and targets. Once this had been corrected, the earlier debates
about mindreading became important to debates about the metaphysics of empathy.
Simulation theorists and theory theorists agree that our attribution of mental states to
others and our ability to empathize with them depend entirely on processes that are
representational—that is, on processes whereby an agent attempting to empathize with a
target generates a representation of that target’s mental states. Empathy occurs then in
3

For more details, see Appendix A.
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virtue of the agent accessing representations (either simulations or theories) internal to
their own mind. Contrary to this, other theorists argue that, when empathizing, agents
have direct-perceptual access to the minds of targets (Zahavi 2001, 2011; Gallagher
2008, IP). These latter theorists believe that we not only have direct access to our own
minds, but that we also have direct access to the minds of others in our perceptions them.
I describe these competing views in more detail in the first paper. I refer to them here
simply to show some of the significance of empathy for philosophical debates—in this
case, for debates about the metaphysics of mind, mindreading, and empathy.
As mentioned, the term ‘empathy’ originated in philosophical debates about aesthetics.
And empathy featured prominently in debates about the problem of other minds; and
more recently, in debates about mindreading and the metaphysics of mind. Also, how
theorists think about empathy has significantly affected at least two other topics of
philosophical concern: ethics and the evolution of altruism. In ethics, Slote has developed
an “ethics of empathic caring” according to which “empathy is the primary mechanism of
caring, benevolence, [and] compassion” (Slote 2007, p 4). He argues that empathy and
cultivating our ability to empathize is central to our moral education and development
(Ibid.). In the feminist tradition, Noddings argues that empathy contributes to self and
other-understanding, which in turn fosters ethically healthy appreciation and criticism
(Noddings 2002a, p 153; 2002b; 2003).
With regard to the evolution of altruism, Sober and Wilson claim that empathy evolved to
cause agents to behave altruistically (Sober and Wilson 1998). They favour the theory of
psychological altruism—the view that organisms have evolved to sometimes act with an
ultimate concern for others—as opposed to the theory of reciprocal altruism—the view
that organisms have only evolved to act with a concern for others in case of a likely
returned benefit (Sober and Wilson 1998, p 7). Their account is a scientifically informed
philosophical contribution to the longstanding debate about whether humans, by nature,
are essentially psychological egoists or psychological altruists. In this debate, Sober and
Wilson take empathy to be the process that is primarily responsible for causing agents to
behave altruistically (Sober and Wilson 1998, Ch. 8). They argue that empathy causes a
motivation to help targets with their concerns—and that this motivation is often altruistic
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in that its intended end is to benefit the target (Ibid.). But the most influential account of
the evolution of empathy is in evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychologists claim that there exist essential sex differences in the
frequency and accuracy of empathy, and that these differences are caused by innate
mechanisms that have remained fixed since the distant evolutionary past (Baron-Cohen
2003; Pinker 2011). In the past, empathy is believed to have functioned to solve adaptive
problems such as “mothering”, “gossip”, “social mobility”, and “reading your partner”
(Dunbar 1998; Baron-Cohen 2003, p 425-437). And because these functions of empathy
are purported to have been mostly performed by females throughout evolutionary history
(until perhaps very recently), evolutionary psychologists claim that this resulted in the
continued selection for genes causing psychological mechanisms that explain
contemporary differences in empathy (Baron-Cohen 2003; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright 2004; Lawrence et al. 2004).

1.3 What is my approach to empathy and how is it different
from the conventional approach?
As mentioned, many sources of empirical evidence have recently shaped empathy
research. An account that draws from these sources is the mirror neuron account of
empathy (Gallese 2001; 2002). It also is a prominent example of an account that follows
the conventional approach. Mirror neurons fire both when we perform an action, and
when we observe another organism performing a similar action. Their activation is
recorded in hand-gesture experiments over short time periods in a laboratory setting.
Mirror neurons are taken by many to be the basis of our ability to simulate the internal
states of others (Gallese 2001; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008) —and thus, to fully explain
how an agent empathizes with a target (Gallese, Keysers, and Rizzolatti 2004).
A major problem with the conventional approach is that it makes social and normative
issues in empathy research very difficult to analyze, let alone resolve. Issue such as:
which contextual and social variables affect whether empathy occurs or not? Why do
conflicting assessments of when empathy has occurred arise, and how should we decide
between them? And what is the role of values, and motivations? Addressing these issues
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will be important for empathy to play a role in resolving conflicts and for it to continue to
be seen as a source of moral good. To begin resolving these issues we should consider
how agents and targets of empathy interact in varying environments. But the
conventional approach avoids them. It is too narrowly focused on an agent’s
neurocognitive mechanisms during short time periods in a laboratory environment, and
on the purported species-wide instantiation of such mechanisms. For example, an account
of empathy following the conventional approach will have difficulty analysing the
empathic experience of what Hoffman calls “complex combinations”:
A shabbily dressed man is observed robbing an obviously affluent person
on the street. A young child might feel empathic and sympathetic distress
for the victim and anger at the immediate, visible culprit. Mature
observers might have these same feelings, but a variety of other empathic
affects as well. They might feel guilty over not helping the victim. If they
are ideologically liberal, they might empathize and sympathize not only
with the victim but also with the culprit because of his poverty. The
observers might view the culprit as a victim of society and feel empathic
anger towards society. Furthermore, if the observers are affluent as well as
liberal, they might feel guilty over being relatively advantaged persons
who benefit from the same society. Ideologically conservative observers
might not sympathize with the culprit but might respond with unalloyed
empathic anger instead. They might also feel empathic anger toward
society, but in this case because they view the victim, not the culprit, as a
victim of society (because of inadequate law enforcement and citizen
protection) (Hoffman 1984, p 657).
Indeed all occurrences of empathy are complex combinations because all occurrences of
empathy are importantly influenced by both the values of agents and targets, as
Hoffman’s example makes clear. But accounts following the conventional approach do
not show how values influence the way empathy works and when it occurs. They do not,
for example, consider the relationships between emotional states and motivational
orientations that are associated with differences in values.
The alternative approach to empathy that I develop in this dissertation integrates three
variables: values, motivational orientations, and environmental contexts. And the
dynamic interactions between these variables and other contextual factors is brought to
the fore. I consider the role of terminal values—qualities of outcome states that are
desirable; and the role of instrumental values—qualities of contextually appropriate
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modes of conduct (Lovejoy 1950). And I include four motivational orientations:
indifference; competition; cooperation; and altruism (McClintock 1972). These
motivational orientations are steered by the goals that agents and targets bring to a
situation. And each motivational orientation is associated with different values which in
turn affect their occurrent beliefs and emotions, depending on their environmental context
(including other organisms). The relationship between goals, motivational orientations,
values, and contexts can be used to assess whether or not empathy has occurred, and to
predict whether or not it will occur. I argue that this is because when values change,
motivational orientations towards targets may also change and vice versa. Values also
affect the content of the concerns of both agents and targets of empathy. Thus, it is
important to understand the role of values in an agent’s ability and likelihood to
empathize with a target. And it is important to understand the role of values in how
targets of empathy understand their own situations. A more detailed account of empathy
that includes the dynamic interactions between goals, motivational orientations, values,
emotions, and environments emerges from the alternative approach that I develop in
these three papers.
Empathy is a fundamentally social phenomenon. But most accounts take the conventional
approach to explaining empathy by focusing on agents in laboratory environments, often
in isolation from other organisms, and even in isolation from elements of their mental
lives, such as their ethical beliefs and commitments, that importantly affect their
interpersonal behaviours. There is a need for an alternative approach to empathy that is
scientifically informed, but also more socially and thus more philosophically informed.
Such an approach should be good for understanding the relational nature of empathy;
debates in empathy research about our ability to take the perspective of many organisms;
and the implications and consequences that these debates have for current socially and
ethically important challenges.
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1.4 What is the need for an alternative approach to
empathy?
Widespread interest in empathy has increased in the last 15 years. Some of this interest is
due to economic and technological change. In this time, trade and communication have
become even more technologically mediated. These transactions are now faster and more
global. Paradoxically, in the midst of this communication revolution, group tensions have
taken center stage in policy deliberations and in the media. Preventing and combatting
international terrorism is now at the top of the political agenda in Canada and many other
countries. And while I write this introduction, people motivated by a desire for equality
and justice across racial identities are protesting in 170 U.S. cities. A fuller account of
and use of empathy may contribute to progress on these and related issues (CallowayThomas 2010).
Another source of the renewed interest in empathy is the emerging view of human nature
in biology and studies of the mind. Hobbes’s view of human nature is well known:
humans are essentially self-interested and the world is essentially competitive. This view
of human nature and evolution has been popularized by Dawkins who states that:
“‘nature red in tooth and claw’ sums up our modern understanding of natural selection
admirably” (Dawkins 1989). More recently however, researchers have begun to develop
theories according to which humans are by nature more cooperative and altruistic than
previously thought (Sober and Wilson 1998; de Waal 2010; Rifkin 2010). Along these
lines, the discovery of mirror-neurons that contribute to our interpretations of others, the
discovery of empathy’s role in autism and psychopathic disorders, as well as
developments in cognitive science, ethics, and the philosophy of mind and psychology
are contributing to a renewed sense of optimism about empathy.
But these advances in research (and the resulting optimism) are not without their
theoretical difficulties and detractors. Confusion about what empathy is has become a
significant impediment to further advances in empathy research. As Batson (2009) and
Pinker (2011, Ch. 9) point out, the word ‘empathy’ refers to many different mental states
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and phenomena.4 And some theorists such as Prinz (2011a, 2011b) have argued that
empathy is not beneficial to ethical theory or to the resolution of large-scale ethical
challenges such as environmental destruction or disease relief. An alternative theoretical
approach to empathy should be worthwhile for empathy research to continue benefiting
the many domains it does, and for the phenomenon of empathy to contribute to meeting
the difficult social challenges we face.

1.5 Paper 1: The care account and the role of values in
empathy
The focus of my alternative approach motivates the main questions in each of the three
papers. The first paper asks: what is the role of values in empathy? In answer to this
question, I present of a novel account of empathy called the care account. Care is a value.
We care about what happens, about how it happens, about objects, and organisms. In
empathy, the value of care is important. Care causes empathizing, and empathizing
causes care. When an agent cares for or values the well-being of a target, that agent is
more likely to empathize with that target. This is because the value of care is most often
subsumed under the motivational orientations of cooperation and altruism. When an
agent is engaged in an activity that involves or requires cooperation or altruism, that
agent’s behaviours can be partially explained by a motivation that is informed by the
value they place on the target’s well-being. This in turn provides some insight into the
types of environmental contexts that an agent is more likely to empathize in. For
example, in a competitive environment such as a meeting with business rivals, empathy is
less likely than at a dinner table with friends. Care also results from empathy. An agent
does not necessarily have to care for a target prior to attempting to empathize with that
target. But I think that when an agent empathizes accurately with a target, that agent cares
for the target; this is because (as I suppose) empathy involves an agent becoming aware
of a targets’ concerns and feeling motivated to help the target with those concerns. Thus,

For example, some researchers take ‘empathy’ to refer to an agent having knowledge of the emotional
state of a target. Others take it to involve an agent having the same experience as that of a target. I will
provide more examples of the different uses of the term and distinguish between account types in my first
paper.
4
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my care account begins by examining the role of care in empathy, which in turn opens up
a space for examining of the role of other values in different environmental contexts.

1.6 Paper 2: Two challenges to empathy from unconscious
emotions
The main question of my second paper is: what relationship must there be between an
agent and a target’s unconscious emotional states for empathy to occur? The care account
I develop in the first paper is a token of the concern account type of empathy account. As
such, for empathy to occur, it requires a matching relation between an agent and a target
whereby an agent experiences an emotion with the same valence as that of the target
(either positive or negative). For example, empathy may occur even if an agent is
experiencing pride and a target is experiencing joy, just as long as both are experiencing
emotions that are positively valenced. On the other hand, matching accounts of empathy
have a stricter matching relation requirement for when empathy occurs.5 On matching
accounts, the matching relation between an agent and a target specifies that both must
experience the same emotional content. For example, when a target of empathy is
experiencing anger, for empathy to occur, an agent must also experience anger.6 The
matching relation required between an agent and target’s conscious emotional states for
empathy to occur is precisely specified on each account type. However, the matching
relation required for empathy to occur between an agent and a target’s unconscious
emotional states has not been examined. Clarifying the matching relation required
between the unconscious emotional states of agents and targets on each account type of
empathy is the main goal of my second paper.
Including unconscious emotions in an account of empathy has important implications for
what counts as accurate empathy that have not hitherto been investigated. I draw out
these implications by presenting a separate challenge to each account type of empathy: an
unconscious concerns challenge, and an unconscious matching challenge. Exploring each
challenge allows me to more precisely define what accurate empathy is on each account

5
6

Although matching-accounts do not usually discuss the notion of valence.
And not say, sadness, which is also often a negatively valenced emotion.

12
type.7 After doing so, I present new possible replies to each challenge from each account
type.
Because my care account of empathy is a concern account, the most important reply that I
present is the indeterminacy of affect valence reply to the unconscious concerns
challenge. This challenge asks: must an agent become aware of a target’s unconscious
concerns for accurate empathy to occur? For example, evolutionary psychologists argue
that conscious emotions can cause unconscious concerns. In particular, Cosmides and
Tooby (2000) state that the experience of fear causes changes in behaviour that are
motivated by concerns that need not be conscious. When an agent walks alone at night,
that agent experiences fear because they are possibly being stalked or about to be
ambushed (Cosmides and Tooby 2000, p 3). In this case, the agent consciously
experiences fear and is consciously concerned about being stalked or ambushed. But with
this conscious experience of fear come unconscious concerns such as: a concern for
safety; a concern for the location of loved ones; a concern for the location of others than
can protect me; a concern for finding a defensive position (Ibid.). The questions then are:
for accurate empathy to occur on a concern account, is it sufficient that an agent become
aware of the target’s conscious concern about being stalked? Or must an agent also
become aware of the target’s unconscious concerns such as their concern of locating
loved ones and finding a safe location? I present a reply to this challenge that draws from
Charland’s (2005) indeterminacy thesis of affect valence. Charland’s thesis argues that
unconscious emotions are not functionally and behaviourally identical to conscious
emotions. Specifically, unconscious emotions are not motivational; whereas, concerns are
motivational. Therefore, I claim that on a concern account such as mine, an agent need
not match a target’s unconscious emotions because they do not cause unconscious
concerns.

7

Each account type differs with regard to what it takes empathy to be. This is not the same as differing
with regard to what accurate empathy is. The former defines what an agent is attempting to do when
empathizing. The latter (empathic accuracy) defines a state that occurs when an agent’s attempt at empathy
is successful.
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1.7 Paper 3: Towards and enlarged evolutionary
psychological explanation of empathy
The main questions of the third paper are: why, when, and how did empathy evolve? I
present an enlarged evolutionary psychological answer to these questions. Specifically, I
examine evolutionary psychological research on empathy. Evolutionary psychologists
conclude that the answer to why empathy evolved is that it functioned to improve
females’ capacity for mothering; caused females to gossip more easily and frequently
among themselves; caused females to form social alliances with their male partner’s
associates more easily; and allowed females to anticipate and attend to the needs of their
male partners more easily (Pinker 2002, 2011; Baron-Cohen 2003, 2007). They argue
that the mental processes of empathy that motivated females to behave in this way were
selected for during the Pleistocene, and they are still operative today.8 This is consistent
with the dictum of standard evolutionary psychology that “our modern skulls house a
stone age mind.” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997).
These claims about why and when empathy evolved depend on a specific understanding
of how it evolved. This understanding or theoretical framework is standard across
evolutionary psychology. Its three central tenets are: 1) inclusive fitness; 2)
computational theory of mind; 3) slow evolution. These tenets are consistent and
mutually supportive. However, my alternative approach to empathy allows us to notice
that the theoretical framework of standard evolutionary psychology [SEP] is one that is
focused on processes internal to the individual; it does not take into consideration values
or motivational orientations; and it treats the environment as stable and fixed rather than
examining the variety of environments that organisms inhabit, and the ways that
organisms have modified their environments throughout evolutionary history. To make
my approach consistent with evolutionary theory, I enlarge the framework of SEP to
include the following recent advances in evolutionary biology, computer science, and
philosophy: 1) niche construction and mutualism; 2) self-adaptive computer software; 3)
feminist evolutionary theory and biological leverage.

8

The Pleistocene refers to the period between approximately 2.6 million years ago to 12 thousand years
ago.
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This theoretical enlargement has important methodological implications for SEP. It
shows that SEP cannot merely rely on the existence of fixed of mental processes that
were selected in the distant past to explain current behaviour. Before doing so, it must
justify the purported fixity of such processes by more precisely characterizing their causal
contribution throughout history (including the more recent evolutionary history of the last
12 thousand years). These implications take the form of a revision to the method of SEP.
Specifically I present a comparative method according to which many of the steps in the
method of SEP remain the same. For example, according to the new method of enlarged
evolutionary psychology [EEP], it remains important to form hypotheses about the effects
that our mental processes causally contributed to in the environments of the distant past.
However, the methodological starting point of EEP is different. It begins by generating
hypotheses about the current causal contributions of our mental processes (i.e. their
current functions). Doing so allows a researcher looking to explain the evolution of
empathy to compare the current functions of empathy with its distant historical functions.
The benefit of this method is that it allows us to notice whether those functions have
remained the same. Furthermore, if functional changes are discovered, then the revised
method of EEP also allows a researcher to start examining and tracking those changes. I
begin to apply the revised method of EEP in sketching a new explanation of how
empathy evolved. And I conclude, contrary to SEP, that relatively recent environmental
modifications and resultant social interactions of evolutionary significance (e.g.
biological leverage) affected the evolution of the psychological processes currently
enabling empathy.
EEP can be situated among the many criticisms of SEP insofar as it argues that the
functions posited by SEP (including the functions of empathy) are not the only ones that
are evolutionarily plausible (Stotz and Griffiths 2002; Greene 2004; Buller 2005; Liesen
2007). But other criticisms of SEP have not discussed how the practice of evolutionary
psychology might change as a result of this claim. EEP goes a step further by presenting
specific revisions to the standard method of SEP. These revisions have significant
consequences for SEP explanations of empathy and other phenomena that it seeks to
explain.
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1.8 What are the future directions in empathy research?
There is great potential for additional research on empathy and related issues. A debate
that is already being addressed by philosophers which requires more attention is about the
metaphysics of the mental processes involved in empathy. The question here is whether
we always (or ever) have direct access to the mental states of a target (in perhaps the
same way that we have access to our own mental states), or whether we always have
indirect access to representations of a target’s mental states? With a more detailed
understanding of the how the mental processes involved in empathy work, progress may
be made in this philosophical debate. Another debate that is already being addressed by
philosophers is about whether empathy is necessary or important for moral action,
progress, and theory.9 This debate has recently been more widely addressed by an
interdisciplinary panel in the Boston Review forum entitled Against Empathy.10 Although
not all of the researchers on the panel were “against empathy” the question of whether
empathy plays or should play an important role in ethics is worthwhile. More
specifically, a question that will be important to further consider is: how and under what
conditions is empathy a liability or even dangerous? Some researchers believe that
empathy is an intrinsically negative process or an intrinsically negative emotion. They
claim that this is because empathy is biased towards those who are similar to us. Rather,
they suggest that pure (non-emotional) reason is a better guide to right thinking and
action. They further claim that empathically motivated behaviour can be manipulated.
For example, there is evidence that legal defendants who show emotions receive lighter
sentences than those that do not (Tsoudis 2002). Both of these claims—that empathy is
biased, and that it can be used for manipulation—are true. But this does not mean that
empathy is not important for moral theorizing, moral development, decision-making, and
other practices. For example, voluntary empathy may be used to assess and challenge the
biases of automatic empathy. However, it does mean that more research is required to
better understand the potential dangers of empathy and to help satisfy the concerns of
those who are strongly against its role in ethical theories. This dissertation has

9

Consensus in this debate is probable but not imminent.
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy
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consequences for these and other debates already underway in philosophy and empathy
research more broadly. But it may also be used to address two areas that have not yet
been examined by philosophers. These areas are more salient after considering the
totality of this document. So I will here be brief.
The first area is empathy testing. Empathy tests are used in the selection, training, and
assessment of personnel and clients in many fields including management, medicine,
pharmacy, nursing, social work, and teaching. The problem here is that current designs of
empathy tests (e.g. “empathy quotient” tests designed by evolutionary psychologists), do
not differentiate between whether participants are being assessed on their awareness
resulting from empathic perspective-taking or on their ability to apply familiar
stereotypes (Lindgren and Robinson, 1953). The question of what exactly empathy tests
are measuring remains controversial. Empathy tests usually take one of two forms: a brief
group interaction session in a plain room or a text-based self-report questionnaire. In the
design of empathy tests, two types of experimental prompts (prompts for empathic
perspective-taking and prompts for applying cultural norms) should be more clearly
distinguished. For example, on self-report questionnaire based empathy tests, respondent
answers sometimes coalesce around certain answers that may have been chosen for their
propriety rather than having been empathy induced. For example, in answering the
question of whether a respondent was friendly to a target, respondents answer “fairly
friendly” very frequently. This occurs regardless of whether their other responses support
the conclusion that they are “good empathizers” (Ibid.). My approach to the analysis of
empathy can contribute to developing tests that better distinguish between answers that
are caused by a more abstract understanding of what is appropriate to respond, and
answers that result from empathic processes such as perspective-taking and feeling
motivated to help a target. At least two guidelines for designing empathy tests follow
from my approach which integrates goals, emotions and motivations, and social
variables. First, empathy tests should be administered over longer time periods.
Currently, empathy tests of both types are short in duration. Second, participants should
be assessed in varying environmental and social contexts. Empathy is more or less likely
to occur as a result of changes in motivational orientations towards targets which change
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as a function of social factors such as time constraints. Accordingly, measuring empathy
in various environmental and social contexts will be important for distinguishing between
the causes of responses.
Empathy contributes to socially and morally desirable behaviour. This is supported by
DSM-based diagnoses of anti-social personality disorder and personality tests specific to
psychopathy that measure a reduction or absence of empathy (Blair 1995). Further,
correlations are often drawn between the results of general personality tests and
personality tests specifically designed to measure “empathic ability” or “empathy
quotient” (Lawrence et al. 2004). These correlations support the hypothesis that a lack of
empathy leads to poor social adjustment. More precisely identifying what is being
measured in empathy tests will allow us to develop tests that more accurately measure the
intended construct.
The approach developed in this dissertation can be applied to a second topic that has not
yet been examined by philosophers; namely hot-cold empathy gaps (Van Boven and
Lowenstein 2005). Decision making experiments have recently shown that an agent’s
predictions of a target’s decisions are significantly influenced by that agent’s own
emotional states. This evidence is important because previous theories of decision
making (especially under risk or uncertainty) are consequentialist and cognitive theories.
These theories are consequentialist in that they predict that people make decisions based
on the assessment of the consequences of possible alternatives. And they are cognitive in
that this assessment is described as an expectation-based calculus. The emotional states
and feelings that people have when making decisions are meaningless or epiphenomenal.
In short, previous decision-making theories predicted that agents will aim to maximize
their expected utility (benefit to themselves). Accordingly, predictions about a target’s
decisions will also be based on predictions about expected utility.
Evidence from research on hot-cold empathy gaps shows that these decision-making
theories are incomplete. An agent’s emotional state often causes that agent to make false
predictions about their own and other people’s emotional states and decisions. For
example, when an agent is asked to predict whether they would be willing to participate
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in potentially embarrassing activities (such as dancing in front of an audience), their
prediction varies as a function of the immediacy of the activity (Van Boven et al. 2004).
When the activity is to be performed in the distant future, agents overestimate how
willing they are to perform it as compared to when the activity is to be performed nearly
immediately. That is, when making a hypothetical rather than a real decision to perform,
agents were more likely to predict that they would participate. An agent’s emotional state
also influenced their predictions about other people’s potential decisions. In hypothetical
versus immediate (potentially) fearful conditions, agents were more likely to predict that
others would also participate in the immediately (potentially) fearful activity. In sum, our
own emotional states sometimes cause us to make false predictions about other people’s
decisions because they blind us from parts of a target’s perspective.
The relationship between motivational orientations and values developed in my approach
to empathy could be integrated into the models used in these experiments. For example,
whether an agent is ethically conflicted about performing a certain action could influence
their predictions about whether they and other people would perform that action.
Similarly, if performing an action is taken to be threatening to an agent’s values or to
those of others (either present or not, affected by the action or not), the agent’s
predictions may also vary. Further, the relationship between values and emotional states
under hypothetical and real conditions could be modeled and tested.

19

References
Baron-Cohen, Simon. Essential Difference: Male and Female Brains and the Truth about
Autism. Basic Books, 2003.
---. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. MIT press, 1995.
---. “The Evolution of Empathizing and Systematizing: Assortative Mating of Two
Strong Systematizers and the Cause of Autism.” (2007).
---. The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty. Basic books, 2011.
Baron-Cohen, Simon, Alan M. Leslie, and Uta Frith. “Does the Autistic Child Have a
‘theory of Mind’?.” Cognition 21.1 (1985): 37–46. Print.
Baron-Cohen, Simon, and Sally Wheelwright. “The Empathy Quotient: An Investigation
of Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High Functioning Autism, and Normal Sex
Differences.” Journal of autism and developmental disorders 34.2 (2004): 163–
175. Print.
Batson, C. Daniel. “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct
Phenomena.” The Social Neuroscience of Empathy. Ed. Jean Decety and William
Ickes. Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press, 2009.
Batson, C. Daniel, and Laura L. Shaw. “Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of
Prosocial Motives.” Psychological Inquiry 2.2 (1991): 107–122. Print.
Blair, R. James R. “A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the
Psychopath.” Cognition 57.1 (1995): 1–29. Print.
Buller, David J. Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for
Human Nature. MIT Press, 2005.
Callicot, J. Baird. “On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species.” The Preservation of
Species. Ed. Norton Bryan G. Guildford, Surrey UK: Princeton University Press,
1986. 138–72. Print.
Carolyn Calloway-Thomas. Empathy in the Global World: An Intercultural Perspective.
2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, California, 91320, United States: 2010. Print.
Charland, Louis C. “Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence.” Emotion
and consciousness (2005): 231–254. Print.
---. “The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem.” Journal of
consciousness studies 12.8-10 (2005): 82–102. Print.
Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby. “Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions.”

20
Handbook of emotions (2000): 91–115. Print.
---. “Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer.” Evolutionary Psychology: a primer (1997).
Darwall, Stephen. “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.” Philosophical Studies 89.2 (1998): 261–
282. Print.
Dawkins, Richard. “The Selfish Gene.” revised edn. Oxford (1989): Print.
De Waal, Frans. The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. Random
House LLC, 2010.
Dunbar, Robin, and Robin Ian MacDonald Dunbar. Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution
of Language. Harvard University Press, 1998.
Gallese, Vittorio. “The Roots of Empathy: The Shared Manifold Hypothesis and the
Neural Basis of Intersubjectivity.” Psychopathology 36.4 (2002): 171–180. Print.
---. “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis. From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.” Journal of
consciousness studies 8.5-7 (2001): 5–7. Print.
---. “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.” Journal of
consciousness studies 8.5-7 (2001): 33–50. Print.
Gallese, V, C Keysers, and G Rizzolatti. “A Unifying View of the Basis of Social
Cognition.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8.9 (2004): 396–403. CrossRef. Web.
Goldman, Alvin I. “In Defense of the Simulation Theory.” Mind & Language 7.1-2
(1992): 104–119. Print.
Gopnik, Alison, and Henry M. Wellman. “Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a
Theory.” Mind & Language 7.1-2 (1992): 145–171. Print.
Greene, Sheila. “V. Biological Determinism: Persisting Problems for the Psychology of
Women.” Feminism & Psychology 14.3 (2004): 431–435. Print.
Currie, Gregory. "Empathy for Objects." Empathy: Philosophical and psychological
perspectives (2011): 82.
Hoffman, Martin L. “Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?” Journal of Personality and
social Psychology 40.1 (1981): 121. Print.
---. “The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment.” Reaching out:
Caring, altruism, and prosocial behavior 7 (1987): 161–194. Print.
---. “The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment.” Reaching out:
Caring, altruism, and prosocial behavior 7 (1994): 161–194. Print.

21
Kennett, Jeanette. “Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency.” The Philosophical Quarterly
52.208 (2002): 340–357. Print.
Krebs, Dennis L. “Altruism: An Examination of the Concept and a Review of the
Literature.” Psychological bulletin 73.4 (1970): 258. Print.
Lawrence, E. J. et al. “Measuring Empathy: Reliability and Validity of the Empathy
Quotient.” Psychological Medicine 34.5 (2004): 911–919. CrossRef. Web.
---. “Measuring Empathy: Reliability and Validity of the Empathy Quotient.”
Psychological Medicine 34.5 (2004): 911–919. CrossRef. Web.
Liesen, Laurette T. “Women, Behavior, and Evolution: Understanding the Debate
between Feminist Evolutionists and Evolutionary Psychologists.” Politics and the
Life Sciences 26.1 (2007): 51–70. Print.
Lindgren, Henry Clay, and Jacqueline Robinson. “An Evaluation of Dymond’s Test of
Insight and Empathy.” Journal of consulting psychology 17.3 (1953): 172. Print.
McClintock, Charles G. “Social motivation—A Set of Propositions.” Behavioral Science
17.5 (1972): 438–454. Print.
Newson, Lesley, and Peter J. Richerson. “The Evolution of Flexible Parenting.”
Evolution’s Empress: Darwinian Perspectives on the Nature of Women (2013):
151–67. Print.
Nichols, Shaun. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.
Oxford University Press, 2004.
Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen P. Stich. Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence,
Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Clarendon Press/Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.
University of California Press, 2003.
---. Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. ERIC, 2002.
---. Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy. University of California Press, 2002.
Pinker, Steven. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Penguin, 2003.
Preston, Stephanie D., and Frans De Waal. “Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate
Bases.” Behavioral and brain sciences 25.01 (2002): 1–20. Print.
Prinz, Jesse. “Against Empathy.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 214–
233. CrossRef. Web.

22
Prinz, Jesse J. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” Empathy: Philosophical and
psychological perspectives (2011): 211–229. Print.
Richerson, Peter J., and Robert Boyd. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed
Human Evolution. University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Rifkin, Jeremy. The empathic civilization: The race to global consciousness in a world in
crisis. Penguin, 2009. Rizzolatti, Giacomo, Corrado Sinigaglia, and Frances Trans
Anderson. Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions.
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Sagi, Abraham, and Martin L. Hoffman. “Empathic Distress in the Newborn.”
Developmental Psychology 12.2 (1976): 175. Print.
Slote, Michael. The Ethics of Care and Empathy. Routledge, 2007.
Sober, Elliott., and David Sloan. Wilson. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Print.
Stotland, Ezra. “Exploratory Investigations of Empathy.” Advances in experimental
social psychology 4 (1969): 271–314. Print.
Stotz, Karola C., and Paul E. Griffiths. "Dancing in the Dark." Evolutionary Psychology.
Springer US, 2003. 135-160. Tsoudis, Olga. “Influence of Empathy in Mock Jury
Criminal Cases: Adding to the Affect Control Model, The.” W. Criminology Rev.
4 (2002): 55. Print.
Van Boven, Leaf, and George Loewenstein. "Empathy gaps in emotional perspective
taking." Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and
others (2005): 284-297.
Vischer, Robert. “On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics.”
Empathy, form, and space: Problems in German aesthetics 1893 (1873): 89–124.
Print.
Waal, F. B. M. de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other
Animals. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Print.
Wilson, Edward O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. Vol. 31. Random House LLC,
1999.
Zahavi, Dan. “Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies 8.5-7 (2001): 5–7. Print.
---. “Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal.” Review of
Philosophy and Psychology 2.3 (2011): 541–558. CrossRef. Web.

23
---. “Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese.” Life, Subjectivity & Art. Springer,
2012. 217–254.

24

2. The care account and the role of values in empathy
2.1 Introduction
The main question in empathy research is “how does empathy work”? The majority of
accounts that answer this question share three features. First, they focus on short-term
phenomena “inside the head” of an individual agent. Second, the evidence they appeal to
is gathered exclusively from laboratory observations. Third, they posit neurocognitive
mechanisms that are (universally) shared by all humans. Accounts that have these three
features can be said to be following the conventional approach to explaining how
empathy works. A prominent account that follows the conventional approach is the
mirror-neuron account of empathy. Mirror neurons fire both when we perform an action,
and when we observe another organism performing a similar action. Their activation is
recorded in hand-gesture experiments over short time periods in a laboratory setting, and
is taken to fully explain how an agent empathizes with a target (Gallese, Keysers, and
Rizzolatti 2004).
In this paper I develop an account of how empathy works that takes a different approach.
I call this account the care account of empathy. The care account focuses on the value of
care, and the role of values more generally in empathy. Values are important. They are at
the core of an agent’s relationship to the environment. For example, some basic emotions
such as a fear, and anger are often said to provide an agent with evaluative relationships
to the world that are fundamental to its survival (Panksepp 2001). Values have an
affective, a cognitive, and a behavioural component (Rokeach, 1973). I follow Rokeach
(1973) in taking a value to be “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or endstate of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of
conduct or end-state of existence.” (Rokeach, 1973) Accordingly, values are evaluative
beliefs insofar as they are about whether an end-state or behaviour is desirable or
undesirable.
Conventional accounts of empathy have neglected values. At first glance, this is
surprising, in part, because everyday goal-directed action is guided and motivated by
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values. But ignoring the value of care is especially problematic for answering the
question of how empathy works because agents that empathize accurately with a target
feel motivated to help that target with their concerns. It is an agent’s care or value placed
on the well-being of a target that motivates that agent to help a target of empathy when it
occurs. Furthermore, whether an agent cares for a potential target of empathy influences
whether that agent attempts to empathize with that target. And whether and when an
agent cares for a target is influenced by that agent’s other values, which are differently
operative in different environments. As psychological states then, the value of care and
values generally should feature prominently in any account of empathy that minimally
involves an agent sharing a target’s psychological states.
This is not to say that, once empathy occurs, an agent will in fact help a target. For
example, if an agent sees advertisements for charitable organizations asking for money to
help starving children, that agent may empathize with those children by becoming aware
of their concerns, feel negative emotions, and be motivated to help them. However, that
the agent is motivated at a particular time to help these children does determine whether
the agent will in fact help them. Other considerations (e.g. there being too many to help)
may override this motivation or even eliminate it. Empathy merely requires that the agent
be motivated to help the target at some point.
I distinguish between two types of empathy accounts: matching-accounts and concernaccounts. Then, I argue that care is a necessary component of the end state of empathy
because it is what explains why agents feel motivated to help targets when empathy
occurs. My account is a significant departure from all existing accounts of empathy that
have not considered the roles of care in empathy. Furthermore, existing empathy accounts
do not sufficiently take into consideration values more generally. My care-account fills
this theoretical gap in empathy research. I outline the roles of care in the different
component psychological processes of empathy, and model care in relation to how values
influence when empathy occurs by shaping the motivations that agents have towards
potential targets of empathy. I conclude that my care account provides a more precise
explanation of empathy than other concern accounts and instances of the matching
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account, and that it is better able to predict when empathy will occur. I will now begin by
fixing reference on what I broadly take to be the phenomenon of empathy.

2.2 The phenomenon of empathy
Before I begin, I would like to make small point about imagination in reading and in
empathy. Throughout this paper I will be presenting many examples that will allow me to
fix reference on the phenomenon of empathy. These examples are drawn from my own
experience, but I will intentionally present the persons in these examples using genderneutral terms, and I will not describe their physical appearance. I have not done this so to
sidestep the issue of gender parity in my research (or any other issue). Rather, I have
done so for us to more easily notice the types of informationally-laden imaginations that
we construct when reading. In reading this paper, you might, in a relevant sense, be
attempting to take the perspective of the fictional targets in its examples. Similarly, when
taking the perspective of non-fictional targets, we also construct and fill in certain
information. This information is often based on our own experience and our own values. I
think that presenting my examples in such neutral terms may allow us to further notice
the importance of taking into consideration environmental variables and values in
developing a fuller account of empathy. Now, on to a few examples.
Imagine that a friend tells you that they have recently been fired from a job they found
fulfilling. Upon hearing this, you share their disappointment, their belief that they were
dismissed unjustly, and you feel motivated to help them find a new job. You experience
similar emotions and beliefs as they do, and you are motivated to help them
appropriately. You empathize with your friend. It is also possible to empathize with
someone you have not previously met. Imagine you are taking a leisurely evening walk
around your neighborhood. You see a person sitting against lamppost bearing a cardboard
sign asking for money. You imagine what it would be like for you to be in that person’s
place, you feel somewhat sad, and feel motivated to give them some change. You
empathize with that stranger. It is also possible to empathize with an enemy. By
imagining how an enemy perceives your actions and their effects as being dangerous or
harmful, you can feel motivated either to change your actions or to better describe the
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goals of your actions in order to help an enemy towards increased cooperation. These are
examples that help us to understand what empathy is: becoming aware of someone else’s
concerns, sharing their emotions and beliefs, and feeling motivated to help them with
their concerns. A point I will elaborate upon later is that empathy is often taken to be
synonymous with mindreading. But there is a big difference between the two both in
terms of their psychological processes and their neural instantiation (Singer 2006).
Whereas mindreading involves understanding the behavioural intentions of a target,
empathy invariably involves in some sense sharing a target’s emotional states. While
there is some debate about the neural overlap between the mentalizing system that makes
mindreading possible and the mirror (neuron) system that is often said to be involved in
empathy (Overwalle & Baetens, 2009, p 566), most theorists take the key component
psychological processes of empathy to be emotional contagion, mimicry, perspectivetaking, and motivation.
These component psychological processes of empathy are the focus of accounts that
answer the question: how does empathy operate? The conventional approach is to answer
this question by discussing the mental format of one or more of empathy’s component
processes. Accounts that answer the question in this way include: simulationist, theorytheory, and direct-perception accounts. On “simulationist” accounts for example, the
processes of empathy are realized in mental simulations (Goldman 1992; Gallese and
Goldman 1998; Goldman 2006; de Vignemont and Singer 2006). These simulations are
taken to be perceptual representations that an agent creates when taking the perspective
of a target. Similarly, “theory-theory” accounts answer the question of how empathy
works by arguing that the processes of empathy are realized in mental representations
that are less perceptual and more like a-modal theories (Stich and Nichols 1992; Nichols
2004). Both simulationist and theory-theory accounts espouse a metaphysical theory of
mind according to which perspective-taking in empathy employs mental representations.
Contrary to this view, direct-perceptual accounts of empathy answer the question of how
empathy works without positing such a role for mental representations (Gallagher 2001,
2008; Zahavi 2001, 2008, 2011a, 2011b). On a direct-perception account, an agent has
causally unmediated access to the psychological states of a target. An agent reads the
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psychological states of a target off the target’s behaviour. The target’s states are thus
directly available in the agent’s conscious experience. What is important to note is that all
three of these accounts (simulationist, theory-theory, direct-perceptual) answer the
question of how empathy works by characterizing the mental format of the psychological
processes of empathy.
But the question of how empathy works remains elusive. This is partly because the
various accounts that focus on the mental format of empathy are actually talking about
different phenomena. There is a striking variety of uses of the term ‘empathy’ among
these accounts. And indeed there is no consensus in empathy research about what
empathy is. This inconsistency of usage is impeding progress towards answering the
question of how empathy works. By not clearly specifying what empathy is and focusing
on the mental format of empathy, accounts that agree on the format of empathy turn out
to disagree about what empathy is. With the aim of clarifying what empathy is, in the
next section, I will discuss how four of empathy’s component processes—(1) emotional
contagion; (2) mimicry; (3) perspective-taking; (4) motivation—inform different uses of
the term ‘empathy’.

2.3 Various uses of ‘empathy’
The term ‘empathy’ is applied to many different phenomena (Batson 2009). In this
section I distinguish four phenomena that have been variously emphasized in connection
with different uses of the term. My initial classification here follows from what most
theorists take to be component processes that play important roles in empathy.
Process 1: Emotional Contagion
Emotional contagion is described as an agent involuntarily “catching” the emotions of a
target (Doherty 1997). For example, psychological experiments show that 2-day-old
infants cry when another newborn cries. This seems to be a specific response to the vocal
properties of the other’s cry (Simner 1971; Sagi & Hoffman 1976). Infants reacted in a
more subdued manner to auditory cues of the same intensity that did not resemble human
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crying (Ibid.). These and similar results have been taken to be evidence of a “rudimentary
empathic distress reaction” (Sagi & Hoffman 1976). Sometimes emotional contagion is
referred to as causing “affective empathy” whereby an agent experiences a vicarious
emotional response to the emotions expressed by a target (Knafo et al. 2008 p 3; ZahnWaxler et al. 1992). When ‘empathy’ is used to refer to emotional contagion, an empathic
agent involuntarily matches the emotional state of a target.
Process 2: Mimicry (behavioural and neural)
Imitation of a target, or mimicry, is also sometimes called “empathy” (Bavelas et al.
1996; Hoffman 2000; Darwall 1998). Motor mimicry—which includes mimicking facial
expressions, bodily movements and postures—has been proposed as an empathic
response to a target. Neonates and infants can imitate both facial and manual gestures
(Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1983; Meltzoff 1988), and it has been shown that when adults
are exposed to emotional facial expressions they often spontaneously mimic part of these
facial stimuli (Dimberg et al. 2011). Likewise, adults also often mimic the postures and
behaviours of others (Bavelas et al. 1986). And the feedback internal to an agent resulting
from motor mimicry can initiate and modulate felt emotion (Darwall 1998, p 265; Ekman
1992; Adelmann and Zajonc 1989). Motor mimicry has been taken to be a “major
empathic mechanism” whereby an agent matches the internal state of a target as a
consequence of matching their behaviour (Darwall 1998, p 266). On such accounts,
empathy ends when an agent vicariously experiences the emotional state of a target as a
consequence of voluntarily or involuntarily mimicking the target’s behaviour.
Accordingly, even when an agent mimics a target’s nervous tick, and experiences the
same emotion as that target as a result of this mimicry, then empathy has occurred.
Neural Mimicry is another form of mimicry that has been the focus of explanations of
empathy. Rather than focusing on mimicked motor behaviour (that may result in
matching internal states), Preston & de Waal (2002) have proposed a “unified theory of
empathy” according to which an agent mimics a target’s neural state automatically and
without mediation by behaviour. They argue that when an agent perceives a target, the
agent mimics the target’s neural representations because perception and action rely on the
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same neural circuits. An agent produces an internal state that is partially the same as that
of the target by neurally mimicking the target. Other influential accounts of empathy
focus on another version of neural mimicry (which they call “mirroring”) that involves
mirror neurons (Gallese, Keysers, Rizzolatti 2004; Iacoboni 2008). Mirror neurons fire
both when we perform an action, and when we observe another performing a similar
action. On some uses of ‘empathy’, mirror neurons implement the processes by which we
mimic and understand the internal states of others. It is important to note that there exist
severe criticisms of the conclusions drawn from the empirical investigation of mirror
neurons. For example, Hickok (2009) argues that we should not take mirror neurons to
have semantic properties that would contribute to, if not fully explain, how we
understand the goal of another’s actions. Rather, he suggests that the role of mirror
neurons may be to prime motor vocabulary by neurally instantiating associations between
areas of the brain that respond to perceptual information (e.g. movement or sound) and
areas of the brain that store action patterns (Ibid.). The implication here being that the
language system plays a prominent role in understanding (mindreading) or empathy.11
Similarly, Kilner and Lemon (2013) argue that the role of mirror neurons in contributing
to understanding is at best incomplete. Like Hickok, they are critical of attributing
semantic properties to mirror neurons. They cite evidence that top-down inputs from the
visual systems and memory contribute to the generation of the models for predicting the
sensory input that targets are providing (Ibid.).
Process 3: Perspective taking (like-me and like-other)
The third process which has been the focus of some uses of the term ‘empathy’ is
perspective taking (Stotland 1969; Ickes 1993; Batson 1991; Ruby and Decety 2004). On
this usage, what is important is that the agent imagine or infer what it is like to be in a
target’s place. Two modes of perspective have been distinguished. The first of these is the
imagine-self perspective (Stotland 1969; Batson 1991). In this mode, an agent takes the
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Hickok (2009) presents other criticism along similar lines that mirror neurons should be seen as
facilitating associations between perceptual information and other neural systems that process object
recognition and semantic understanding such as that of the ventral stream of visual processing. He also
points to a variety of dissociations between the mirror system and its purported psychological and
behavioural effects that do not support its specified role.
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perspective of a target by imagining what it would be like for the agent to be in the
target’s position. For example, if I as an agent take the imagine-self perspective of a
target who is asking for money on a public street, I imagine what it would be like if I
were in that target’s situation. I will imagine what it would be like to be in the target’s
situation and compare that situation with my own current situation and past experiences.
This results in my having a felt internal state that is similar to that of the target, and an
awareness of some of the target’s possible concerns.
The second mode of perspective taking is the imagine-other perspective. In this mode,
the agent does not imagine what it would be like as that agent in the target’s situation.
Rather, the agent’s perspective taking is based on an open sensitivity to the target’s
emotional states and on beliefs about the particular target–such as beliefs about the
target’s situation, concerns, and past experiences (Barrett-Lennard 1981). For example,
suppose that I see a man asking for money on the street, and recognize him as someone I
met last week. On that occasion, he and I interacted over the course of a minute or two
and I came to believe that he is a military veteran who served his country in several tours
of duty. This belief then plays a role in my imaginings of what it is like for him (as
opposed to me) to be in his situation. The emphasis in imagine-other perspective taking is
on what the particular target feels and is concerned with, rather than on what the agent
would feel or be concerned with were the agent in the target’s situation.
Process 4: Altruistic motivation
Some uses of ‘empathy’ take empathy to include an agent’s motivation to help a target
(Hoffman 1975; Batson 1991; Sober and Wilson 1998). For example, Batson’s (1987,
1991) conception of empathy includes the production of what he calls altruistic
motivation (Ibid.). His experiments show that when an agent empathizes with a target in
distress, the agent will be motivated to help the target. He contrasts his use of the term
‘empathy’ with “personal distress”. When an agent feels personal distress at witnessing
the suffering of a target, an agent may choose to help the target as a way of relieving their
own distress. Often, however, an agent will choose instead to relieve their own distress in
a way that does not involve helping the target. Batson calls this “egoistic motivation”.
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Thus, on his use of the term, empathy includes an altruistic motivation that leads an agent
to help a target in distress.
Hoffman (1975) also uses ‘empathy’ in a way that includes an altruistic motivational
component. He cites the example (among others) of a child seeing another child with a
cut finger. He argues that when the child “takes the role” or perspective of another child
in pain, the former may experience “empathic distress” (Hoffman 1975, p 613). The
agent then attributes this feeling of distress to the target. Consequently, the agent will be
motivated to help the target (p 615). Like Batson, Hoffman also distinguishes between
this form of altruistic motivation and more directly egoistic motivation (p 617). The
tendency to altruistically help others in distress as a result of taking their perspective is
central to Hoffman’s account of empathy.
Some conceptions of empathy involve just one of these four processes. Others involve
several of them. Take one of the reference fixing examples I presented at the outset:
empathizing with a friend who recently lost their job. At least two of the component
processes of empathy are involved. When my friend tells me about being dismissed, I
may take their perspective by imagining how I would feel about losing my job and think
about whether how I was treated fairly (perspective taking). I may also feel motivated to
look for new employment in the same field or feel motivated to concentrate my efforts on
finding different employment (motivation). The other component processes of empathy
could also be involved. When my friend comes to me with the news of their dismissal, I
may perceive what I take to be an expression of sadness on their face and vicariously feel
sad myself (emotional contagion). Doing so, I may slouch in my chair, thus adopting a
similar posture as my friend (behavioural mimicry). But the question arises, what counts
as accurate (or successful) empathy in in this example? Is it that at least one of empathy’s
component processes is active? Or must more than one process be active for accurate
empathy to occur? Having raised the question of what counts as accurate empathy, we
can begin to see that answering the question of “how empathy works” by discussing only
the nature (or format) of psychological processes will not suffice. The question is indeed
premature because the question of what empathy is has not been sufficiently established.
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We can better understand what empathy is by distinguishing between two types of
empathy accounts: matching accounts and concern accounts. Each of these account types
employs distinct criteria of empathic accuracy—the criteria for an empathizer to “get it
right”. Empathic accuracy is the result of empathizing; it is the end state of empathy.
Accordingly, each account type’s conception of what empathy is varies according to its
criteria of empathic accuracy. I will now go on to describe this relationship between what
empathy is and empathic accuracy.

2.4 The relationship between what empathy is and
empathic accuracy
Empathy accounts differ in what they take empathy to be. And this affects when they take
empathy to occur. Generally, when a person experiences empathy the process can be
divided into three parts: 1) the moment it gets started; 2) the activity of processes that
instantiate it; and 3) the moment it stops. Each account type of empathy differs with
regard to the criteria that specify when empathy stops. And the output or state of an agent
at that moment can be evaluated in terms of whether accurate or inaccurate empathy has
occurred. These criteria for when empathy stops and an agent is truly empathizing (when
an agent “gets it right”) are criteria of empathic accuracy. There is a long tradition of
explicit discussion of theories of empathic accuracy in the context of professional
counselling and therapy (Fiedler 1950; Rogers 1957; Ickes et al. 1997). In this context,
psychologists and psychiatrists have developed many empathic accuracy scales for
measuring a therapist’ (or counselor’s) empathic accuracy when interacting with a client,
and other empathic accuracy scales for various measurements such as “closeness”
between married couples (Feldstein and Gladstein 1980; Ickes et al. 1997). It is important
to note that all accounts of empathy have a theory of empathic accuracy (although it is
often left implicit).
There is a significant conceptual problem in understanding the relationship between what
empathy is and when accurate empathy occurs. The problem is that there is no principled
relationship between which process an account focuses on and its theory of empathic
accuracy. For example, an account may focus on neural mimicry as the main process of
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empathy, and its theory of empathic accuracy may specify that an agent empathizes
accurately with a target when the agent matches the target’s internal state. Alternatively,
an account may focus on perspective taking, and its theory of empathic accuracy may
specify that an agent accurately empathizes with a target when the agent becomes aware
of the target’s needs or concerns. This problem is compounded when we notice that even
accounts of empathy that focus on the same processes (e.g. perspective taking) can have
different criteria of empathic accuracy. Any two accounts of empathy may focus on the
same psychological processes of empathy but differ in terms of when those processes end
and provide an end state to be evaluated in terms of accuracy. To take another example,
Ickes’s account of empathy focuses on perspective taking (Ickes 1993). And his theory of
empathic accuracy states that empathy occurs when an agent accurately infers “the
specific content of another’s person’s thoughts and feelings.” (Ickes 1993, p 591) On
Ickes’s account, the criterion for accurate empathy is that the agent has knowledge of the
target’s thoughts and feelings (Ickes 1993, p 590-591). Compare this to Batson’s account
of empathy which also focuses on perspective taking. His theory of empathic accuracy
requires that an agent experience an emotional state that is similar to that of the target.12
The relationship between which processes an account empathy focuses on and its criteria
for evaluating when accurate empathy occurs is problematically arbitrary because
theorists have not agreed on what empathy is.
While some researchers have begun to discuss the conceptual difficulty resulting from the
various uses of the term ‘empathy’ (and their associated theories of empathic accuracy)
(Batson 2009), most seem to regard this divergent usage as merely terminological, and
therefore unimportant. But indeed this variation is in fact of great importance because an
account’s theory of empathic accuracy will have consequences for what it counts as
empathy. The question of how empathy works is premature because the question of what
empathy is has not been satisfactorily answered (as is apparent in the diverse ways that
empathic accuracy is used). As mentioned, I organize accounts of empathy into two types
(matching accounts and concern accounts) according to their criteria of empathic

I will describe Batson’s account in more details after having presented my two-fold distinction between
types of empathy accounts.
12
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accuracy. Rather than attempting to identify what empathy is according to the different
component processes that instantiate it, I tether what empathy is to two sets of criteria for
what counts as accurate empathy. This allows me to consistently identify what empathy is
across research that focuses mostly on its component processes. This way of specifying
what empathy is will in turn allow me to return to the component psychological processes
posited in different accounts and examine how they operate in relation to what counts as
accurate empathy.
It may seem strange to speak of empathy in terms of a process with parts or stages
because many philosophical analyses of phenomena take the form of specifying the
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for them to occur. But this shall
not be the form of my analysis of empathy. I do not think that only providing a list of the
conditions that specify when empathy occurs is the best way to understand it. My goal is
not to provide a conceptual analysis of empathy whereby one uncovers the conception of
empathy that all researchers share. Nor is it to provide a definition of empathy that will
mitigate the inconsistent uses of the term. Researchers that provide an account of
empathy do use the term consistently. Rather, my goal is to provide an analysis of
empathy as a process and subsequently an account of empathy that takes into
consideration certain neglected aspects of it such as values, environmental contexts, and
motivations. I believe that analyzing empathy as a process will help us to better
understand it by making explicit the causal connections between the antecedents and the
effects of the psychological states it involves. If we only specify empathy as state, like
Ickes (1993), whereby an agent infers “the specific content of another’s person’s thoughts
and feelings”, this does not tell us what causes an agent to attempt such an inference
(Ickes p 591). Hence, it does not tell us when empathy starts. Similarly it does not tell us
about the possible effects of empathy beyond the purported inference because there is no
way of telling immediately when such an inference has occurred. But if we treat empathy
as a process, we can better account for when it occurs and better explain the relationship
between its causes and its effects. Let us take sex between humans as an analogical
example. Sex can be treated as either a state with necessary and sufficient conditions or it
can be treated as a process with a beginning, middle, and end. On the former analysis, we
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may say for the state sex to occur it is sufficient that a penis is inserted into a vagina. On
the latter analysis, we may say sex is the process of inserting a penis into a vagina. This
analysis has certain advantages. We can take sex to be a goal-directed activity; we can
explain it in terms of antecedent sexual arousal which often continues during the process
of sex; and we understand the connection between its ending and its effects such as
pregnancy. This is not the say that this is impossible when analyzing sex as a state. But
merely specifying the conditions for the occurrence of state does not make explicit the
relationship between the antecedent states that may be important components of the state
or the relationship between its occurrence and its effects.
There are vast metaphysical assumptions that come with one’s choice of analyzing a
given phenomenon as either a state or a process.13 But in the case of empathy as a
construct, I believe that its use in scientific contexts (e.g. in empathy tests), lends some
credence to treating it as a goal-directed process. Further, doing so will allow us to
account for the causal connections that explain why an agent attempts to empathize with
a target, and it will allow us to better predict when an agent is more or less likely to
attempt to empathize with a target. Also, treating empathy as a process will be conducive
to an evolutionary explanation that takes these explanatory and predictive goals into
account. In my third paper, I show how understanding the causal connections between the
psychological states involved in the process of empathy as it occurs in various
environmental contexts allows us to better explain how it evolved.

2.5 Two types of empathy accounts
Most empathy researchers understand what empathy is by reference to the activity of the
psychological processes it involves. As we have seen this leaves open the problematic
possibility that even if two accounts are referring to the same processes, they may have
different criteria of empathic accuracy. Rather than classifying accounts according to the
processes they involve, I classify them according to their theory of empathic accuracy.
That is, by the theory of when the process of empathizing has ended successfully. This
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See debates about process metaphysics and substance metaphysics.
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allows me to differently sort accounts of empathy by what they take empathy to be. A
possible worry at this point may be that one must know what empathy is before knowing
what makes empathy accurate. But in my view, knowing what empathy is and knowing
what makes empathy accurate come together. That is, they inform each other.
Accordingly, I think it will be informative to treat empathy as a process and investigate
its accuracy conditions in an attempt to better understand both what it is and its accuracy
conditions. My choice of proceeding by investigating empathy’s accuracy conditions is,
in part, determined by what many researchers have said about the effects of empathy.
Namely, that when empathy occurs, helping behaviour that is altruistically motivated
often ensues. My investigation of empathy’s accuracy conditions is an avenue into
identifying what empathy is across differing accounts of the psychological processes it
involves in virtue of the causal connections that my analysis reveals between the end state
of empathy (empathic accuracy) and the activity of these processes.

2.5.1

Matching accounts

The main criterion of empathic accuracy on matching accounts is that there be a match
between the internal state of an agent and the internal state of a target. There are two
matching relations that matching accounts make use of. The first of these is an exact
match between the thoughts and feelings of a target, and the “inference” or
representation that an agent has about the target’s thoughts and feelings.
Matching relation A: An agent infers (or represents) the content of a target’s
experience.
Mentioned above, Ickes’s (1993) account is a token of a matching account. The relevant
match on this account is between an agent’s represented inference and a target’s
experience. The procedures he and his colleagues have developed to assess empathic
accuracy is called the “dyadic interaction paradigm” (Ickes et al., 1986; Ickes et al.,
1990a, 1990b; Ickes and Stinson, 1992). It involves two participants interacting for five
minutes while unknowingly being videotaped. The participants are then informed that
they were being videotaped and are then separated. Once separated, the participants are
asked to watch the video of their interaction and to provide a written record of (a) their
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own thoughts and feelings during the interaction, and (b) what they believe their
interaction partner was thinking and feeling during the interaction. On the first viewing,
the participants are instructed to pause the video at each point at which they remember
having a specific thought or feeling. They are then asked to watch the video a second
time and report what they believed their partner was thinking and feeling at each point
that the video was paused during the first viewing. The video is then watched a third
time, and each participant is asked to report on the thoughts and feelings of their
interaction partner at every time the video was paused during the first and second
viewing. Ickes’s account is a matching account because empathic accuracy occurs when
there is an exact match between what an agent represents a target’s experiences to be and
that target’s actual experience.
Jesse Prinz also argues in favour of a matching account of empathy. On Prinz’s account,
accurate empathy occurs when an agent’s felt emotional state matches the felt emotional
state of a target.
Matching relation B: An agent has the same experiences those of a target.
Prinz’s is a matching account because the primary criterion of accurate empathy is that of
emotional experience matching between agent and target. As he puts it: “In empathy, we
feel the same emotion that someone else is feeling; we put ourselves in another person’s
shoes.” (Prinz, 2007, p 82) He states that empathic responses can be measured by
comparing the brain activation associated with the felt emotions of agents and targets
(Ibid.). The matching relation on Prinz’s account is different from that of Ickes. For
Ickes, accurate empathy occurs when an agent’s representations match the experienced
states of a target. For example, if an agent accurately assesses that a target is sad, then
that counts as accurate empathy even if the agent is gleeful about it. Whereas for Prinz,
accurate empathy occurs when an agent experiences emotional states that are the same as
(or match) those of a target’s emotional states (Prinz 2011a; Prinz 2011b).
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2.5.2

Valence

The concept of valence is important to the second type of empathy account (concern
accounts). For this reason, I will describe it here before proceeding. Imagine a longtime
salesperson in a large downtown retail store who has been working towards being
promoted to manager of the store for several years. One day, this person is informed that
the current store manager will be retiring next month and that they will likely be offered
the position. Getting the new job would mean a substantial increase in pay and additional
health benefits. A month goes by. But then the employee is informed that due to a
downturn in sales projections, a new manager with more experience and an educational
background in marketing will be hired instead.
We can easily imagine a significant difference between the emotions of the agent before
and after being informed that they would not be getting the job. The emotional
experiences that the employee has after being informed that the position is opening up
and prior to being informed that they will not be offered the position are likely positive.
After being informed that they will not be getting the job the employee’s emotional
experiences are likely negative. The distinction between positive and negative emotional
experience is called affect valence (Charland 2005a; Colombetti 2005).
As applied to emotional experiences, affect valence refers to the agent’s evaluative
appraisal of an experience (Lazarus, 1991). On a subtly different use of the term,
emotions themselves are taken to be either positive or negative (Prinz, 2004). For
example, Prinz claims that some emotions, like anger, are ‘negative’ emotions. When the
concept of valence is applied to an emotion in the abstract, rather than to the subjective
evaluation of a particular felt experience by an agent, this is called emotion valence. It is
important to note that affect valence and emotion valence are distinct because some
emotion theorists believe that certain emotions are intrinsically valenced (Prinz 2004);
whereas other theorists believe that the same emotion, say sadness, can be evaluated as
having a different valence at different times (Charland 2005b).14 For present purposes, I
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In the next paper I discuss the issue of intrinsic valence in relation to the role of unconscious emotions in
accounts of empathy.
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will take ‘valence’ to mean ‘affect valence’ (the valence of a felt emotional experience).
Valence plays an important role on some accounts of empathy; what I call concern
accounts. Let us now proceed to this second account type.

2.5.3

Concern accounts

The second type of empathy account is the concern account (Batson 1987, 1991;
Hoffman 1975, 2000). What concern accounts and matching accounts have in common is
that matching is a criterion for empathic accuracy. For example, on Batson’s account
accurate empathy requires that the valence of an agent’s emotional experience be
“congruent” with the valence of a target’s emotional experience (Batson 1991). By
‘congruence’, Batson does not mean that the content of an agent’s emotional state be the
same as that of a target’s. For example, when an agent empathizes with a target, the agent
may feel sad and the target may feel frustrated. Rather, what the agent must match is the
valence of the target’s emotional state–the agent must experience a negatively valenced
emotional state when a target is experiencing a negatively valenced emotional state (and
likewise for positive valence).
Matching relation C: The valences of the agent’s experience match the valences
of the target’s experience.
But although matching is a criterion of empathic accuracy on both types of accounts,
matching is not the main criterion on concern accounts.
On concern accounts, empathy is not just a matter of matching (Batson 1991; Hoffman
2000). Concern accounts add two criteria of empathic accuracy other than matching. The
first of these is that an agent must become aware of the needs or concerns of a target. To
achieve such awareness, the agent must have the ability to recognize that the target is an
animate organism that is distinct from itself, other animate organisms, and inanimate
organisms (Hoffman 1975, 2000). Then by taking the perspective of a target, the agent
may come to have an awareness of the target’s concerns. On concern accounts, this is
when empathy starts. And an accurate awareness of a target’s needs is a main criterion
for assessing when accurate empathy has occurred.
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The second additional criterion for empathic accuracy on concern accounts is that an
agent must feel motivated to help a target with their concerns. This motivational
component of empathy is supposed to be caused by the agent having matched the
emotional valences of a target’s internal states. An agent must select a target, take their
perspective, and become aware of the target’s concerns. This awareness of the target’s
concerns can result in the agent having an emotional response whose valence matches
that of a target. Alternatively, the valence match between an agent and target can occur
via processes that are less voluntarily controlled than perspective taking, such as
emotional contagion. But regardless of the process by which an agent comes to have an
experience whose valence matches that of a target, once the agent has such an experience,
the agent must also feel motivated to help the target with their concerns (Hoffman 1981,
p 51). And these concerns may be associated with either positively or negatively valenced
emotional states. For example, a target may have just won a race and is expressing
positively valenced joy. On a concern account, it is not sufficient that the agent
vicariously experience the target’s joy for accurate empathy to occur. The agent must
experience joy or some other positively congruent emotional feeling such as pride. But it
is also necessary that the agent become aware of the target’s concern(s). An example of a
target’s concern in such a situation may be that others express recognition of how
difficult it was to win the race. Thus, for accurate empathy to occur on a concern account,
the agent must be aware of this concern for others to express recognition, and the agent
must feel motivated to recognize the winning racer’s achievement. It is important to note
that behaviour directed at helping a target with their concern does not need to occur for
accurate empathy on concern accounts. The agent must feel motivated to help, but does
not need to act on this motivation. Helping behaviour may be suppressed. Or once
motivated to help the target with their concern, the agent may be distracted or decide to
engage in some other activity. However, the two main criteria for accurate empathy that
concern accounts add are that an agent must first become aware of a target’s concerns,
and second, feel at least momentarily motivated to help that target.
To recap, concern accounts and matching accounts of empathy both specify that an
important criterion for accurate empathy is that agents must (in some sense) match the
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internal state of a target. On matching accounts this takes the form of an agent matching
the experience of a target, or of an agent having matching representations about the
target’s experience. On concern accounts, the matching relation between agent and target
is one of valence. For empathy to occur, an agent does not need to match the exact
content of a target’s emotional experience. But the agent must have an emotional
experience that matches a target’s experience in terms of its valence (either positive or
negative). What differentiates matching accounts from concern accounts then is that the
latter introduce two additional criteria for empathic accuracy: 1) that an agent have an
experiential awareness (based on the target’s emotional state valences) of the concerns of
a target; and 2) that an agent feels motivated to help the target with those concerns.

2.6 Empathy as a motive
Many theorists unequivocally take empathy to motivate helping behaviour (Batson 1991;
Sober and Wilson 1998; Hoffman 2000; Preston and de Waal 2002; Decety and Jackson
2004; Slovic 2007). This is especially true of those who put the concept of empathy to
practical use, such as evaluating the relationship between therapists and patients
(Dymond 1948; Fiedler 1950; Hall and Bernieri 2001). And the motivational contribution
of empathy has been observed in everyday cooperative social life (Main 1979; Sawin
1979). Feeling empathy for a target motivates an agent to help that target with their
concerns such as relieving their suffering or recognizing their achievements.
Additionally, compelling evidence that empathy motivates helping behaviour is found in
the behaviour of people who have difficulty empathizing with targets, such as people who
meet psychopathic or sociopathic criteria. People meeting those criteria are capable of
reasoning, making predictions about their own and others’ behaviour, understanding
principled norms, and experiencing emotions; indeed they often appear to be quite
socially adept. But they either suppress their empathic motivation or lack the capacity for
empathy altogether. It is their lack of empathic development that that explains their
frequent disregard for the well-being of others (Anderson et al. 1999; Damasio 1994;
Blair 1995, 2004, 2007). Concern accounts of empathy incorporate the motivational
component of empathy better than matching accounts. But neither account type
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sufficiently accounts for how values interact with other components of empathy to
significantly affect how empathy motivates helping behaviour. Before addressing this
issue, I will discuss how matching accounts and concern accounts treat empathy as a
motive.
Matching accounts downplay empathy’s motivational component. Rather, their focus is
on the accuracy of the match between the internal state of an agent and that of a target.
They do not discuss the motivational states involved in such matching. For example, an
agent may need to be in a certain motivational state in order to take a target’s perspective.
Another example of how motivational states influence empathy is when an agent
experiences a motivation to switch between modes of perspective taking (like-me
perspective taking to like-other perspective taking) after matching has occurred. In later
sections, I will expand on the roles of motivational states in empathy. For now, I am
merely pointing out that matching accounts do not model an agent’s motivation to help a
target with their concerns while empathic matching is occurring. Matching accounts
emphasize the matching relationship between agent and target rather than the
motivational component of empathy that often leads to continued accurate empathy and
helping behaviour.
On the other hand, concern accounts of empathy better explain the motivational
component of empathy. Concern accounts tend to focus on the agent’s awareness of a
target’s concerns. In doing so, they model how an agent achieves this awareness, and the
relationship between empathy and helping behaviour. For example, Batson and his
colleagues have performed many and various experiments demonstrating the factors that
influence when an agent empathizes with a target and subsequently helps that target
(Batson 1987, 1991; Batson and Shaw 1991; Batson et al. 1997; Batson et al. 2007). The
overarching research goal of these experiments is to determine whether an agent is
helping a target as a consequence of egoistic motivation or altruistic motivation. To this
end Batson et al. isolate and manipulate variables that affect the relationship between
empathy and helping behaviour such as:
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i)

Different modes of perspective taking

ii)

Facial expressions

iii)

Perceived similarity to a target

iv)

Options for an agent to reduce their own distress at the perception of a target
in need rather than helping that target

v)

Punishment administered to an agent for not helping (e.g. negative social
evaluation, negative self-evaluation)

vi)

Reward administered to an agent for helping

vii)

Having a “mood-enhancing” experience as a result of helping 15

What Batson et al.’s experiments show is that there is a strong correlation between an
agent empathizing with a target and an agent subsequently helping that target from
altruistic motivations rather than egoistic motivations–that is, rather than being motivated
to help for the advantages or disadvantages that are expected to result from helping or not
helping. Including motivations as a component of empathy is very important. Let us
return to an example above of a potential target of empathy winning a race and feeling
pleasure. An agent might infer that the target who just won the race is elated (positive
valence) and might, via perspective-taking, feel delighted (delighted). But the agent may
not necessarily feel motivated to help that target. Although the agent and the target share
the relevant emotional experience, the agent may in fact be matching the target with the
intent of causing the target harm by reporting them for the use of disqualifying
substances. We would not want to say that the agent in this case is accurately
empathizing with the target precisely because the agent feels motivated to harm rather
than help the target. Being able to distinguish between such cases is a very important
reason for including the motivational component in an account of empathy.
But although concern accounts of empathy incorporate the motivational component of
empathy better than matching accounts, neither account type specifies the role of values
that affect this motivational component. In the next section, I will argue that the value an
agent places on the well-being of target affects empathy in four different ways. I call this
For a detailed summary of Batson et al.’s experiments on the relationship between empathy and altruistic
helping behaviour, see Batson 1991, Part III.
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value care. I will show that current accounts overlook the many roles of care in empathy.
Considering the roles of care, as a value, in empathy opens up a space for presenting my
care account. And in the remainder of the chapter, I will develop a sketch of my care
account of empathy by connecting the role of care to that of values more broadly, and
their influence on other components of empathy (such as goals and motivations) that
existing accounts have neglected.

2.7 Care in empathy
In this section I will show that care—the value that an agent places on the well-being of a
target—plays a central role in empathy. First, it should be noted that the term ‘value’ is
used in several ways. In this section I will be using ‘value’ in reference to a value that an
agent holds. I take value, on this usage, to be a subjective state of an individual agent.
The agent “values” the well-being of a target. I will not be characterizing this value as
being derived from a theory specifying when one target is objectively more valuable than
another. Rather, the value that an agent assigns to the well-being of a target is a personal
state of an agent that is derived from that agent’s experience (or development) and is
dependent on the agent’s social context for its realization. Later, I will present and argue
in favour a new account I call the care account of empathy. I will show how the value
assigned to the well-being of a target, or care that an agent has for a target, varies
according to which component processes of empathy are active. I will also show how
care for a target varies according to specific motivational and social variables that
importantly affect when empathy gets started, how it occurs, and under what conditions it
is taken to be accurate. This will have significant implications for our understanding of
what empathy is, and in turn, how it works.
The value that an agent assigns to the well-being of a target is what I call care. My notion
of care as a value finds some support in the work of philosophers that are interested in
what makes people able to achieve and maintain a state of care for a target. For example,
Noddings (2003) states that care is a “capacity for interpersonal attention.” (Noddings
2003, p 19) Her focus is on characterizing the practice of care and on arguing for why it
is important. Similarly, Gilligan (1993) discusses the differences between men’s and
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woman’s psychological and social development of an “ability to care.” (Gilligan 1993, p
17) Like Noddings, Gilligan focuses on the expression of care. She argues that woman
have historically taken on more caring roles than men, and that this contributes to the
perpetuation of norms that contribute to specifying contemporary genders. I agree with
Gilligan and Noddings that it is important to examine the development and expression of
our capacity to care, especially when it is mediated by empathy. Agents who care for the
well-being of targets have the capacity to do so, and express care in empathy. But for the
purposes of this paper, I will not be focusing on the historical or evolutionary reasons
why agents come to care about targets. Rather, I treat care as a value in order to
investigate it as part of the broader set of values that agents have. Doing so allows me to
describe the roles of care in empathy while clarifying its relationship to other values.
One of care’s roles in empathy is that of valuing the well-being of a target which
contributes to empathy “getting started”. Along these lines, Batson has recently argued
that “valuing the other’s welfare” is a “key antecedent” to becoming aware of a target’s
concerns (Batson 2011, p 41). Here Batson means that care, as a “key antecedent”,
regularly causes some of empathy’s component psychological processes to occur (e.g.
perspective-taking). In the sections immediately below, I will be examining in detail the
connection between care and empathy’s psychological processes. Another of care’s roles
in empathy is that once the process of empathy is started it can cause care–it can cause an
agent to value the well-being of a target.16 This in turn could lead to further empathizing
or more accurate empathy. I shall address these two roles in turn. In later sections I will
describe how other values that both agents and targets have can also affect when empathy
gets started and empathic accuracy.

2.8 The causal roles of care
The central claim of the care account of empathy that I will present is that an agent’s care
for a target is an individual value that is constitutive of empathy’s end state. When an
agent accurately empathizes with a target, that agent cares for the well-being of the target.
This is indicated by an agent’s motivation to help a target when empathy occurs. In other
16

In this role care is a consequence of empathy rather than a cause.
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words, the care in empathy explains why an agent feels motivated to help a target.
Concern accounts are better poised to integrate the role of care in empathy than are
matching accounts. Existing concern accounts suggest that care is involved by including
a motivational component in their understanding of what empathy is (Stotland 1969;
Hoffman 1990; Batson 2011). But the status of care and its roles in empathy have not
been clarified.
I will describe four roles of care in empathy:
1) Care: before involuntary perspective-taking
2) Care: after involuntary perspective-taking
3) Care: before voluntary perspective-taking
4) Care: after voluntary perspective-taking
Then I will argue that in all of these instances, care for the well-being of a target must be
present at the end state of empathy. Hence, that care is constitutive of empathy.

2.8.1

Care: before involuntary perspective-taking

Some empathy researchers claim that there are “two routes”, internal to an agent, which
lead to empathy: the involuntary and the voluntary.17 This is a claim that I find well
empirically supported, and that I agree with. Empathy can result from processes that are
initiated involuntarily. On this involuntary route to empathy, care for the well-being of a
target can be prior to the component processes of empathy becoming active.
When an agent perceives a target, psychological processes that may be activated
involuntarily include emotional contagion, motor mimicry, and neural mimicry. Via the
involuntary activation of these processes, an agent takes at least part of the perspective of
a target. For example, the agent may experience an emotion that is exactly the same as
that of the target; or the agent may experience an emotion that is congruently valenced
with that of the target; or the agent may come to some awareness of the target’s concerns

17
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and so on. But it is important to note that these involuntarily processes leading to
perspective taking are not always activated upon the perception of all targets. When an
agent perceives a target that the agent at least minimally cares for, some combination of
emotional contagion, motor mimicry, or neural mimicry may occur. And fortunately,
most people have at least a minimum of care for the well-being of targets that they know
and like, and even targets that they have never met before. Accordingly, on the
involuntary route to empathy, care is often a precondition for empathy to occur. Care can
be an antecedent to perspective-taking that facilitates its activation.
This is not to say that care is a sufficient condition for empathy to get started before
involuntary perspective taking. Although an agent may minimally care for a potential
target of empathy, an agent may have difficulties with the involuntary activation of the
component processes (e.g. neural mimicry) leading to perspective taking. As mentioned,
persons meeting the criteria for sociopathy or psychopathy frequently disregard the
concerns of targets. This may be the result of problems with the activation of involuntary
empathic processes. This does not imply that such people do not necessarily care about a
target. Even though they may care for a target, they may simply not be able to
involuntarily take that target’s perspective.

2.8.2

Care: after involuntary perspective-taking

Care also plays a role in empathy after involuntary perspective-taking has occurred.
Independent of an agent having a disposition to care for a potential target of empathy,
when involuntary processes lead to perspective taking, care for that target can ensue.
Once an agent has taken the perspective of a target via the involuntary route to empathy,
the agent may become aware of (some of) that target’s concerns, and experience an
emotional state that is congruently valenced with that of the target. When accurate
empathy occurs, this perspective-taking will in turn motivate the agent to help the target
with their concerns. That empathy motivates helping behaviour indicates that empathy
can contribute to an agent valuing the well-being of a target. However, as Batson’s
experiments show, that an agent feels motivated to help a target (or even exhibits helping
behaviour) does not necessarily imply that the agent is motivated by empathic
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perspective-taking at all (or alone). There are many routes to helping behaviour that do
not involve empathy. I will soon describe some of these routes in the section on care as
subsequent to voluntary perspective taking. For now, suffice it to say that involuntary
perspective taking can lead to care (as evinced by an agent’s motivation to help a target
with their concerns).

2.8.3

Care: before voluntary perspective-taking

That an agent care for a target is not required for voluntary perspective taking. I will
discuss the notion of voluntary perspective-taking in detail in subsequent sections. A
distinction between two types of perspective-taking significantly informs current debates
and impacts experimental designs in empathy research. For present purposes, we can
understand voluntary perspective-taking as an act that an agent performs whereby an
agent imagines how a target’s situation is affecting that target, and what that target’s
concerns are with regard to their well-being and the ongoing development of that
situation (for better or worse). An agent can voluntarily take the perspective of a target
without first caring for that target. And often in empathy experiments, agents are
instructed to take the perspective of targets that they do not already care for (Stotland
1969; Batson 1991; Ickes 1993). However, if an agent cares for a target, that agent is
more likely to take the target’s perspective. Contrarily, an agent who places no value on
the well-being of a target is not likely to imagine what it is like to be in a target’s
situation and how they are affected by it. Similarly, an agent who places value on
harming a target is likely to experience incongruent emotional states to that of the
perceived target in need.18 For example, a salesperson may experience joy upon hearing
that a competitor has not secured a potentially lucrative contract.19 Or an agent may
dispassionately understand a target’s concerns without experiencing a congruent
emotional state or feeling motivated to help (Batson 2011, p 41). However, when an
agent cares for a target, this contributes to the likelihood of that agent taking the target’s
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Unless the agent is attempting to deceive the target as in the example of the race winner above.
I will discuss the relationship between various “motivational orientations” (e.g. competition) and values
in empathy later in the paper.
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perspective and in turn empathizing with that target. Care for a target is not required for
an agent to start empathizing with a target, but it helps.

2.8.4

Care: after voluntary perspective-taking

As a result of perspective-taking an agent can come to care for a target, even if the agent
did not care for the target prior to perspective taking. Even if at first an agent does not
care for a target, once an agent has taken the perspective of a target, the agent may
become aware of a target’s concerns, and feel motivated to help the target with those
concerns. Here again, that empathizing motivates an agent to help a target provides some
reason to believe that the agent cares for the target.
This claim is empirically supported by the results of perspective taking experiments.
Mentioned above, Batson et al.’s experiments isolate many of the factors that contribute
to an agent being egoistically motivated (as opposed to altruistically motivated) to help a
target. What their experimental manipulations show is that, when empathy occurs, an
agent is primarily motivated by an awareness of the target’s concerns as opposed to being
primarily motivated by other factors such as perceived similarity, reward, punishment
and so on. While these latter factors may exert influence on an agent’s motivation to help
a target, I think Batson et al.’s results also show that care and perspective-taking often
contribute to an agent’s motivation to help. As mentioned, Batson has recently argued
that an agent needs to care about whether a target has concerns and about how those
concerns affect the target (Batson 2011, p 41). Furthermore, several additional studies
show that by age 3-5, children recognize the feelings of others (Borke 1971; Feshbach
and Roe 1968). In one of these studies, children aged 3-8 years old were shown drawings
of faces taken to represent happy, sad, afraid, and angry emotional states and asked to
identify them as such (Borke 1971, p 264). If a child had difficulty identifying them
correctly, the examiner identified the emotion for them. The children were then told
stories in which another child would likely experience one of these emotions (e.g. losing
a toy; getting lost in the woods at night). The stories were accompanied by a picture of a
child with a blank face engaged in the described activity. Each participant child was then
asked to select the face that best showed how the child in the story and associated picture
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felt. In this same study, children were then shown eight additional stories in which they
were described as behaving toward another child in ways that might make that other child
happy, sad or angry (e.g. pushing the other child off a bike, sharing candy). In this second
task, each child was asked to point to the face (happy, sad, or angry) that best indicated
how the other child felt in the situation described. The results showed that approximately
88% of children were able to associate the appropriate face to the picture in the first task
by age 5. The results were similar on the second task when the child had to identify the
emotional state of a target they were interacting with. The children’s ability to recognize
the feelings of others increased with age. And, when agents do so, they often report both
feeling emotions that are congruent with that of targets and being motivated to respond
with helping behaviour.20
There are many variables (e.g. potential reward or punishment) that influence whether an
agent’s perspective-taking results in a motivation to help a target with their concerns.
Helping behaviour often occurs in situations where several incentives have influenced an
agent’s motivation to help a target. However, the value that an agent assigns to the wellbeing of a target is often that agent’s primary motivation to help. When care accompanies
perspective-taking, empathy can occur.

2.9 On the separation of care and empathy
I have outlined roles that care plays in influencing when empathy gets started and how
care in empathy motivates helping behaviour. In the next section I will make the stronger
claim that care is constitutive of empathy. I will do so by examining whether the
component psychological processes of empathy typically involve care or require care for
their activation. But first, I will address a possible objection to my claim that integrating
the role of care into an account of empathy is important. Specifically, I will address
Prinz’s (2011a; 2011b) claim that care and empathy should be analyzed or treated
separately.

20
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I have used “care” to refer to the value that an agent assigns to the well-being of a
target.21 It is important to note that an agent can care for a target without empathizing
with that target at all. As shown above, an agent can care for a target prior to taking that
target’s perspective. Or an agent can assign value to the well-being of a target according
to more abstract principles that the agent takes to be contextually appropriate. Care can
occur independently of empathy. For example, a potential target may not care for their
own well-being and feel sad about this, but an agent can still assign value to the wellbeing of this target without taking that the target’s perspective. But although it is possible
to care for a target in this way, I have argued that care for a target can (and often does)
result from perspective-taking. For example, a target who has recently lost their job may
be concerned about their well-being and be concerned about finding a new job. An agent
can come to care for this target by taking that target’s perspective, sharing their emotional
states, and feeling motivated to help them with their concerns. Similarly I will argue that
care for a target can occur as result of perspective-taking even when the target does not
care for themselves. For now, suffice it to say that these examples begin to suggest that
care may play an important role in empathy.
Contrary to this, Jesse Prinz notably maintains that care and empathy should be treated as
separate phenomena in all cases (Prinz 2011a, 2011b). Prinz’s claim has both ontological
and methodological implications. To assess it, we must first understand his distinction
between care and empathy. For Prinz care is “worrying about [a target’s] welfare” (Prinz,
2011a, p 211). He goes on to say that it is something one can do “even if one doesn’t feel
what it would be like to be in [the target’s] place.” (Ibid.) It is important to note here to
for Prinz, concern (as opposed to my notion of care) is characterized by the emotion of
worry, and that it occurs independently from an agent taking a target’s subjective
perspective. That is, being concerned for a target is a phenomenon that occurs from a
third-person perspective (we may call this abstract care), separate from empathy. Recall
that empathy for Prinz involves an agent matching in experience the psychological states
of a target. It is a first-person response. Accordingly, Prinz thinks that it should be treated
separately from concern (a third-person response). Prinz and I agree that care is a value
21
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that an agent assigns to the well-being of a target. But he also thinks that care does not
result from emotional matching between an agent and a target. That is, care does not
result from empathy. Prinz provides two reasons in support of treating care and empathy
separately.
Prinz uses the words “care” and “concern” interchangeably. In both cases it is the agent
that is caring for (or is concerned for) a target. For simplicity, I will refer to this as
“Prinz’s notion of concern” in order to distinguish it from my notion of “care”. So, the
first reason Prinz provides for treating care and empathy separately is that his notion of
concern is a third-person response. On this notion of concern, an agent worries about a
target by having beliefs about what a target should be experiencing, as opposed to an
awareness of what that target is experiencing. He provides the example of meeting a cult
member who is delighted by their cult leader’s nefarious plans (Prinz 2011a, p 2). When
meeting the cult member, Prinz says, an agent will likely feel fear (of the leader) on the
cult member’s behalf because that agent knows that this is what the agent should feel
(Ibid.). In this way, the agent is concerned for the target. On the other hand, empathy for
Prinz is a first-person response. It is a response which allows an agent to experience the
effects of a situation from the target’s first-person point of view. Returning to the
example, when an agent empathizes with the cult member who is delighted by their cult
leader, the agent will also feel delighted. This accords with Prinz’s account of empathy
(which is a matching account) on which accurate empathy occurs when an agent comes to
have the same psychological states as a target. Thus, although Prinz’s notion of concern
(like my notion of care) implies that an agent assigns value to the well-being of a target,
he thinks that this value (expressed as worry) should be treated separately from empathy.
This is because concern is a third-person response, and empathy is a first-person
response.
The second reason Prinz provides to support the separation of concern and empathy is
that concern (unlike empathy) is always an agent’s negatively valenced emotional state
(regardless of the target’s emotional state valences). This allows Prinz to maintain that an
agent can be concerned for targets that are plausibly emotionally quite different from that
agent, or even for inanimate objects. The examples he provides are of being concerned
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for a building that is in disrepair, a plant, or an insect (Ibid.). As mentioned, Prinz’s
notion of concern characterizes an agent’s belief about the well-being of a target being in
jeopardy and an agent’s negatively valenced feeling of worry. It is not an emotional state
that needs to be shared between agent and target. An agent can feel concern for a target,
even though the target may not feel concern for themselves. The example he provides
here is that of an agent seeing a drug addict using a drug. Like the agent who is worried
about the cult member, this example of the drug addict is one in which the valence of the
agent’s states do not match those of the target. But this latter example adds a further
important consideration: that the target does not care for themselves. Accordingly, the
agent may be concerned for the well-being of the drug addict, even though the agent does
not match the emotional state of the drug addict or the lack of concern that the target has
for themselves. Whereas the emotion the drug addict is experiencing is pleasure, the
emotion of the target is concern (Prinz 2011b, p 230). The target does not care for
themselves, but the agent nonetheless values the well-being for the target (Ibid.). The
agent can be concerned for the target without empathizing with the target. And vice
versa, the agent can empathize with the target without being concerned for the target.
This is not the notion of empathy that I espouse. Unlike Prinz, I include a motivational
component in my account of empathy. On my care account, like on other concern
accounts, empathy is achieved when an agent becomes aware of a target’s concerns and
feels motivated to help with those concerns. I believe that this motivational component
should be included because of the evidence that empathy, even on a matching account,
often causes an agent to care for a target. On a matching account, there are counterexamples to this evidence. For example, an agent can match the emotional state (e.g. joy)
of a target that has just won a baseball game. But the agent in this case will not be
motivated to help the target with their concern for celebrating this win. This is because
the agent in this example favoured a player on the opposing team to win. My care
account of empathy treats such cases as attempts at empathy that end unsuccessfully. It is
because the process of empathy has started in this agent that the agent matches the
target’s joy. But it will turn out that the agent will not be motivated to celebrate with the
target because the agent is in a competitive motivational orientation towards the target
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that contributes to this motivation being absent or changed. I will say more about the role
of motivational orientations in later sections.
Care plays an important role in affecting the efficiency and accuracy of attempts at
empathy. Specifically, if an agent cares for a target prior to selecting that target as a
potential target to empathize with (either as a result of abstract care or previous
empathizing), then it is more likely that the agent will succeed in empathizing accurately
with that target. This is because for an agent to accurately empathize with a target, that
agent may be required to voluntarily sustain an effort of perspective-taking leading to an
awareness of the target’s concerns. If an agent cares for a target prior to selecting that
target as a potential target to empathize with, then I believe it will be more likely that this
agent will feel motivated to help the target with their concerns. This causal relationship
between the motivational component of empathy and helping behaviour is supported by
evidence from evolutionary psychology presented by Baron-Cohen (2003) and Pinker
(2011).22
The second important difference between my account of empathy that of Prinz’ is that the
notion of care that I employ is significantly different from Prinz’s notion of concern.
Prinz’s notion of concern is more limited than my notion of care. For Prinz, concern is
(1) third-person response, and (2) is always negatively valenced. I will address the second
of these properties first.
I incorporate a more flexible assignment of value to the well-being of targets than Prinz’s
notion of concern. As we have seen, perspective-taking can result in a valence match
between agent and target. Thus, if a target is in a positively valenced emotional state, an
agent can take that target’s perspective, become aware of their concerns, and feel a
positively valenced care for that target. Care, unlike Prinz’s notion of concern, is not
always negatively valenced. On my account, an agent’s care for a target can be
experienced either as a negative or positive emotional state. By widening the notion of
care for the well-being of a target to include the possibility that an agent can express care
that is both positively and negatively valenced, my account characterizes an agent
22
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assigning value to the well-being of a target in a wider variety of cases—namely, in cases
where an agent is empathizing with a target in a positively valenced emotional state. It is
important for an account of empathy to be able to handle such cases because agents often
empathize with targets that have concerns while experiencing positively valenced
emotions. For example, when a runner wins a race, that runner may be concerned with
celebrating this achievement with others.23
The other relevant feature of Prinz’s notion of concern is that it is a third-person
response; whereas he takes empathy to be first-person response. Here again, I disagree
with Prinz. The notion of care (concern in Prinz’ terms) that I am employing is
compatible with it being both a third-person response (abstract care) and a first-person
response (we can call this empathic care) at the same time and separately at different
times. It is compatible with my account that valuing the well-being of a target be the
result of an agent having beliefs about what a target should be experiencing. An agent
need not attempt to empathize with a target in order to care for that target. In such an
instance, an agent would care for a target from a third-person point of view perhaps as a
result of the ethical principles or duties. Crucially, however, on my account, care can also
be a first-person response. To see how this is the case, let us re-examine the example of
the agent interacting with a drug addict who is using a drug.
On my account, when an agent empathizes with the drug addict, the agent will experience
an emotional state that is congruently valenced with that of the target. So the agent may
experience pleasure when the drug addict is experiencing relief upon using a drug. Even
though the agent arguably should not feel pleasure, what is important is that both the
agent and the target experience a positively valenced emotional state. In addition, the
agent can take the target’s perspective and become aware of the drug addict’s broader
concerns such as: sharing the pleasure of drug use with another person, quitting drugs
altogether, finding support in quitting and so on. Finally, when accurately empathizing,
the agent must also feel motivated to help the target with these concerns. That an agent
cares for the target is what explains the agent’s motivation to help the target with these
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concerns at the particular times when the agent is accurately empathizing with the target.
Care, in this instance, is a first-person response. Even though the agent did not care for
the well-being of a target prior to perspective-taking, an agent can attempt to empathize
with a target and, when successful, feel motivated to help that target with their concerns.
On my account, care for the drug addict does not (always) result from an understanding
of what the drug addict should be experiencing. Rather, it can be the result of the agent
assigning value to the well-being of the drug addict based on the agent’s changing
awareness of the drug addict’s changing concerns. Care can be first person-response
resulting from empathy.
To repeat, on Prinz’s matching account, care for a target is the result of abstract thirdperson reasoning about what a target should feel. Upon seeing a drug addict use a drug,
an agent may share the emotional experience of the target. In this case, both the agent and
the target will experience pleasure. But for Prinz, this is where empathy and care part
ways. When the agent begins to care for the target, the agent’s emotional state changes
from pleasure to worry (or other emotions of disapprobation such as anger or disgust).
The agent becoming aware of what the target should be experiencing causes this change.
And it is separate from what the agent is experiencing and from what the target’s
concerns are. Care, for Prinz, does not result from taking a target’s perspective. It is not a
first-person response. Hence, he concludes that it should be treated separately from
empathy.
I agree with Prinz insofar as it is possible to care for (or as Prinz puts it be concerned for)
a target without empathizing with that target. But I also think (as I have argued above)
that care influences empathy both prior to and subsequent to the activation of empathy’s
component processes. And in the case when care results from perspective-taking, care
explains why agents who attempt to empathize with a target feel motivated to help that
target more often than agents who do not attempt to empathize with the same target.
Thus, care and empathy are not always separate phenomena. Accordingly, they should
not always be treated separately.
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I have argued that care and concern are the same insofar as they both involve assigning
value to the well-being of a target. But I have distinguished care from concern on the
basis of two differences. First, care need not be always negatively valenced. And second,
care need not always be a third-person response. We can conclude from this that
assigning value to the well-being of a target occurs in empathy, and that for this reason,
empathy and care for targets should not be analyzed separately. And as mentioned, even
on a matching account, the match resulting from empathy often leads agents to feel
motivated to help targets. An account of empathy that treats care separately does not
explain this motivation. Care is an important component of empathy in just the same way
that emotional contagion or perspective-taking is. Care shapes the motivational end state
of empathy. And by treating care and empathy together we can better predict and explain
an empathizing agent’s behaviour.
Prinz’s advocacy for the separation of care and empathy is presented in the context of his
rejection of empathy being important for moral judgment, moral development, and moral
motivation (Prinz 2011a, 2011b). As we have seen, for Prinz, when an agent empathizes
with a target, that agent matches the content of the target’s emotional states. But he
argues that this phenomenon is not important for the development of moral behaviour or
moral theories. Accordingly, he argues that we should not cultivate what he calls
“empathy-based morality”. He believes that negative emotions embodying judgments of
disapprobation such as concern (expressed as worry), anger, disgust, shame, and so on,
are more important for morality than empathy. Empathy is not required because it is a
weak moral motivator, and because it is biased towards those targets that agents take to
be similar to themselves.
In this context, we can better understand his prescription that empathy should be treated
separately from care. However, to accept Prinz’ conclusion that empathy is not important
for morality, we would have to accept that empathy and care are not only
methodologically separable, but that they also only occur separately. I have so far
provided reason to believe that care and empathy should be treated together by describing
the roles of care in shaping the component processes of empathy. For example, care
affects when empathy occurs. And when an agent cares for a target as a result of
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perspective-taking, it motivates helping behaviour. I will now argue that the roles of care
in relation to empathy lend credence to the stronger claim that care is constitutive of
empathy. If this claim is correct, then empathy will indeed be important for morality.
Like Prinz, I think that care is important for morality. So rather than directly addressing
Prinz’s arguments “against” the importance of empathy for morality, I will show that
insofar as the processes of empathy are both caused by and are often the cause of care,
empathy as a whole will be important for morality. To show this, I will re-examine some
of the component processes of empathy and present two criteria for evaluating whether
care is constitutive of these processes. Although the component processes of empathy can
occur independently from care, it will turn out that there good reason to claim that care is
constitutive of empathy.

2.10

On the constitutivity of care in empathy

Let us briefly return to one of the reference-fixing examples of empathy that I presented
at the outset of this chapter. Imagine that your friend tells you that they have just been
fired from a job they found fulfilling. Upon hearing this, you feel disappointed along with
your friend. You know a little about your friend’s difficult relationship with their
employer and this leads you to believe that they were dismissed unjustly. You also feel
motivated to help your friend find a new job. In this example, where does empathy stop
and care begin? Or vice versa, where does care stop and empathy begin? Some accounts
of empathy accept that the boundaries between care and empathy are easily
distinguishable and that empathy is merely a matter of an agent matching the relevant
beliefs and or emotions of a target (Ickes 1993; Darwall 1998; Prinz 2011a, 2011b). But I
am proposing an account on which care plays an important role in enabling empathy to
start, and in regulating the motivations that agents have to help targets. By examining
these roles and their relation to empathy’s component processes, I will argue that care is
constitutive for empathy.
Care influences when empathy occurs and influences the motivations to help that an
agent experiences in empathy. If care is removed, then an agent’s competence for
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empathic accuracy is greatly diminished. Accordingly, the following two conditions
provide a partial specification of the constitutivity of care in empathy.
1) That care is reliably and typically part of empathy.
2) That accurate empathy cannot occur without care also occurring.24
The questions then are 1) for which of the component processes of empathy is it the case
that care is typically a cause or a result of that process, and 2) is it the case that when
accurate empathy occurs, care co-occurs? In the next section, I examine how the
component processes of empathy fare with regard to meeting each of conditions just
listed.

2.10.1 Mindreading
Mindreading is the first component process of empathy that I will examine with regard to
1) whether care is typical of its occurrence, and 2) whether care necessarily co-occurs
with it. Nichols and Stich (2003) describe mindreading as “the capacity for ordinary
people to understand the mind”. Similarly, Baron-Cohen (1995) calls mindreading an
ability “to infer” what is on another’s mind. The term is generally used to refer to our
ability to attribute intentional states (e.g. beliefs and desires) to others about their
behavioural goals. In the well-known “Sally-Anne” task, Baron-Cohen et al. measure this
ability in children by specifically examining whether children can attribute false beliefs to
targets in relation to the goal of finding a ball which has been moved from one basket to
another (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). The experimental procedure is as follows. Two dolls
(Sally and Anne) are presented to a participating child. Sally places a marble in a basket
in front of her and leaves the scene. Anne then takes the marble out of Sally’s box and
places it in her own. Sally returns, and the participating child is asked “Where will Sally
look for her marble?” Children who fail this task by pointing to where the marble has
been moved to (as opposed to where it had been before the move), are said to have
difficulty mindreading (Ibid.).

24

The first of these conditions is weaker than the second. It specifies that when empathy occurs, care will
likely also occur.
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A major debate in the literature on mindreading is about the mental format of the
processes involved‒whether they are theory based (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Carruthers
and Smith 1996, Gopnik and Wellman 1995) or simulation based (Goldman 1992a; Heal
1996; Goldman 2006). In the former case, mindreading would be a matter of having a
theory resulting in thoughts about a target’s mental state, while in the latter it would be a
matter of more emotionally and motivationally laden imaginings of what their mental
state is like.
As earlier mentioned, this debate has been extended to encompass the question of
whether the nature of empathic processes are theory based or simulation based (Currie
and Jureidini 1995; Goldman 1992b; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Sorensen 1998; Adams
2001). Important in this debate is the claim that empathy is equivalent to mindreading, or
that mindreading is a component process of empathy. For the purposes of this chapter, the
debate about the format of the processes of mindreading can be set aside. The question
presently at hand–of whether mindreading typically involves care–can be posed
independently of both whether we take mindreading to count as empathy or whether we
take it to be a component of empathy, and whether it is theory-based or simulation-based.
We need only acknowledge that many theorists take mindreading to be an important
component of empathy.
The question then is: does mindreading typically involve care? To answer to this
question, let us look again to the Sally-Anne task. The task measures whether a
participant can, in attributing a false belief to a target, understand the behavioural intent
of that target. Care–as the value that an agent places on the well-being of a target–does
not seem to be typical in this mindreading task. The task does not typically involve an
inducement or an assessment of the participant’s care for the dolls. This is especially true
on an account of mindreading that claims mindreading is theory driven. On a “theorytheory” account of mindreading, what is important is that the agent have the right sort
cognitive states representing a target’s mental states. On the other hand, simulationist
accounts of mindreading allow for a richer characterization. They include the emotions
and motivations that an agent may have towards a target. Accordingly, it is more
plausible to posit that care is typically involved in mindreading on a simulationist
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account. But again, simulationist accounts do not cite evidence that could support the
claim that care is typically or necessarily involved in mindreading.
Even though there is no evidence to suggest that care is typically involved in
mindreading, we can still ask whether care is required for mindreading to occur. Due to
fact that care does not seem to be typically involved in mindreading, I think we should
also conclude that care is not necessarily involved. An agent does not need to value the
well-being of a target in order to have an expectation about that target’s behavioural
intentions. A child participating in the Sally-Anne task may not care at all about either
doll, but still be fully possessed of the ability to mindread insofar as that child is able to
tell where the target doll will look for the ball after it has been moved to the second
basket. Thus, care is not typically involved in mindreading, nor it is necessarily involved.

2.10.2 Emotional contagion
Is care typical of or necessary for emotional contagion? Emotional contagion is a
phenomenon in which an agent involuntarily “catches” the emotional state of a target. If
an agent witnesses a target falling off their bicycle, that agent may involuntarily feel a
somewhat painful discomfort. The agent need not already care for the target for
emotional contagion to occur. Emotional contagion can occur when an agent is not
acquainted with the target, or when an agent is acquainted with and dislikes the target.
However, as discussed, emotional contagion can lead to an agent gaining some
information about the target’s perspective. When the agent witnesses the target falling off
a bicycle, the agent’s experience of discomfort is an emotional state that may lead the
agent to imagine what it would be like for the agent to also fall off a bicycle. That is,
emotional contagion may lead to like-me perspective-taking. In this example, the agent’s
discomfort alone (resulting from emotional contagion) may not be sufficient to lead the
agent to care for the target. But if this discomfort leads the agent to imagine themselves in
such an uncomfortable situation, then the agent is likely to come to care for that target.
Insofar as emotional contagion typically results in an awareness of (some of) a target’s
concerns and a motivation to help that target, we can say that emotional contagion
typically involves care. But is it in fact typical that emotional contagion leads to such
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awareness and motivation? This is an empirical question to which I find no evidence to
support an answer. However, we can easily imagine cases where the states produced by
emotional contagion are purposefully suppressed or are simply not deemed important
enough at the time to attend to. In such cases, emotional contagion will not lead to
perspective taking and in turn care. Thus, emotional contagion can occur without care.

2.10.3 Mimicry (behavioural and neural)
Mimicry often leads to shared emotional states. In this section, I will examine whether
agents that mimic targets typically or necessarily place value on the well-being of those
targets. Two types of mimicry often feature as component processes of empathy:
behavioural and neural. I will address them in turn. Behavioural mimicry is a
phenomenon whereby an agent involuntarily imitates the behaviour or adopts the posture
of a target (Field et al. 1982, 1985; Meltzoff and Moore 1977; Stern 1977). In such cases,
it is posited that the agent may come to experience a state that is similar to that of a
target. I consider behavioural mimicry to be a sub-type of emotional contagion in that the
state experienced by the agent is one which is involuntarily “caught”. Accordingly, we
may conclude, as in the case of emotional contagion, that behavioural mimicry typically
involves care only in cases where such mimicry leads an agent to an awareness of a
target’s concerns and a motivation to help. If an agent attends to the states produced by
behavioural mimicry, the agent may imagine what it would be like for that agent to be in
the target’s position. However, as a sub-type of emotional contagion, we may also
conclude that care is not necessarily involved in behavioural mimicry. An agent can
experience a state that is relevantly similar to that of a target as a result of behavioural
mimicry, but that agent need not care for the target in order for this to follow.
The second type of mimicry is neural mimicry. A prominent account of empathy that
appeals to neural mimicry is that of Preston and de Waal (2002).25 Their “PerceptionAction Model” is a matching account of empathy according to which empathy occurs
when an agent neurally matches the “embodied representations” of a target (Preston and
25

The activation of mirror neurons is also a form of neural mimicry. Accordingly, I take my conclusions
about neural mimicry to apply to accounts that explain empathy in terms of mirror neurons.
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de Waal 2002, p 42). This matching occurs involuntarily. And, importantly, the agent
uses “information about the self… to model the states of others.” (Preston and de Waal
2002, p 43). However, Preston and de Waal do not specify exactly what information
about the self is used by the agent. This is crucial to assessing whether care is involved in
neural mimicry on their account of empathy. Although an agent may involuntarily
neurally mimic the emotional states of a target, care would only be involved in so far as
the agent also mimics the value that the target places on their own well-being. If we
assume that neural mimicry does involve the agent neurally mimicking the value that a
target places on themselves, then we can say, by hypothesis, that neural mimicry typically
involves care.26 And it follows that an agent neurally mimicking a target’s care for
themselves cannot do so without also caring for that target (if only “offline” or in
simulation). That is, if an agent does not mimic the value that an agent places on
themselves, then only partial mimicry has occurred. Having stated this however, more
empirical research is needed to better understand whether when an agent involuntarily
neurally mimics a target, that agent also mimics the care that the target places on
themselves. Thus, it remains inconclusive whether neurally mimicking a target typically
involves care, or whether it can occur in care’s absence.

2.10.4 Like-me perspective-taking
Stotland (1969) introduced the distinction between two types of perspective-taking which
map on to what I have been calling “like-me” and “like-other” perspective-taking
(Stotland 1969, p 288, 289). In Stotland’s terminology they were called “imagine-self”
and “imagine-him” perspective-taking (Stotland 1969). Like-me perspective-taking
involves imagining how an agent would think and feel were they in a target’s situation. It
can be described as an agent “projecting” themselves, as that agent, into the situation of
the other. It is important to emphasize that in imagine-self perspective-taking, the agent
imagines what it would be like if that agent (as themselves) were in that target’s situation.
This is why I call this type like-me perspective-taking.

26

It follows that if a target does not value their own well-being, this would also be mimicked. In such a
case, care would not be involved.
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In her experiments on like-me perspective-taking, Stotland was interested in the question
of whether it had “empathetic emotional consequences as well as predictive value.”
(Stotland 1969, p 289). She found that when participants were instructed to engage in
like-me perspective taking, as opposed to merely watching and focusing on a target’s
behaviour, there was an increased physiological and emotional response. Thus, we can
ask whether such an emotional response shows that like-me perspective-taking typically
involves care?
An examination of Batson’s work will be of help in answering this question because it
makes substantial use of Stotland’s distinction between types of perspective-taking. I
think that the work of Batson et al. shows that care is typically involved in like-me
perspective-taking. Specifically, the care typically involved in like-me perspective-taking
is an egoistic care for a target in that it is dependent on the agent first caring for
themselves. Batson shows that when participants engage in like-me perspective-taking
upon witnessing a target in distress, they feel upset, anxious, disturbed, and so on (Batson
1991, p 77). This, more often than not, motivates targets to relieve their own distress
rather than that of the target (Batson 1991, p 78). But although agents that engage in likeme perspective-taking are less likely to help targets (as compared to agents engaging in
like-other perspective-taking), their emotional responses resulting from like-me
perspective-taking indicates that they care for the well-being of targets. They care for
them in so far as they care for themselves. When an agent imagines themselves in a
target’s distressful situation for example, that agent feels distressed because that agent is
aware that the situation the target is in is somehow harmful to their well-being. The agent
cares about that target’s well-being. However, this care that the agent has for the wellbeing of the target motivates the agent to relieve their own distress rather than that of the
target. Thus, even though an agent may care for a target as a result of like-me
perspective-taking, the motivation that this produces is not directed at the target. The
motivation to help a target resulting from like-me perspective taking and care is selfdirected at the agent, rather than other-directed at the target. Importantly, this provides
evidence that care is nonetheless typically involved in like-me perspective-taking.
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Let us now examine the second condition of care’s constitutivity of empathy: whether
like-me perspective-taking can occur without care. We have seen that when an agent
engages in like-me perspective-taking, that agent cares for the well-being of the target
insofar as that agent cares about themselves. If the agent imagines caring about
themselves when engaging in like-me perspective-taking, the agent will care about the
target. But it is possible for an agent not to care about themselves when engaging in likeme perspective-taking. Often agents engage in risky, reckless, or obviously harmful
behaviour. In such cases, we can assume that agents have limited care or no care for
themselves. Now if such an agent engages in like-me perspective-taking upon witnessing
a target in distress, and imagines that they were in that target’s situation, then that agent
would probably not experience the feelings of personal distress similar to those reported
in the experiments of Stotland and Batson. We can thus predict that if an agent that
engages in like-me perspective-taking, and in doing so imagines themselves not caring
about themselves, then that agent would also likely not care about the target. It follows
that a requisite for care being involved in like-me perspective-taking is that the agent
would care about themselves were they in a situation like that of a potential target of
perspective-taking. This indicates that like-me perspective-taking can occur without care,
and is therefore not necessary for like-me perspective-taking to occur.

2.10.5 Like-other perspective-taking
The second type of perspective-taking is what Stotland (1969) calls “imagine-him” or
what Batson (1991) calls “imagine-other” perspective-taking. This second type
characterizes the act of imagining what and how a target is thinking and feeling in a
situation with a voluntary effort to concentrate on what it would be like for the target (not
the agent themselves) to be in that situation. This type of perspective-taking takes into
consideration beliefs that the agent has about a particular agent. Potential examples of
such beliefs include beliefs about a target’s character, their present context, their history,
their values, and so on. It is important to note that what differentiates this type of
perspective taking is that an agent imagines what it would be like to be a particular target,
rather than a more general like-me imaginative act that would involve an agent making
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use of their familiarity with a situation and their prototypical beliefs about what they
would experience were they in a target’s situation. This type of perspective-taking is
richer in that it not only takes into consideration what it is like for me (as an agent) to be
in a target’s situation. It also takes into consideration information that agents have about
particular targets.27 This is why I call this type like-other perspective-taking.
Similar to like-me perspective-taking, like-other perspective-taking involves considering
the effects of a target’s context (or environment) on that target. But dissimilarly, likeother perspective-taking results in less personal distress than like-me perspective-taking
(Stotland 1969, p 297). And it is well empirically established that agents engaging in likeother perspective-taking are much more likely to be motivated to help targets of empathy
(Batson 1991; Batson et al. 1997; Lamm et al. 2007). Does like-other perspective taking
typically involve care?
Indeed, like-other perspective-taking is the phenomenon that presents the strongest
evidence for care being typically involved. There is a high correlation between like-other
perspective taking and helping behaviour (Batson 1991). And this correlation is explained
by the role of care. It is the care that an agent has for a target that motivates an agent to
engage in the time-consuming act of like-other perspective-taking. The aforementioned
type of like-me perspective-taking can be performed voluntarily. But like-me perspectivetaking does not require an agent to have a rich set of beliefs about a target. The agent can
recruit their own familiar experiences, and expectations to imagine the thoughts, feelings,
and concerns of a target. Or an agent can use these to imagine what it might possibly be
like for that agent to be in a prototypical conception of their situation. On the other hand,
when an agent engages in like-other perspective-taking, that agent must either have
beliefs about a target’s particular life, and beliefs about how that particular target
experiences their environment. In performing this imaginative act, an agent may rely on
beliefs acquired by prior acquaintance with the particular target. But often, an agent will
need to acquire these beliefs by lengthy observation and interaction. It is this voluntary
and time consuming effort involved in like-other perspective taking that provides support
27

And this requires agents to have longer periods of interaction with potential targets of perspective-taking
in order to imagine what it is like to be in a target’s particular situation.
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to my claim that it typically involves care. At times, an agent may be motivated by other
values when engaging in like-other perspective taking. But I think it is correct to say that
in most cases, the value of care plays an equally or more important motivational role.
Turning now to the question of whether like-other perspective-taking can occur without
care, we can say that it can get started, but without care empathic accuracy would be
greatly diminished or be impossible. Caring for a target while engaging in like-other
perspective-taking enables the agent to become aware of differences between how that
agent would care for themselves in a particular context as compared to how the target’s
value of care may be conceived of differently in the same context.28 It may also lead an
agent to become aware of differences between how that agent is experiencing their
context in relation to this different conception of care. Furthermore, care contributes to
motivating an agent to focus on their awareness of a target’s concerns, rather than on
their own personal distress. This, in turn, explains why agents engaging in like-other
perspective-taking are more likely to help targets of empathy.

2.10.6 Summarizing constitutivity
The following table will summarize the conclusions presented above:
Table 1: Component processes of empathy compared to typicality and necessity of care

Yes

Perspectivetaking (likeme)
Yes

Perspectivetaking (likeother)
Yes

No

No

No

No

Some

Some

Some

Yes

Mindreading

Emotional
contagion

Behavioural
mimicry

Care typical

No

Yes

Care necessary

No

Evidence of
constitutivity

No

28

Neural
mimicry

Inconclusive

I will expand on the consequences of different conceptions of care in the next sections.
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Having identified which of empathy’s component processes meet the criteria of (1)
typically involving care, and (2) not occurring without care (or necessarily involve care),
we can draw the conclusion that care is constitutive of empathy. Applying the first
criterion to the component process of empathy yielded the result that care is highly
typical of empathy. And applying the second criterion showed that without care, the
occurrence of empathy would be less frequent, and empathic accuracy would be
diminished to the point of being impossible while engaging in like-other perspectivetaking. Care plays important roles in almost all of empathy’s component processes. And
without it, the activation and accuracy of these processes would be greatly diminished.
To treat empathy and care separately, as Prinz does, is to unjustifiably separate empathy
from component processes that are both typical and necessary to its end state when it
occurs. Such an approach offers no explanatory benefit, and may lead to misguided
empirical investigation. Accordingly, I take care to be constitutive of empathy. As I have
just argued, this does not mean that care is necessary for the component processes to get
started. Care is a necessary motivational state of an agent when the component processes
of empathy result in accurate empathy. Batson also argues for a similar conclusion
(Batson 2011). He states that for empathy to occur, more is required than an agent
perceiving a target as being in need and becoming aware of the target’s needs (i.e.
concerns). In addition, the agent must care for the target as a condition for feeling
motivated to help the target with their concerns (Batson 2011, p 41).
Taking the value of care to be constitutive of empathy opens a space to ask important
questions about the roles of values (other than care) that agents and targets have. As an
individual value, care for the well-being of a potential target is importantly connected to
other values that both agents and targets have, and to broader social values that may be
expected or imposed by the context in which agents and targets engage in empathy. In the
next section, I will address how empathy is shaped by the relationship between care,
other individual values held by agents and targets, and by broader communal and
institutional values that are at work in the contexts in which empathy occurs.
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2.11

The roles of “values” in empathy

So far, I have argued that the value of care is constitutive of empathy. In doing so, I
stated that the value an agent assigns to the well-being of a target affects whether
empathy will occur or not. But in addition to being influenced by care, empathy is
influenced by other values. I will begin this section by providing some general remarks
about what values are in relationship to care and motivation in empathy. Then I will
describe three ways that values influence empathy. First, values influence when empathy
“gets started”; they influence what counts as a triggering cause of empathy. Second,
values generally (like care) make empathy what it is; they structure the component
processes of empathy. And third, values affect empathy as a motive; they influence
emotions and behavioural motivations in empathy. Describing the influence of values
generally on empathy (constituted by care) will allow me to provide a sketch of how
empathy works on a care account. Doing so will involve sketching a model of empathy by
reference to the interactions between values, motivational orientations, environmental
contexts, and goals.

2.12

Care and other values

Accounts of empathy have largely ignored the role of values generally. One reason for
this is conceptual. Theorists in many disciplines speak about the importance of values.
But often, they use the term while saying very little about what they take values to be.
Interpreting what values are is often left to the reader’s familiarity. Another reason why
values are not addressed in accounts of empathy is that values are difficult to
operationalize (Gecas, 2008). They are often set aside in favour of more easily measured
variables such as “attitudes”, “norms”, and “roles” (Ibid.). Furthermore, there is a
tendency in science and philosophy of science to downplay the role of values as outside
the proper domain of scientific investigation (Graham 1981; McMullin 1982).29 Many
researchers have taken science to provide objective and universal explanations. However,

29

More recently, many philosophers of science have acknowledged and described the roles of values in
science. They argue that values play important roles in influencing the goals of science, theory choice, and
hypothesis acceptance. For a review, see Graham (1981) and McMullin (1982).
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my view is that integrating the role of values in empathy is important for providing a
fuller and contextually-sensitive account.
As a value in empathy, care is a terminal value–a belief that an agent has about a
“desirable end-state of existence” for a target in a particular context (Lovejoy 1950, p
596-597; Rokeach 1973, p 7).30
As a terminal value, care interacts in important ways with instrumental values. For
example, let us take empathy as a motive to helping behaviour. When an agent
empathizes with a target, that agent’s behavioural motivations will be influenced by
instrumental values–beliefs about contextually appropriate “modes of conduct” (Lovejoy
1950, p 596-597; Rokeach 1973, p 7). Having taken the perspective of a target who is
asking for money on the street, an agent may be motivated to help that target by giving
them money. This agent’s actions can be interpreted as being influenced by the
instrumental value of “charity”. A different agent, having taken the perspective of the
same target may feel motivated to help by ignoring the target and walking on. This latter
agent’s actions can be interpreted as being influenced by the value of “personal
autonomy”. For present purposes, I will leave the question of whether accurate empathy
has occurred in either case. What is important to emphasize is that an agent’s values will
influence the behavioural motivations that an agent has when empathizing with a target.
Values, like desires, are motivational. It is important to note that, although values may
cause desires, they are distinct from desires (Williams, 1968, p 284). For example, I may
desire to eat given that I value food. But my desire to eat food is not equivalent to my
valuing food. Valuing food is prior to desiring food. The value I have is FOOD,
according to which I believe it would be desirable for me to be in a context where food is
present (then I would eat it).
30

I follow Rokeach in taking values to be beliefs that have a cognitive, affective, and behavioural
component. But it is important to note that, unlike other beliefs, values are evaluative in that they are about
states or behaviours that are desirable or undesirable, rather than true or false. It is also important to note
that a terminal value is not a description of an end state. Accordingly, care in empathy does not determine
an agent’s conception of the context or conditions for a target’s well-being. It specifies that in a particular
end-state, a target’s well-being is desirable. Though care is of central importance to empathy, it is but one
value among an agent or target’s total system of values (Williams and Albert 1968, p 287).
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Values may be embedded in verbal behaviour, actions, and environmental contexts
(Williams and Albert, p 287). In the case of values being embedded in environmental
contexts, what I mean is that environmental contexts impose certain values on agents due
to the conventions that are associated with desired outcomes or behaviours in those
contexts, and due to the structural features of the physical environment. An agent need
not explicitly endorse the values that are influencing or guiding their behaviour. An agent
may verbally express the values they conceive to be desirable, but acknowledge that
context requires that they operate according to different values (Morris 1956a, 1956b;
McLaughlin 1965). Likewise, an agent may act according to values that they are not
aware of or that they do not express (Ibid.)). Accordingly, it is not surprising that an
agent’s values are often inconsistent. Any agent (or target) may have values that are
mutually inconsistent at a particular time, or which become inconsistent depending on
context and development. For example, the value of “money” and the value of
“convenience” are often inconsistently held by the same agent purchasing a meal at a
fast-food restaurant. Such value trade-offs indicate that agents frequently have
inconsistent values (Tetlock 2003).
It is also important to note that any particular value is not independent from other values.
An agent’s values influence each other. For example, an agent in a particular context may
value “freedom”, and that value may be influenced by that agent also valuing “adherence
to social hierarchy” (Williams 1968, p 286). Thus, the agent’s terminal value of
“freedom” is shaped and constrained by the instrumental value of “adherence to social
hierarchy”. Another agent in a different context may also value “freedom”. But in this
agent’s context, the agent’s value “freedom” is influenced by their valuing “equality” (as
opposed to “hierarchy”) (Ibid.). In either case, the agent’s value of “freedom” will be
influenced by other values, and thus shape the agent’s experience differently (Ibid.).
Given these general remarks about value, we can begin to see that both terminal values
(e.g. care) and instrumental values (e.g. appropriate behavioural motivations) will interact
and influence each other in significant ways in empathy. I will argue that values affect
when empathy occurs, what empathy is, and the behavioural motivations that agents
experience when empathizing with a target. Before describing the three roles of values on
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my care account of empathy, it will be useful to summarize some important aspects of my
account and how they relate to empathic accuracy.

2.13

A care account and empathic accuracy revisited

For accurate empathy to occur on my care account of empathy there are four criteria:
1) Agent is aware of a target’s concerns
2) Matching emotional valences between agent and target
3) Agent cares for the target
4) Agent feels motivated to help target with concerns
The first criterion requires that the agent become aware of a target’s concerns. This
awareness can occur via involuntary component processes such as emotional contagion
or neural mimicry; or via component processes under more voluntary control such as
perspective-taking. For example, upon hearing from a friend that they just lost their job,
an agent could become aware of that target’s concerns such as paying their debts, and
finding satisfaction in a different line of work.
The second criterion is that there be a match between the valences of the emotional states
of the agent and the target. This valence matching does require that both agent and target
experience emotional states with the same content. For example, upon seeing that a friend
just win a race, an agent could match the emotional state valences of the target (at a
particular time). The runner may be experiencing joy, whereas the agent may be
experiencing pride. What is important is that there be a valence match, as opposed to a
content match.
The third criterion is that an agent cares for a target. I have characterized this care as a
value that an agent assigns to the well-being of a target. For example, upon seeing a
person sitting on the sidewalk asking for money, an agent could care for that target. The
agent could conceive of an environment in which the target’s concerns are met, and
experience this conception as desirable. When accurate empathy occurs, an agent places
value on the well-being of a target.
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Fourth, for accurate empathy to occur, an agent must feel motivated to help a target with
their concerns. It is important to emphasize that the agent merely needs to feel motivated
to help the target with their concerns insofar as the agent has conceived of behaviours
which will contribute to this goal. The agent need not act on these motivations.
In sum, matching accounts of empathy involve an exact match between the state of an
agent and that of target. Concern accounts involve a partial match between agents and
targets in terms of the valence of their emotional states. Concern accounts also add a
motivational component whereby for empathy to occur its end state must include an
agent that is motivated to help a target with their concerns. Further, the care account adds
that an agent’s care for the well-being of a target is what explains this motivation. In
support of this claim, I have shown how care is typically involved in many of empathy’s
psychological processes, and how the value of care is a necessary component of
empathy’s end state. With these criteria in mind, let us move on to examining the three
roles that values (generally) play in empathy.

2.13.1 Values influence what causes empathy (i.e. they are
triggering causes)
Another agent in the environment or a “target”, is commonly the triggering cause of
empathy (Dretske 1991). I am following Dretske here in distinguishing between
triggering and structuring causes (Dretske 1991, ch. 2). Targets are what trigger the
activation of empathy’s component processes. Which targets are taken by an agent as a
potential target of empathy is the result of a confluence of factors. In some sense, the
entirety of an agent’s history, environment, and psychology can be understood as
contributing to which targets an agent empathizes with. This is because an agent’s
psychological development generally will contribute to explaining this phenomenon of
selection. Also, an agent’s interactions with a particular target often vary over time, and
will thus influence whether that particular target is taken as a potential target of empathy.
In modeling these interactions I will examine several factors, which along with values,
influence which targets become triggers of empathy. Values influence which targets will
be taken as potential targets of empathy [PTE]. But their influence is indirect. There is no
immediate causal connection between an agent’s values and which targets an agent takes
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to be PTE. I will argue that it is more accurate to describe what determines which targets
are selected as PTE as a system of reciprocal causal relationships between an agent’s
terminal values, goals, motivational orientations, environments, and instrumental values.
In this section I will address the first four of these factors. In the next section on values as
structuring causes of empathy, the role instrumental values will be described.
As discussed above, terminal values are an agent’s beliefs about a desirable end-state of
existence. Examples of terminal values are “freedom”, “equality”, and “a comfortable
life” (Rokeach 1973, p 252; Curhan et al. 2006). Insofar as an agent values “freedom”
that agent will assign value to an outcome in which freedom is present and promoted.
That agent will feel positive emotions when freedom is promoted and negative ones when
it is challenged. And that agent will strive for or behave in such as a way as to achieve an
end state which that agent describes as “free”. This brings us to the second factor: goals.
Agents engage in goal-directed behaviour (Adams and Enç 1992; Barker 2008). And
terminal values influence these goals. Usually, behaviours will not be directed at
attaining a particular valued end-state. Rather, an agent’s goals are influenced by terminal
values in that the latter affect which goals an agent chooses to pursue. For example, an
agent who values “a comfortable life” will not go about aiming to achieve a comfortable
life in all contexts. At any moment, the goal of agent’s behaviours will not usually be to
realize a terminal value. Rather, terminal values influence an agent’s choice of goals.
That is, the goals an agent chooses to pursue will be influenced by their belief that a
comfortable life is desirable.
We are now beginning to approach the indirect influence of values on an agent’s
selection of PETs. Terminal values influence an agent’s choice of goals. These goals, in
turn, will affect an agent’s motivational orientations. When interacting with targets,
agents have different social motives or orientations. In game theory, these orientations
play an important role in determining the way in which agents interact with targets, and
the strategies they use in order to achieve goal-directed outcomes (McClintock 1972;
Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman et al. 1986; McClintock and Liebrand 1988).
Four motivational orientations are distinguished:
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1) Individualism (maximization of agent’s own gain)
2) Competition (maximization of difference between agent and target’s gain)
3) Cooperation (maximization of joint gain)
4) Altruism (maximization of other’s gain)
The goals that an agent pursues will shape the motivational orientations that an agent is in
when interacting with PETs. And these goals will, of course, vary according to
environmental context. For example, an agent who values “profit” may be working at a
very profitable company. While at work, that agent will pursue a variety of work-related
goals such as: impressing a client at a meeting with competitors; discussing the budget at
a staff meeting; visiting a construction site. A change in goal can affect the motivational
orientation that an agent is in when interacting with targets that the agent encounters. For
example, when pursuing the goal of impressing a client, the agent may be in a
competitive motivational orientation towards other salespeople. When pursuing the goal
of negotiating a budget at the staff meeting, the agent may be in a cooperative
motivational orientation towards co-workers. Accordingly, changes in goals can involve
changes in the motivational orientations, which in turn determine the behavioural
strategies that an agent employs when interacting with targets (Ibid.). The significance of
motivational orientations for which targets are taken as PETs is that changes in
motivational orientations will involve changes in which targets an agent cares for.
On this model, I predict that motivational orientations will be importantly related to the
value of care that agents assign to targets. It is more likely that an agent will care for a
target when in the cooperative or altruistic orientations (as opposed to the individualistic
or competitive orientations). Because an agent is interested in maximizing joint gain
when in a cooperative orientation this indicates that the agent may value the well-being of
the target insofar as that target’s well-being is compatible with that of the agent’s wellbeing. The strategy of “joint gain” that is at work in the cooperative orientation implies
that the agent, at the very least, is concerned (in Prinz and Darwall’s third-person sense)
for the well-being of the target. Furthermore, I think that in the cooperative orientation it
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is likely that an agent’s concern may cause or be accompanied by attempts at like-me
perspective-taking resulting in a first-person awareness of a target’s concerns and a
motivation to help that target with their concerns. As we have seen, valuing the wellbeing of a target is typical of like-me perspective taking. In the altruistic motivational
orientation, that an agent care for the target is all but guaranteed. In an altruistic
orientation, an agent is both more likely to care for a target and more likely to attempt to
empathize with that target. This prediction is supported by evidence of the high
correlation between empathy and altruistic behaviour. I have argued that what explains
this altruistic behaviour as a result of empathy is that care is constitutive of empathy.
Thus, I predict that in the altruistic motivational orientation, agents will likely take
targets as PETs and engage in like-other perspective-taking. The role of care in like-other
perspective-taking explains the selection of PETs in an altruistic motivational orientation.
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Figure 1: Motivational orientations and terminal values

I have been arguing that values (terminal values and “care”) will play a crucial role in
determining which targets are taken by agents as potential targets of empathy. An agent
will be in a particular context as a result of terminal values. In this context, that agent will
pursue goals which will be met by adopting motivational orientations of interaction
towards targets. I have predicted that in motivational orientations of cooperation and
altruism, an agent is more likely to assign value to the well-being of a target. This is
because care plays important roles in causing an agent to empathize with a target. And
with greater reason, because care is constitutive of empathy, an orientation in which an
agent is likely to care for a target is one in which an agent is likely to empathize with that
target.

79

2.13.2 Values influence why empathy occurs (i.e. they are
structuring causes)
Values are structuring causes of empathy (Dretske 1991). We have seen that values
indirectly influence which targets (as triggering causes) an agent takes to be potential
targets of empathy. On the other hand, a structuring cause is a cause which is responsible
for a process being a process with a certain product (Ibid.). A product describes an event
or condition, such that, until it occurs, the process has not ended (Dretske 1991, p 44).
The product of empathy then–the point at which the process of empathy ends–is an
agent’s motivation to help a target with their concerns. Accordingly, the value of care and
terminal values are structuring causes of empathy. They are the causal conditions for
empathy being a process that causes an agent to feel motivated to help a target. We can
schematize this relationship as follows:
Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Helping behaviour (H)
We have already seen that terminal values and care influence which targets (T) cause
empathy (E) to start. If we have knowledge of an agent’s terminal values, we may have
knowledge of that agent’s goals, and the motivational orientations that the agent is in
when pursuing those goals. This would allow us to infer from observation that a target
(T) caused an agent to empathize (E) with that target, which in turn caused that agent to
help (H) that target with their concerns. The agent helped the target when, and because, it
saw a target which it selected as a potential target of empathy. But why did Empathy (E)
cause helping behaviour (H)? This question is about the structuring cause (as opposed to
the triggering cause) of the relationship between (E) and (H). It is about the conditions in
which (E) causes (H) rather than something else.
Here again care will be important. Care affects which targets act as triggers of empathy.
But it is also responsible for empathy being a process that causes helping behaviour–it is
a structuring cause. When an agent is triggered to empathize by a target, care explains
why a target feels motivated to help a target with their concerns as opposed to say feeling
motivated to ignore the target or feeling motivated to perform some other activity. The
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value of care that an agent assigns to a target explains why an agent feels motivated to
help a target. This explanation of helping behaviour as a result of empathy resides not in
the stimulus (or triggering causes), but in the correlations between care and helping
behaviour. Care in empathy causes helping behaviour:
Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Care (C) as a condition for helping
behaviour (H)
Targets (T) as triggering causes explain why empathy gets started now.31 But care (C) as
a structuring cause explains why helping behaviour results from empathy as opposed to
something else.
Similarly, instrumental values are structuring causes of empathy. Instrumental values are
desirable properties that an agent assigns to a behaviour. Examples of instrumental values
include “respect”, “self-control”, “forgiveness”, “ambition”, “responsibility” (Rokeach
1973; Curhan 2007). Accordingly, like care, instrumental values are responsible for
empathy being a process that results in a motivation to help a target. Instrumental values
contribute to the explanation of why an agent who empathizes with a target helps that
target with their concerns. It is because instrumental values are desirable properties of
behaviour that they are motivational. For example, an agent that values “self-control”
more than “forgiveness” may not help a target even if that agent cares for the target. On
the other hand, an agent that values “responsibility” more than “self-control” is more
likely to help a target (especially if the agent also cares for the target). Instrumental
values do not reside in the stimulus or triggering causes of empathy. Like the value of
care, they structure the process of empathy by being conditions for when helping
behaviour will occur (as opposed to some other behaviour):
Target (T) causes Empathy (E) which causes Care (C) and Instrumental value
(I) as conditions for Helping behaviour (H)

31

We have seen that care has an indirect influence on which targets are taken as triggers. But caring for a
target is not itself the stimulus that causes empathy. Care is not itself a triggering cause.
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Instrumental values are causal conditions or structuring causes of empathy that
importantly contribute to explaining why empathy is a process that causes helping
behaviour. They are distinct from triggering causes which explain what causes empathy
to start at a particular time, in a particular context, when stimulated by a particular target.

2.13.3 Values influence how empathy operates (i.e. which
motives are involved)
We have seen that instrumental values shape what agents take to be “desirable modes of
conduct” (Rokeach 1973, p 7). They are properties of the means by which agents strive
for desirable ends. Their significance for empathy is that they influence how empathy
works. Specifically, instrumental values influence which behaviours an agent attempting
to empathize with a target feels motivated to perform. How they do so is by their
connection to motivational orientations.
I described above the role of motivational orientations in the selection of which targets an
agent takes to be potential targets of empathy. These motivational orientations play
another important role in empathy. Namely, they determine which instrumental values an
agent will make use of in any given situation. This is because the motivational orientation
that an agent is in subsumes different instrumental values. For example, when in the
competitive motivational orientation, an agent’s behaviours may be shaped by
instrumental values such as “ambition” or “logical” (Rokeach 1973, p 119). When an
agent is in the cooperative or altruistic orientation, an agent’s behaviours may be shaped
by values such as “broadminded” or “forgiving” (Ibid.). Thus, the motivational
orientation that an agent is in will affect the instrumental values that shape an agent’s
behaviour. The import for empathy of the relationship between motivational orientations
and instrumental values is that an agent’s motivations to help a target with their concerns
will depend both on the motivational orientation the agent is in and on the terminal values
of that agent subsumed under that orientation.
Instrumental values are important to integrate into an account of empathy for their
explanatory contribution. By examining the relationship between an agent’s motivational
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orientations and that agent’s terminal values we can understand why an agent’s
behavioural motivations to help a target with their concerns are as they are, as opposed to
being some other way. For example, agent1 is in an altruistic motivational orientation
when attempting to empathize with target1 who is sitting in the street asking for money.
In this orientation, agent1’s behaviours are influenced by instrumental values such as
“helpful” and “loving”. This will contribute to an explanation of why agent1 stops, talks
to target1 about their concerns and gives target1 money. An agent with different
instrumental values who is attempting to empathize with the same target may behave
quite differently because this agent’s motivational orientation is associated with different
instrumental values. This agent2 is also in an altruistic orientation and attempting to
empathize with target1. But agent2’s altruistic motivational orientation is associated with
instrumental values such as “independent” and “responsible”. Thus, agent2 may stop and
talk to target1, but decide not to give target1 money. It is the difference between agent1
and agent2’s instrumental values under the same motivational orientation that explains the
difference in the behaviours they each felt motivated to perform when attempting to
empathize with target1.
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Figure 2: Motivational orientations and instrumental values

But this is not the whole story. We can imagine a case where agent1 and agent2 are both
in the same motivational orientation (e.g. altruistic), and that this orientation subsumes
the same instrumental values (such as “helpful” and “loving”) for both agents. But even
by keeping the relationship between motivational orientations and instrumental values
constant, we can still imagine that agent1 and agent2 will differ in the behaviours they feel
motivated to perform in order to help target1. This is because terminal values also affect
the behavioural motivations of agents. They do so indirectly by affecting an agent’s
conceptions of a target’s concerns. For example, when engaging in like-me perspectivetaking an agent will become aware of and attribute concerns to a target. And we have
seen that this will involve a match in emotional valence between agent and target based
on an agent’s familiarity with contexts similar to that in which the target finds
themselves. Importantly, the content of the concerns that an agent takes a target to have
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will be influenced by that agent’s terminal values. An agent that is taking the perspective
of a target and becoming aware of that target’s concerns sees the target in a particular
context, makes use of past experience in similar contexts, and matches the valences of
that target’s emotional states. But this process is not psychologically isolated from
terminal values. I think it is useful to think of the contribution of terminal values as an
agent’s “ideals” or “ideal outcomes” to the construction of an agent’s awareness of a
target’s concerns. When attributing concerns to a target, an agent will be influenced by
what that agent takes to be positive or ideal outcomes for that agent. As we have seen,
this is because, when empathizing with a target, an agent cares for that target’s wellbeing. Accordingly, we can say that how an agent conceives of a target’s well-being is
influenced by an agent’s terminal values. Agents will differ in their terminal values, and
so they will differ in how they conceive of the well-being of a target. In turn, different
agents will construct different concerns that they attribute to PETs.
Returning to our example then, we can imagine two agents that share the same
motivational orientation towards a target and whose motivational orientations subsume
the same terminal values. And we can imagine that each of these agents will have
different behavioural motivations to help the target with their concerns. This can be
explained by the different concerns that each agent has attributed to the target. Agent1’s
conception of the well-being of target1 will have been influenced by different terminal
values than agent2’s. All things being equal, agent1 and agent2 will have different
behavioural motivations to help target1 when attempting to empathize. And this will have
been a consequence of the influence of terminal values on each agent’s construction and
attribution of concerns to the target.
We can now see why the care account of empathy that integrates the role of care and
values more generally is an improvement over accounts of the matching account type.
There is clearly a necessary evaluative component that influences when an agent will, as
a result of empathy, feel motivated to help a target. And when this evaluative component
is understood as preferences over possible outcomes for the target, we can see that these
preferences can only be known by adopting the evaluative stance of the target. By doing
so, the agent is motivated to act in the target’s interests. This is what explains the
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correlation between matching a target’s internal state and helping behaviour. Without
considering the role of care and values, matching accounts cannot explain this
correlation.

2.14

Concluding remarks

This paper has been concerned with classifying what empathy is, and with proposing an
account of how empathy works that better explains its motivational component. I started
by classifying accounts according to their conception of empathic accuracy. Namely, by
distinguishing between matching accounts and concern accounts. I then argued that
concern accounts better explain how empathy works by including the component in
empathy that motivates and agent to help a target with their concerns. Further, I built
upon the work of concern accounts to present the care account of empathy. I argued that
the care account is an improvement on existing concern accounts because it better
explains and predicts empathy. The care account includes the roles of care and values
more generally. It is a first step towards providing more detail about the causes of
empathy, the conditions in which it occurs, and the motivations of agents and targets that
cause helping behaviour. If the care account is correct in its central claims that values,
environmental contexts, and motivational orientations are important to empathy, then
going forward there is reason to reject matching accounts of empathy, and reason to
favour concern accounts that integrate the factors that the care account emphasizes.
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3. Two challenges to empathy from unconscious emotions
3.1 The two challenges
Theories of empathy can be divided into two account types: matching-accounts, and
concern accounts. These types differ in terms of their criteria for empathic accuracy—the
point at which the process of empathy ends. Whereas matching accounts focus on the
experiential or representational match between an agent and a target, concern accounts
focus on a match between an agent and a target’s experienced states and an agent’s
awareness of a target’s concerns. Both of these account types describe in detail the
matching relationship required between an agent and target’s conscious emotional states
for accurate empathy to occur. But recently, developments in psychoanalysis,
evolutionary psychology, and embodied cognition have made it clear that unconscious
emotional states play an important role in our mental lives. The existence of unconscious
emotional states has important implications that have not been investigated for what
counts as accurate empathy on each type of empathy account. This paper is about two
challenges that unconscious emotions present for accurate empathy on existing theories
of empathy. First I reintroduce the distinction from the previous paper between matching
and concern accounts of empathy. Then, I describe what I take unconscious emotions to
be, and what accurate empathy is on each account type. I go on to present a challenge to
each account type from unconscious emotions. The first of these is the unconscious
matching challenge. The second is the unconscious concern challenge. I address each of
these in turn. I present replies from the perspective of a theorist espousing a matching
account of empathy to the first challenge, and a reply from the perspective of a theorist
espousing a concern account of empathy to the second challenge. The reason for
presenting my replies in this way is that each challenge appeals to the matching
relationship between an agent and a target that is appropriate to each account type. The
later reply draws from Charland’s (2005) indeterminacy thesis of affect valence. It shows
that unconscious emotions are not functionally and behaviourally identical to conscious
emotions, and hence should not be treated as such on concern accounts of empathy. It
will turn out that there are a variety of possible responses to these challenges from
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unconscious emotions, but that a researcher espousing either account type of empathy can
meet them successfully.

3.2 Two types of accounts: matching and concern
In the previous paper I distinguished between two types of empathy accounts: matchingaccounts and concern-accounts. The account types differ in how they treat empathic
accuracy. In this section I will briefly review the notion of empathic accuracy and how
these account types are differentiated by their criteria of empathic accuracy.
As the name suggests, “empathic accuracy” is the phenomenon whereby an agent
accurately empathizes with a target. It does not refer to the process of empathy as a
whole. Rather, it refers to the outcome of empathy (Ickes 1993). As such, it does not
prioritize any of the component processes of empathy (e.g. neural mimicry, emotional
contagion). Empathic accuracy can be achieved by varying routes. Goldman (2011)
argues that empathic accuracy can be achieved by two routes: the “mirroring route” and
the “reconstructive route”. The mirroring route is involuntary, and it involves the
component process of mirror neuron activation, whereas the reconstructive route is
voluntary and it involves the component process of perspective-taking.
Individual accounts of empathy emphasize different routes to accurate empathy. As a
consequence of this, they also emphasize different component processes of empathy. But
I have argued that accounts of empathy can be classified as tokens of one of two types
according to their criteria for empathic accuracy: matching accounts (Ickes 1993; Gallese
and Goldman 1998; Goldman 2006, 2011; Iacaboni 2008; de Vignemont and Singer
2006; Prinz 2011a, 2011b) and concern accounts (Krebs 1975; Batson 1991; Sober &
Wilson 1998; Hoffman 2011).
On a matching account, empathic accuracy occurs when an agent’s internal state matches
the internal state of a target. This matching relation can take one of two forms:
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Matching relation A: An agent has the same experiential states as those of a
target
or
Matching relation B: An agent infers (or represents) the content of a target’s
experiential states
On matching accounts, accurate empathy occurs when one of these two forms of
matching between agent and target occur. For example, imagine a runner participating in
a race that is running in second place. This runner is, at this particular time, feeling
hopeful because they expect to soon pass the first place runner. On a matching account.
For an agent to accurately empathize with this target runner, the agent will either feel
hopeful themselves or think that the target is hopeful.
On concern accounts, accurate empathy occurs when an agent becomes aware of a
target’s concerns and feels motivated to help that target with their concerns. Like on
matching accounts, concern accounts also involve a matching relation between an agent
and a target. But it is important to note that the matching relation on concern accounts is
not the same as either of the two forms of matching relations just mentioned above. On
concern-accounts, the matching relation between an agent and a target is that of matched
affect valence. Affects are individual felt emotional states. They can be classified as
either positive or negative. For example, if I am sad at the loss of a loved one, I would
classify the valence of this emotion as negative. If I am proud that my friend won a race, I
would classify the valence of this emotion as positive. The classification of emotional
states as either positive or negative is to attribute to them a valence (Lazarus 1991).
Accordingly, accurate empathy on concern accounts take the following form:
Matching relation C: The valences of the agent’s experience match the valences
of the target’s experience.
Concern accounts also add that, when accurate empathy occurs, an agent feels motivated
(at least momentarily) to help a target with their concerns. On concern accounts, when
matching relation C occurs it leads an agent to become aware of a target’s concerns. To

98
understand how this occurs, let us return to the example of the runner participating in a
race. For accurate empathy to occur in this case on concern accounts, an agent must first
match the emotional state valences of the target. So when the runner wins the race and
feels pleasure or joy, the runner, in this example, is experiencing an emotional state with
a positive valence. The agent need not match the content of the target’s emotional states.
That is, the agent does not need to feel pleasure or joy. Rather, what is required is that the
agent experience emotional states with the same valences. So an agent that is accurately
empathizing with the runner may be experiencing pride or relief (whereas the runner is
experiencing pleasure and joy). This match of valence then leads the agent to become
aware of the target’s concerns. These concerns may include: the runner’s concern to share
their joy with the other runners; the runner’s concern to be recognized for their efforts in
winning the difficult race, and so on. Having become aware of the runner’s concerns, the
agent will then feel motivated to help the runner with those concerns. It is not required
the agent actually behave in a helpful way. However, what is required is that the agent
feel motivated to help the target with their concerns. Accurate empathy occurs on a
concern account when there is an emotional valence match, and the agent feels motivated
to help the target with their concerns.
On both matching-accounts and concern-accounts, an emotional matching relation
between agent and target is required for empathic accuracy. On a matching account,
accurate empathy requires that an agent match the content of the target’s emotional states.
And on a concern accounts, accurate empathy requires that an agent match the valences
of the target’s emotional states. This accords with the well-established fact that empathy
minimally requires a match between an agent and a target’s conscious emotional states.
But the role of unconscious emotions in empathic accuracy remains unexamined. I will
present a challenge from unconscious emotions to each empathy account type. This will
allow me to specify the implications that unconscious emotions carry for accounts of
empathy. But before presenting these two challenges, I will first specify what
unconscious emotions are.
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3.3 Unconscious emotions
By introspection we can tell that emotions are felt; they involve conscious feelings
(James 1884). During the early part of the twentieth century researchers (particularly in
philosophy) focused their efforts on developing theories of conscious processes. But
recently, a growing number of researchers in philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry
have claimed that unconscious emotions are just as real as conscious ones (Rosenthal
1991; Berridge & Winkielman 2003; Prinz 2004; Wilson 2004; Winkielman et al. 2005).
These researchers were spurred by the development of Freud’s “new science” of
psychoanalysis. Freud posited that certain mental processes occurred independently of
consciousness (Freud 1895). Since then, developments in neurophysiology (Woody and
Phillips 1995), the informational turn in philosophy of the 1950’s (Adams 2003), and the
cognitive revolution in psychology of the 60’s and 70’s (Westen 2002) have documented
that much psychological processing is independent of conscious experience or awareness.
This has been especially relevant to researchers working on emotions because the
existence of unconscious mental processes allows for possibility of unconscious emotions
(Wilson 2003).
Researchers now generally take unconscious emotions to be states of an agent that are
identical to conscious emotional states, except that they are not felt or reportable while
they are instantiated (Kihlstrom 1995, 1999; Kihlstrom et al. 2000; Prinz 2004). Three
areas of study have been particularly influential in promoting this view: psychoanalysis
(as mentioned), evolutionary psychology, and embodied cognition. For example,
evolutionary psychologists claim that humans have evolved a system for recognizing and
reacting to emotional stimuli independent of consciousness (Lundqvist and Öhman
2005). They argue that threatening stimuli, such as angry facial expressions,
unconsciously activate subcortical sites in the brain, and rapidly redirect attention before
the stimuli have been consciously experienced (Lundqvist and Öhman 2005, p 105).
What these psychologists are saying is that felt states such as fear extend beyond
conscious awareness. Further, they hold that the functional and behavioural contribution
of these unconscious precursors to emotional states can occur independently of conscious

100
experience altogether. Accordingly, we can be fearful without feeling fear (Dimberg et al.
2000).
The second area of study in which unconscious emotions feature prominently is in
embodied cognition. Here psychologists have claimed that unconscious emotions
influence both preferences and behaviour (Winkielman et al. 2005; Winkielman et al.
2008). In many studies, participants have been exposed to photos of happy and angry
faces, and asked to sort those photos according to criteria independent of the subject in
the photo’s facial expression. Then participants were asked to pour and drink beverages
they had not drank before. It was found that being exposed to more happy faces than
angry faces resulted in participants pouring and drinking more of the beverages. The
interpretation of these results is that the unconscious emotion of happiness biases the
processing of subsequent stimuli and guides subsequent behaviour (Semin 2008).
Other research in embodied cognition suggests that unconscious emotional processing
influences the speed of sorting tasks. In the experiments of Neumann and Strack (2000),
participants were asked to sort positive, neutral, and negative words. As the words were
presented to participants on a computer screen, circles appeared behind the words as
either increasing in size (moving toward the participants) or decreasing in size (moving
away from the participant). It was found that participants sorted negative terms more
quickly when the circles were moving away from the participants, and positive terms
were sorted more quickly when the circles were moving toward the participants. These
results are taken to show that emotional states can be influenced unconsciously by visual
cues of approach and avoidance (Ibid.). They lend credence to the claim that unconscious
emotional processing affects consciously controlled behaviour.
A final example is that of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, unconscious states
play an important role. He argues that emotional states can be unconscious in at least two
ways. The first of these is when they are repressed (Freud, 1915). An unconscious
emotion that is repressed is one that, at a previous point, may have been experienced
consciously. But because this emotion was negative, the agent has defended against it by
associating it with an idea separate from the original emotion. Thus, the emotion is no
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longer experienced consciously. The agent is only conscious of the idea now associated
with the previously experienced emotion. The experience of the associated emotion has
been repressed.
Another way that unconscious emotions feature in Freudian psychoanalysis is in the
phenomenon of displacement (Freud, 1926). This is a phenomenon whereby one emotion
(e.g. hate) is directed at an intentional object consciously in way that differs from the
emotion’s unconscious intentional object. Here Freud provides the example of a boy who
develops a hatred for horses consciously, but is in truly expressing an unconscious hatred
for his father. When the boy sees his horse get injured, he wishes that it were his father
instead of the horse who is hurt. Rather than accepting this fear of his father, the boy
comes to replace fear with hatred for horses. The consciously felt emotion of fear
develops into hatred, and is then displaced or misdirected at horses. The hatred that the
boy has for horses is thus said to be displaced unconscious hatred for his father (Ibid.).
In the three research areas mentioned above (evolutionary psychology, embodied
cognition, and psychoanalysis) unconscious emotions are states that play the same
functional and behavioural roles as conscious ones, except that they are not felt or
reportable when they occur. Nonetheless, they make the same functional and
motivational contributions as conscious emotions (Erdelyi 1985; Kihlstrom et al. 1984;
Bargh et al. 1982; Bargh et al. 2001; Bargh & Morsella 2008; Bargh and Morsella 2010).
The question then is what requirements do unconscious emotions place on the two types
of empathy accounts and empathic accuracy? The two challenges from unconscious
emotions and the replies to these challenges I will present allow me to specify the
implications that unconscious emotions carry for accounts of empathy.

3.4 Empathy in three parts
Before presenting my two challenges to accounts of empathy, I will in this section review
what empathy is. My description in three parts will allow me to fix reference on accurate
empathy. It is important to distinguish accurate empathy from the whole process of
empathy because accurate empathy refers to the end state of a successful attempt at
empathy. Empathy can be broadly divided into three parts:
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1) Initial conditions
2) The processes that instantiate it (component processes)
3) The end state (empathic accuracy)
A description of empathy’s initial conditions (1) will include the relationship between an
agent of empathy, a potential target of empathy, and an environmental context in which
the agent and the target interact. Which targets are selected by an agent as potential
targets of empathy is a complex issue that I have addressed in the previous paper. I will
not address it here. For present purposes, I merely wish to distinguish the initial
conditions of empathy from the ongoing activity of its component processes. So, once
empathy gets started it can follow one of two procedural routes: the involuntary route and
the voluntary route.32 On the involuntary route, an agent perceives a target, and the
processes of empathy are activated automatically. On the voluntary route, an agent
voluntarily chooses a potential target of empathy that is either perceived, has been
perceived, or is imagined.
The component psychological processes that instantiate empathy can differ on each of
these routes. For example, on the involuntary route, I may come across a target asking for
money on the street. Upon perceiving this target, the process of emotional contagion may
be activated automatically. Emotional contagion is a process by which an agent
involuntarily “catches” the emotions of a target (Doherty 1997). Psychological
experiments have shown that the capacity for this response is either innate or that it can
occur very early in development. Two day old infants cry when they hear another
newborn cry (Simner 1971; Sagi & Hoffman 1976). And it has been shown that this
response is only stimulated by the crying of other infants as opposed to other loud sounds
(Ibid.). In adults too, emotional contagion is a “rudimentary empathic distress reaction”
whereby an agent experiences a vicarious emotional response to the emotions expressed
by a target (Knafo et al. 2008 p 3; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992). Returning to our example
then, the target asking for money on the street may appear cold and sad. Accordingly,

32

Goldman (2011) calls these the “mirroring route” and the “reconstructive route”.
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when empathy gets started, I will “catch” this target’s emotional states involuntarily.
These processes will cause me to experience feelings of sadness. Other processes too may
instantiate empathy on the involuntary route. These include motor mimicry and neural
mimicry. Because I have discussed these processes in detail in the previous paper, I will
not do so here. What is important to emphasize for present purposes is that, once empathy
gets started, there are many involuntary processes that lead to empathic accuracy.
As mentioned, on the involuntary route the component process of empathy can differ
from those on that instantiate empathy on the voluntary route. Under voluntary control
are empathy’s component processes of like-me perspective-taking and like-other
perspective-taking. For example, when I converse with a friend, and that friend tells me
that they have recently lost their job, I may decide to “take their perspective”. When
engaging in like-me perspective-taking, I imagine what it would be like to be in my
friend’s situation as myself (as the agent). I will imagine myself in that target’s situation. I
will imagine what the effects of losing my job would be on me. So for example, if I
would be saddened by losing my job, I will imagine that the target–having lost their job–
will feel sad. In like-me perspective-taking, the agent uses their familiarity with situations
like that of the target to imagine how they (as this agent) would think and feel were they
in the target’s situation.
Alternatively on the voluntary route, I may engage in like-other perspective-taking. Likeother perspective-taking differs from like-me perspective-taking in that there is a
voluntary effort on the part of the agent to concentrate on what it would be like for the
target (not the agent themselves) to be in that situation. Like-other perspective-taking is a
process in which an agent takes into consideration beliefs about the particular target.
These beliefs may include beliefs about a target’s character, their present context, their
history, their values, and so on. What differentiates this mode of perspective-taking is that
I imagine how the particular target’s situation is affecting them, rather than relying on my
familiarity with a type of situation the target is in and my prototypical beliefs about what
I would experience were I in the target’s situation.
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The processes along the voluntary route to empathy can, and often do, recruit the
involuntary processes typical of the involuntary route. For example, when an agent takes
the perspective of a target, this agent may also be sharing some of the agent’s emotional
state by means of emotional contagion or motor mimicry. Alternatively, when
perspective-taking, an agent’s mirror-neuron system may be activated. So the component
processes of empathy can be treated as overlapping along the voluntary route. Similarly,
involuntary component processes can lead an agent to activate voluntary ones. For
example, if a target is selected as a potential target of empathy involuntarily by the
activation of emotional contagion, this process may lead an agent to voluntarily take that
target’s perspective in attempt to more accurately empathize with that target.
We have just seen that once empathy gets started, it can proceed along two routes. Along
these routes, the component processes of empathy will be activated. And eventually, they
will stop. It is when empathy stops that we can carve out a portion of the phenomenon to
be assessed as accurate or inaccurate. This is the outcome of empathy. I have described
above that the part of empathy that is counted as empathic accuracy will differ on each
account type (matching or concern). On a matching account, accurate empathy occurs
when either matching relation (A) or matching relation (B) are instantiated. These
matching relations can be combined as follows:
Accurate empathy on a matching account: when an agent experiences
[matching relation A] or represents [matching relation B] the content of a target’s
emotional state.
Which of these relations (A or B) counts as accurate empathy on a matching account will
vary from one token of this type to another. But what all matching accounts share is that
accurate empathy occurs when there is a match between an agent and the exact content of
a target’s emotional state.
As we have also seen above, when empathy stops on a concern account, accurate
empathy occurs when matching relation (C) is instantiated. On this account type,
accurate empathy occurs when an agent matches the valences of a target’s emotional
states. There need not be a match between the content of the agent and the target’s

105
experiential states. But on concern accounts this is not all that accurate empathy
circumscribes. The agent also needs to be aware of the target’s concerns and feel
motivated to help the target with those concerns. These additional conditions are
introduced on a concern account to better explain the relationship between accurate
empathy and helping behaviour. For example, when speaking to a friend who has just lost
their job, accurate empathy will occur when the agent matches the valences (as opposed
to the content) or a target’s emotional states. If the target is feeling sad, the agent may be
feeling disappointed. So far so good, as long as both the agent’s and target’s emotional
states are congruently valenced—in this example, negatively. But to repeat, concern
accounts add two criteria of empathic accuracy. The agent must become aware of the
target’s concerns such as: communicating their negative emotions with a friend; feeling
re-assured that they will find another job; finding another a job, and so on. And an agent
must feel motivated to help the target with their concerns. Thus, accurate empathy on a
concern account can be summarized as follows:
Accurate empathy on a concern account: (1) when an agent experiences a
congruently valenced (with a target) emotional state; (2) is aware of the target’s
concerns; (3) feels motivated to help the target with their concerns.
We can now see how matching accounts and concern accounts of empathy each employ a
different notion of empathic accuracy. I will now present the first challenge from
unconscious emotions to each account type of empathy.

3.5 Challenge I: Unconscious matching
As we have seen, an account of empathy can employ one of three matching relations to
determine when accurate empathy occurs. In doing so, accounts have focused on the
matching relation between an agent and a target’s conscious emotions. Conscious
emotions are felt emotional states such as sadness or anger. But such emotions can occur
independently of awareness or conscious experience (Rosenthal 1991). The question then
is what requirements do unconscious emotions place on each account type’s notion of
empathic accuracy?
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The first challenge from unconscious emotions is the unconscious matching challenge.
This challenge is directed at matching accounts of empathy. We have seen that on
matching accounts, two types of emotional matching are possible for accurate empathy to
occur. An agent may experience the same conscious emotional states as a target. Or an
agent may represent (without necessarily experiencing) the content of a target’s
conscious emotional states. When combined with a realist position on unconscious
emotions, we can begin to ask questions like: What sort of matching relation would be
required if an account of empathy integrated the role of unconscious emotions?
Unconscious emotions are either unfelt or unreportable while they are instantiated, but
they share two features with conscious emotions. First, unconscious emotions are
functionally equivalent to conscious emotions. This means that they play the same roles
as conscious emotions within an agent’s overall psychology. So for example, an agent
who is consciously happy will form preferences for new beverages more easily than an
agent that is consciously sad. Similarly, if an agent is primed to be unconsciously happy
(or to be unaware of their happiness), this agent too will form a liking for new beverages
more easily. The second feature that unconscious emotions share with conscious ones is
that they are taken to be potentially behaviourally equivalent. This means that the causal
contribution of an emotional state to an agent’s behaviour can be the same regardless of
whether the state is conscious or unconscious. Returning to a previous example, an agent
may feel motivated to harm his horse and do so because he is consciously angry at the
horse. Alternatively, an agent may harm his horse because that agent has displaced fear of
his father that is now being directed at his horse. In the former case, the conscious
emotion of anger results in the agent harming his horse. And in the latter case, the
unconsciously displaced emotion of fear is resulting in the same behavioural outcome.
On a matching account, accurate empathy occurs when an agent matches the conscious
emotional states of a target (Darwall 1998; Prinz 2011a, 2011b). The unconscious
matching challenge then asks of matching accounts whether an agent must match both
the target's conscious and unconscious emotional states; and if so, how is this achieved.
Including unconscious emotions when formulating the matching relations that are
possible on matching accounts of empathy allows us to see the problem more clearly. If

107
on a matching account, an agent must match the unconscious emotions of a target, two
possible matching relations are possible:
Matching relation A2: An agent has the same unconscious emotions as that of a
target
or
Matching relation B2: An agent represents the content of a target’s unconscious
emotions
I think that we can meet the unconscious matching challenge on a matching account that
employs either of the above matching relations for accurate empathy. I will present three
replies to this challenge. Our aim in trying to solve this puzzle is to determine whether
matching accounts of empathy can retain a useful notion of empathic accuracy. At stake
is our ability to assess empathic accuracy on matching accounts. On such accounts,
accurate empathy requires that the agent and that target’s states be identical. This may be
very difficult to assess if it requires that both the agents and targets have the same
unconscious emotional states. Furthermore, even if the difficulty of assessing whether
accurate empathy has occurred is overcome, the unconscious matching challenge may
make it difficult to defend a matching account of empathy if empathy occurs only very
rarely on such an account.

3.5.1

First reply: Eliminativism

‘Eliminativism’ is a term used to refer to the thesis that a category of entities, processes,
or properties do not exist (Ramsey et al. 1990). A standard example is eliminativism
about witches. In the past, witches were posited in explanations of various calamities
(Ibid.). But they have since been eliminated from explanations of these same calamities.
People concluded that positing witches did not contribute to explaining the phenomena
under consideration. Repeatedly in science, certain entities are posited and then later
eliminated in subsequent theories. For example, phlogiston was posited to explain
combustion and rusting. Items were said to contain phlogiston that was released when
burnt. This release explained the burning process and why items lost mass after burning.
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Phlogiston was later eliminated from these theories in light of evidence showing that
certain substances (such as magnesium) actually gained in mass when burned. There is
evidence that information processing occurs unconsciously, and some compelling
evidence of their functional contribution to decision-making in embodied cognition. I will
not attempt to argue for whether unconscious emotions should be eliminated on a
matching account of empathy. I present the position merely as one that can meet the
unconscious matching challenge.
A researcher proposing a matching account of empathy can meet the unconscious
matching challenge by being an eliminativist about unconscious emotions. The researcher
can accept that much “information processing” goes on unconsciously. For example,
many component processes of vision operate independent of consciousness. Evidence of
this is borne out in cases of brain injury. Agents with brain lesions sometimes experience
hemi-neglect, whereby they respond to visual stimuli in the visual field that is
contralateral to the area of the lesion without consciously experiencing the stimuli
(Gelder 2005). An empathy researcher may accept that this type of unconscious
information processing occurs, but deny the existence of unconscious emotions for at
least two reasons. First, it is difficult to identify and explain the connections between
unconscious emotions, conscious states (including conscious emotions), and behaviours
(Izard 2009, p 12). This is especially problematic in psychoanalysis where the
identification of the roles that unconscious emotions play requires long-term interaction
and familiarity with an agent’s particular situation and history. Second, although these
connections have been identified more robustly in evolutionary psychology and
embodied cognition, most unconscious emotional states have yet to be correlated with
neural states (Ibid.). Some of the psychological processing involved in facial recognition,
for example, has been neurally correlated (Ekman 2003). However, many unconscious
emotions taken to influence preferences (as in the beverage drinking experiment), and
motivations (in evolutionary psychology) have not been correlated with neural states.
Thus, there are reasons for being an eliminativist about unconscious emotions. It is
difficult to explain their functional contribution, and it is difficult to identify their neural
correlates.
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The eliminitavist can answer “no” to the question of whether empathy requires that an
agent match both a target’s conscious and unconscious emotions. This is because, on this
view, unconscious emotional states do not exist. If unconscious emotional states do not
exist, a target of empathy does not have any such states. Therefore, an agent cannot
match the unconscious emotions of a target.

3.5.2

Second reply: Restrictivism

‘Restrictivism’ is the term I will be using to refer to a theory that restricts an explanation
of the phenomenon under consideration to only certain ontological posits. My usage of
the term is close to that of Prinz (2011c) who calls “restrictivism” the position that all
conscious states are perceptual states. Prinz argues that an explanation of cognitive
phenomenology can be restricted to positing mental images and inner speech. The details
of his position are not important for present purposes. What I would like to emphasize
(and use) is the argumentative or theoretical strategy that Prinz employs. Restrictivism on
this usage refers to a position which restricts the explanation of a phenomenon X to a
restricted set of entities. The grounds for why an explanation should be restricted are not
often made explicit. But the principle seems to involve the claim that the restricted theory
can do everything the less restricted theory can do (if not better).33 In Prinz’s case,
restrictivism involves explaining all conscious experience by appeal to a restricted set of
entities, namely mental images and inner speech acts (Ibid.). This same argumentative
strategy can be used by a researcher espousing a matching account of empathy to meet
the unconscious matching challenge.
The unconscious matching challenges asks whether, on a matching account, an agent
needs to match the unconscious emotions of a target for accurate empathy to occur. We
have seen that on a matching account, two types of matching relations are possible:

33

Restrictivism seems to be equivalent to Ockham’s razor argument.

110
Matching relation A: An agent has the same experiences as those of a target
or
Matching relation B: An agent infers (or represents) the content of a target’s
experience
Restrictivism about unconscious emotions can be used to meet the unconscious matching
challenge on an account where matching relation A is the criterion for accurate empathy.
On matching relation A, accurate empathy occurs when experienced emotional states of
an agent match those of a target (Iacaboni 2008; Prinz 2011a, 2011b). It follows that
because a target’s unconscious emotions are not felt experiences, an agent that this
empathizing with this target cannot have matching experiences of such states. An agent
need not have the same unconscious emotional states as a target (matching relation A2)
because an explanation of accurate empathy can be restricted to states that are
consciously experienced. Thus, the unconscious matching challenge is met by restricting
the ontology to be used in explanations of accurate empathy to a match between an agent
and a target’s consciously experienced states.
Before moving on, I will consider a variation on matching relation A that takes into
consideration a different notion of unconscious emotions. In this section, I have treated
unconscious emotions as unfelt states lacking in phenomenal experiential content.
However, Rosenthal (1991) treats unconscious emotions differently. For him,
unconscious emotions can be experienced, but they occur independently of awareness.
For example, a target may experience anger but not recognize or be aware of the
experience (Ibid.). But even when there is no recognition or awareness of this conscious
emotional state, the target nonetheless is said to have an emotion with an experienced
phenomenal quality. Thus, for Rosenthal, unconscious emotions are states that we feel
but are not attentively aware of. How then would a researcher espousing an account of
empathy with matching relation A and Rosenthal’s notion of unconscious emotions
respond to the unconscious matching challenge? Let us first look at what matching
relation A requires of Rosenthal’s notion of unconscious emotions.
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Let us assume that a potential target of empathy is experiencing sadness that they are not
aware of. Matching relation A would then require that an agent also experience this
sadness. So far so good. Having restricted the explanation of accurate empathy to
experienced states, a researcher can accommodate Rosenthal’s notion of unconscious
emotions on a matching account as long as the agent matches the target’s unaware but
felt states. However, it is unclear whether such an account of empathy requires that an
agent merely experience the same unaware emotional states as the target, or whether the
account also requires that the agent be unaware of their own experienced emotional
states.
Alternatively, a less stringent account would not impose this condition on the agent’s
awareness. Accurate empathy would occur when the agent experiences the same unaware
emotional states as a target regardless of whether the agent knows that the target is
unaware of them. An even less stringent account would impose even less on the agent’s
emotional awareness. As in the previous variation, accurate empathy would occur when
the agent experiences the same unaware emotional states as the target and the agent need
not have any awareness of the target’s awareness (or lack thereof) of their states.
Furthermore, the agent themselves may not be aware that they are experiencing the
emotional states being matched between agent and target.

112
Figure 3: An agent matching a target’s experienced emotions outside of awareness

For Rosenthal, unconscious emotions are experienced states that we are not aware of.
Adopting restrictivism can be used to meet the unconscious matching challenge on a
standard matching account or a matching account that uses Rosenthal’s notion of
unconscious (unaware) emotions. What restrictivism requires is that only experienced
states be matched between agent and target for accurate empathy to occur. It does not
necessarily impose conditions on an agent’s awareness of their own emotions, nor on an
agent’s beliefs about a target’s emotional awareness. It merely requires that both agent
and target have the same emotional experiences regardless of whether either the agent or
the target are aware of those experiences.

3.5.3

Third reply: Rejecting the challenge

We have just seen that restrictivism is a reply to the unconscious matching challenge on a
matching account of empathy that uses matching relation A. I turn now to a reply to this
first challenge that is directed at matching accounts of empathy that use matching relation
B, instead. When accurate empathy occurs on a matching account that employs matching
relation B, an agent infers to (or represents) the content of a target’s emotional
experience. The question then is how can one reply to the unconscious matching
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challenge on such an account of empathy? Does such an account require that an agent
also represent the content of a target’s unconscious emotional states for accurate empathy
to occur? 34
The simple reply to the unconscious matching challenge in this case is “yes”. I have titled
this reply to the unconscious matching challenge a “rejection” of the challenge because
on a matching account that uses matching relation B, this challenge, in a sense, poses no
challenge. A matching account that uses matching relation B can meet the unconscious
matching challenge without amendment or qualification to the account. Accurate
empathy will simply occur when an agent represents the content of a target’s unconscious
emotional states. For example, if a target has an unconscious emotional state of happiness
(as in the new beverage drinking experiments), then an agent must represent that agent’s
unconscious emotional state for accurate empathy to occur. On this reply, a researcher
need not adopt eliminativism about unconscious emotions. Nor does the researcher need
to restrict the set of explanatory entities to those consciously experienced. All an agent
needs to be able to do for accurate empathy to occur is have a mental representation about
the content of a target’s emotional experiences. However, a difficulty with this response
is that it is unclear how an agent comes to represent the target’s unconscious emotional
states.
I called this “rejection reply” simple. It is a simple reply because it rejects the
unconscious matching challenge by meeting it without change to the account. But its
simplicity veils the complexities that arise from putting such an account of empathy into
practice. The case of the beverage drinking experiment mentioned above was relatively
straightforward. In that case, the agent was an experimenter, and the target was a
participant in an experiment whose hypothesis was about the relationship between
unconscious emotions and decisions to drink a beverage. In such a case, it is easy for the
agent to hypothesize (and thus represent) the unconscious emotions that the target has
because the agent has constructed the environment in which the agent and the target
interact for the very purpose of proving this hypothesis. The agent (experimenter) has

34

See matching relation B2.
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primed the unsuspecting target (participant) to have certain unconscious emotional states
(e.g. unconscious happiness). Then the agent has inferred the relationship between these
unconscious emotions and the behaviours of the target. Thus, the agent accurately
empathizes with the target by forming an accurate representation of the target’s
unconscious emotional states. But an accurate match between an agent’s representations
and the content of a target’s unconscious emotional states is not always so easily
achieved. Even in this experimental case, we might be skeptical of the claim that the
experiment has successfully primed unconscious happiness.
Recall that the first reply—eliminativism—was considered on the grounds that (1)
unconscious emotions are difficult to identify and trace, and (2) that they are not easily
correlated with brain states. If a researcher maintains that unconscious emotions exist
while espousing a matching-account of empathy (with matching relation B), then that
researcher must also provide an account of how accurate empathy occurs in less artificial
environments of agent / target interaction. An example of such an environment is one
where the agent is a psychoanalyst and the target is a client. In this case, the agent may
have the theoretical knowledge to identify a target’s unconscious emotional states and the
skill to determine the connection between them and the target’s behaviour. However, in
the best of cases, this requires that the agent and the target interact over an extended time.
The agent must have a detailed familiarity with the particular target and how the
situations of their lives are affecting them. But this is not something that everyone is
trained to do. As mentioned, specific education and skill are prerequisites for reliably and
accurately representing the unconscious emotions of targets. And even then, there exists
intense and ongoing theoretical disagreement between the various schools and subdisciplines of psychoanalysis and psychiatry generally. How can an agent be sure that
they are accurately representing the unconscious emotions of a target? Thus, the
unconscious matching challenge presents a serious epistemological problem for matching
accounts of empathy.
Matching accounts have not sufficiently explored the problem of how an agent is able to
reliably form representations of a target’s unconscious emotional states. Even
experiments performed to show how agents represent a target’s conscious emotional
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states generally have not required that participants have any special training in identifying
the unconscious emotions of targets. For example, Icke’s “dyadic interaction paradigm”
for measuring empathy is based on a matching account this type (Ickes & Tooke, 1988;
Ickes et al. 1990; Stinson & Ickes, 1992).35 Briefly, it involves two participants
interacting for five minutes while unknowingly being videotaped. Then, the participants
are asked to re-watch the video of their interaction several times noting at co-varying
points what they (the agent) were thinking and feeling and what their interaction partner
(the target) was thinking and feeling. When there is a match between what the agent takes
the target to have been experiencing and what the target reports to have been
experiencing, a point is assigned to the agent for having accurately empathized with the
target. Accordingly, such a matching account can meet the unconscious matching
challenge as long as the agent is also able to accurately represent the content of the
target’s unconscious emotional states.36 But without the relevant training, it is unlikely
that this will occur frequently. Even in current dyadic interaction experiments where
agents are limited by an experimenter’s instructions to inferring what targets are
consciously thinking a feeling, their empathic abilities vary widely (Ibid.). It follows that
it will be even more difficult for an agent to accurately represent a target’s unconscious
emotional states in environments (outside of a laboratory) where no such limits exist.
For accurate empathy to occur on a matching-account (with matching relation B), agents
must accurately represent both the conscious and the unconscious emotions of their
interactions partners. Although such an account can reject the unconscious matching
challenge outright, this reveals that its criteria for accurate empathy are stringent. They
place a high demand on the abilities of agents to represent the content of a target’s
unconscious states. And as we have seen, even in stable laboratory environments, such
accurate representations are hard to come by.

In some studies, this paradigm has been used to measure therapist’s empathic ability (Ickes 1993).
The target’s unconscious emotional states would have to be independently identified because the target
would not be conscious of them.
35
36
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3.6 Challenge II: Unconscious concerns
I will now move on to present and reply to the second challenge from unconscious
emotions: the unconscious concerns challenge. Whereas the first challenge from
unconscious emotions was directed at matching accounts of empathy that employed
matching relations A and B, this second challenge is directed at concern accounts of
empathy that employ matching relation C. Recall that on matching accounts, accurate
empathy occurs when an agent becomes aware of a target’s concerns and feels motivated
to help that target with their concerns. The agent’s awareness of the target’s concerns on
concern accounts results from an affective match whose form is different from the
matching relations we have seen used on matching accounts. Rather than a match in
experiencing or representing a target’s emotional states, concern accounts employ a form
of matching whereby an agent matches the valences of the target’s emotional states. On
concern accounts, the emotional valence-match between agent and target contributes to
the agent’s awareness of the target’s concerns, and accurate empathy occurs when this
valence match causes an agent to feel motivated to help the target with their concerns
(Batson and Shaw 1991; Hoffman 2012). But what if the true concerns of the target (as
opposed to the apparent concern) are caused by unconscious emotions?
It is well established that conscious emotions are motivational (Maslow et al. 1954;
Lazarus 1991; Prinz 2004). Many of our everyday and mundane concerns are motivated
by conscious emotional states. For example, when someone insults us, we may feel
anger. Our concern to retaliate against the offender will be motivated by this anger.
Alternatively, when alone and encountering someone for the first time in an isolated
location, we may feel fear. And this feeling of fear may motivate our concern to avoid or
flee from the person we are encountering. Accordingly, we can say that emotions
motivate concerns. I am using a ‘concern’ here to include things like goals and needs. A
target may put more effort into work because they are concerned about losing their job.
Or a target may be concerned about finding a new job after having looked for one for a
long time. The concerns in these cases will be motivated by conscious emotions such as a
joy or anxiety. But what if an agent's behaviours and concerns are motivated by
unconscious emotional states? The challenge of unconscious concerns asks: must an
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agent be aware of the unconscious concerns of a target to accurately empathize with that
target? Clearly, if an agent misperceives the concerns of a target, the agent may still be
motivated to alleviate those falsely perceived concerns. The challenge of unconscious
needs does not deny this. Rather it asks: does accurate empathy on a concern account
require that an agent become aware of the unconscious concerns of a target as opposed to
the target’s apparent concerns?
To better understand the force of this challenge, let us return to Freud’s description of a
repressed unconscious emotion (Freud 1915). In this example, a boy Hans consciously
fears his father, and the boy’s concern is to harm his father. Hans eventually displaces the
object of fear (his father) with another object, a horse. He now fears horses, and he is
concerned with seeing them harmed or doing harm to them. We can now ask how a
concern account of empathy would deal with such a case. Does a concern account of
empathy require that an agent match the valences of Hans’s unconscious emotions?
Would accurate empathy only occur when an agent becomes aware of Hans’s
unconscious concern with harming his father, or would it suffice for the agent to become
aware of Hans’s conscious concern with harming horses? We can reformulate matching
relation C on a concern account that requires an unconscious emotional valence match
between an agent and a target as follows:
Matching relation C2: An agent’s unconscious emotional valences match the
target’s unconscious emotional valences.
Accurate empathy on concern accounts that employs matching relation C2 would require
that an agent (1) have unconscious emotions whose valences match those of the target;
that the agent (2) be aware of the target’s unconscious concerns; and that the agent (3)
feel motivated to help the target with those unconscious concerns. So when an agent is
empathizing with Hans, that agent would, in the first stage, have an unconscious
emotional state (in this case fear). The agent would also be unconsciously concerned with
harming horses. In the second stage, the agent would then become consciously aware that
their own unconscious concern for harming horses is a displaced unconscious concern for
harming their father. At this point, the agent may be said to be accurately empathizing
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with Hans. But this is a strange result indeed. The agent, presumably, was not aware of
their concern with harming their own father prior to empathizing with Hans. The agent
may get along perfectly well with his father; or their father may no longer even be alive.
The agent may very soon come to believe that these are not in fact his concerns but
Hans’. But on an unconscious concern account that espouses matching relation C2, the
agent must at some point instantiate the unconscious emotional states with the same
valence as the target and the target’s unconscious concerns.
Taking into consideration role of unconscious emotions on a concern account imposes
very strong criteria for accurate empathy. Indeed, it would seem like too high a
theoretical price to pay for the researcher espousing a concern account of empathy,
because these criteria would make it nearly impossible for accurate empathy to occur in
everyday situations. For accurate empathy to occur frequently, an agent would require
specialized training in order to themselves have unconscious emotions with the same
valences as those of a target’s unconscious emotions. Further, the agent would have to
become aware of the target’s unconscious concerns, and feel motivated to help with those
concerns.
Here, as in the third reply to the first challenge from unconscious emotions, the
researcher espousing a concern account of empathy may reject this second challenge
from unconscious concerns and accept the challenge as presented without modifying their
account of empathy. But what made the rejection reply more appealing on a matching
account of empathy was that the agent merely had to represent that content of the target’s
unconscious emotions. The agent did not have to represent the valences of those
emotions. However, on a concern account, an agent would have to themselves have
unconscious emotions with valences that match those of the target’s unconscious
emotions. The agent would also have to become aware of the target’s unconscious
concerns. These criteria for accurate empathy are different from those of matching
accounts. On a concern account then, the implications that follow from including
unconscious emotions in one’s theory of accurate empathy are more severe. Specifically,
if we reject the challenge from unconscious concerns without modifying the criteria for
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accurate empathy on a concern account, then we must accept that accurate empathy will
almost never occur.
The replies of eliminativism and restrictivism are also available in reply to the challenge
from unconscious concerns. But because of the third criterion of empathic accuracy on
concern accounts–that agents feel motivated to help targets with their concerns–it is
premature to restrict accurate empathy to conscious concerns at this stage of responding
to the challenge. If a target’s unconscious emotions cause unconscious concerns, then it is
incumbent upon an agent (on a concern account) to be aware of those concerns in order to
have the relevant motivations to help that target. In the remainder of the paper, I will
present a reply to the challenge from unconscious concerns drawing from Louis
Charland’s indeterminacy thesis of affect valence [ITAV]. By adopting the ITAV, we
give up some of the features that unconscious emotions might have. But what we gain is
a concern account of empathy that integrates the role of unconscious emotions and makes
it possible for accurate empathy to occur much more frequently.

3.6.1

The indeterminacy of affect valence reply

Proponents of Freudian psychoanalysis believe that unconscious emotions significantly
shape unconscious motivations and overt behaviour (Suppes and Warren 1975; Rorty
2000).37 In the previous section we examined a case in psychiatry that exemplified this.
In evolutionary psychology, conscious emotions are also the cause of unconscious
concerns (Cosmides & Tooby 2000, p 119, 130; Buss 2000, p 400; Pinker 1997). For
example, Cosmides and Tooby (2000) state that the experience of fear causes changes in
behaviour that are motivated by concerns that need not be conscious. The example they
provide is of an agent walking alone at night and experiencing fear because they are
possibly being stalked or about to be ambushed (Cosmides and Tooby 2000, p 3). In this
case, the agent consciously experiences fear and is consciously concerned about being
stalked or ambushed. But with this conscious experience of fear come many unconscious
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Technically Freud does not think that unconscious emotions are not felt. They are what he calls part of
the conscious unconscious. The reasons why they remain conscious is a matter of interpretation. But it is
important to remember that these emotions are unconscious to the extent that they are never noticed or
reportable.
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concerns such as: a concern for safety; a concern for the location of loved ones; a concern
for the location of others that can protect me; a concern for finding a defensive position
(Ibid.). As in examples of unconscious concerns from psychoanalysis and embodied
cognition, this evolutionary psychological example makes salient the force of the
challenge from unconscious concerns. Here again the question is whether it is sufficient
that an agent become aware of the target’s conscious concern about being stalked, or
whether an agent must also become aware of the target’s unconscious concerns such as
the location of others, and finding a safe location. According to evolutionary
psychologists, although agents experiencing fear are only consciously concerned with
being stalked or ambushed, they also have many unconscious concerns that are
functionally and behaviourally equivalent to conscious concerns. And as in the
psychoanalytical tradition, the unconscious concerns posited in evolutionary psychology
have the same motivational influence on behaviour as conscious ones.
The view that emotions (both conscious and unconscious) can cause unconscious
motivational concerns is one that is endorsed by Prinz (2004). I will only briefly
summarize his view here, but it is notable because Prinz believes that certain emotions
are intrinsically valenced (Prinz 2004, p 164). For example, he believes that fear is
always negatively valenced. This means that the object of fear is always experienced
unpleasantly or as something to withdraw from (Prinz 2004, p 167-168). Prinz believes
that fear is intrinsically valenced for evolutionary reasons (Prinz 2004, p 164). Were fear
and other “trademark negative emotions” not intrinsically valenced, he believes that
“[w]e would gain little [evolutionary] benefit” (Ibid.). Fear he says, is an “embodied
appraisal” that alerts us to danger (which is always negative). What is of special
relevance for present purposes is that Prinz believes that intrinsically valenced
unconscious emotions, such as unconscious fear, also exist (Prinz 2004, p 168, 198). On
his view, unconscious fear then is functionally and behaviourally identical to fear except
that it is not felt or reportable while it occurs.
Prinz cites an experiment on female fear of spiders to support the claim that unconscious
emotions with intrinsic valences exist (Prinz 2004, p 203). In this experiment, adult
females were asked to perform a series of actions that progressively required closer
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interaction with a spider (Arntz 1993). They were first asked to walk towards a spider
that was captive in a jar. Then they were asked to touch the jar, to open it, to use a pencil
to touch the spider, and so on. Participants could refuse to perform any subtask at any
point. Before the tasks, some participants were given an opioid antagonist that blocks
brain receptors for endorphin and encephalin that correlated with analgesia and feelings
of well-being. The other participants were given a placebo. Unsurprisingly, the
participants who were given the drug stopped participating in the experiments prior to
those who were given the placebo. However, a surprising result was that both groups of
participants reported having subjective experiences of fear that were about the same in
qualitative feel. Prinz argues that this difference in the behaviour of the two groups
(opioid antagonist compared to placebo) suggests a difference in emotional states, despite
conscious experiences of the participants being the same. Prinz thinks that the group
which took the opioid antagonist stopped participating in the experiment earlier because
they were more strongly motivated by states of unconscious fear. The group that took the
placebo continued participating longer. Presumably this was because their fear (both
conscious and unconscious) was being influenced by the activity of their unfettered
neuroreceptors. Prinz takes this evidence to support the conclusion that intrinsically
valenced unconscious emotions influence motivation and behaviour.
As mentioned, the implications of Prinz’s view (and others like it) for concern accounts
of empathy are significant. If a potential target of empathy has unconscious and
intrinsically valenced emotions that cause their unconscious concerns, then for accurate
empathy to occur, an agent will not only have to match the valences of these unconscious
emotions, they will also have to become aware of the targets’ unconscious concerns. The
problem here is that accurate empathy would be so infrequent as to render concern
accounts of empathy trivial—they would scarcely be explaining empathy at all. A
possible reply to this challenge is to sever the connection between unconscious emotions
and motivational concerns. To do so, a proponent of a concern account of empathy can
appeal to Charland’s indeterminacy thesis of affect valence [ITAV].
Charland (2005a) investigates what we have already seen to be a central feature of
emotional experience: affect valence. Affects are simply individual felt emotional states.
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And we have seen that such states can be classified as either positive or negative. For
example, when I experience sadness at the loss of loved one, I likely classify this
experience as negative. I stress the likeliness of my classification in this example because
what Charland argues, contra Prinz, is that the valences of emotional states are not
intrinsic to those states. They are not intrinsically pleasant and desirable or unpleasant
and to be avoided. In other words, the emotional experiences that a target has cannot be
described as positive or negative a priori. Emotional experiences are not objectively
either positive or negative. Whether a target’s emotional experience is positive or
negative will depend on the target attending to and reporting on their emotional
experience. The valence of a particular emotional state (an affect) is “created and
structured” by features of second-order awareness of that state (Charland 2005a, p 235).38
This awareness of an emotional state does not create the phenomenology of the state.
Rather, it shapes what an emotional state means to us, and hence shapes its valence. It
follows that an agent that is attempting to empathize with a target cannot be accurately
aware of the target’s emotion state valence prior to the target attending to their emotional
experience. This is because, prior to the target attending to their experience, their
emotional state valences are indeterminate.
It is important to emphasize that the main point of the ITAV—that valence is not an
intrinsic property of affects—is opposed to Prinz’s view mentioned above. On Prinz’s
view, some emotions, like fear, are always intrinsically negatively valenced. The negative
valence of fear is always a property of fearful states. On the other hand, the ITAV makes
it possible that some fearful states are not intrinsically valenced. For example, a target
that is exhilarated by fear while skydiving may classify the valence of this affect as
positive. On Charland’s view, it is the interaction between attention and phenomenal
experience that fixes the valence of an affect as either positive or negative. Valence is
indeterminate prior to attention and report. It is a dynamically created property.

38

It is important to note that valence is created and structured by features of second-order awareness. The
content of the valence—whether a particular emotional state will be valenced positively or negatively—will
be dependent upon other factors including development and learning throughout the history of the agent.

123
Returning to the challenge: does accurate empathy (on concern accounts) require that an
agent recognize both the apparent conscious concerns and the less apparent unconscious
concerns of a target? The researcher espousing a concern account of empathy who also
espouses the ITAV can reply “no” because unconscious emotions are non-valenced, and
hence non-motivational states. Unconscious emotional states are states that occur
independent of conscious attention or awareness. It follows that if the valence of a
conscious emotional state is indeterminate prior to awareness, and an unconscious
emotional state is one that occurs independent of awareness, then the valence of an
unconscious emotional state is also indeterminate. We can now see that the implications
of the ITAV for replying to the challenge from unconscious concerns are significant. It is
compatible with the ITAV that unconscious emotional states exist. But it is not
compatible that unconscious emotions are motivational–they do not cause unconscious
concerns. By giving up on the claim that unconscious emotional states can have the
“same informational function” as conscious emotional states, a theorist can reply to this
second challenge. Accurate empathy does not require an agent to have unconscious
emotional states whose valences match those of a target because unconscious emotional
states are not yet valenced. Furthermore, because unconscious emotional states do no
cause unconscious concerns, an agent does not need to become aware of a target’s
unconscious concerns caused by unconscious emotions.

3.7 Concluding remarks
We have seen that a theorist espousing a matching account of empathy can choose from
at least three replies to the first unconscious matching challenge. First there was
eliminativism, according to which unconscious emotions do not exist, and thus a
matching relation between an agent and target’s unconscious emotions cannot be
established. Second we considered restrictivism, according to which an agent does not
need to match a target’s unconscious emotional states in experience because unconscious
emotional states do not have experiential content. And third we considered rejecting the
challenge without modification to the matching account. According to this last reply,
accurate empathy would require that an agent represent a target’s unconscious emotions.
But we also saw that this third reply faces two difficulties. The nature of an agent’s
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access to these representations is not sufficiently described. And the requirements of
specialized knowledge and training that this reply imposes would make the occurrence of
accurate empathy infrequent.
Next I argued that by incorporating Charland’s indeterminacy thesis of affect valence, a
theorist espousing a concern-account of empathy can reply to the unconscious concern
challenge. This allowed us to see that unconscious emotions are not functionally and
behaviourally equivalent to conscious emotions. Unconscious emotions are not
motivational because they are not valenced, hence they do not cause unconscious
concerns. That a theorist can meet these challenges from unconscious emotions is good
news for empathy research. It means that both matching accounts and concern accounts
of empathy can take into consideration the role of unconscious emotions in empathy and
be equipped with a good theory of empathic accuracy. My care account, developed in the
previous paper, benefits from this insofar as it can meet the unconscious concern
challenge by adopting the indeterminacy of affect valence reply.

125

References
Adams, Frederick. “The Informational Turn in Philosophy.” Minds and Machines 13.4
(2003): 471–501. Print.
Albert, Stanford CA Gordon H. Bower, others. Cognition and Emotion. Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Arntz, Arnoud. “Endorphins Stimulate Approach Behaviour, but Do Not Reduce
Subjective Fear. A Pilot Study.” Behaviour research and therapy 31.4 (1993):
403–405. Print.
Bargh, John A et al. “The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of
Behavioral Goals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81.6 (2001):
1014–1027. CrossRef. Web.
Bargh, John A., and Ezequiel Morsella. “The Unconscious Mind.” Perspectives on
psychological science 3.1 (2008): 73–79. Print.
---. “Unconscious Behavioral Guidance Systems.” Then a miracle occurs: Focusing on
behavior in social psychological theory and research (2010): 89–118. Print.
Bargh, John A., and Paula Pietromonaco. “Automatic Information Processing and Social
Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented outside of Conscious
Awareness on Impression Formation.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 43.3 (1982): 437. Print.
Batson, C. Daniel. The Altruism Question. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991. Print.
Berridge, Kent, and Piotr Winkielman. “What Is an Unconscious emotion? (The Case for
Unconscious‘ Liking’).” Cognition & Emotion 17.2 (2003): 181–211. Print.
Breuer, Joseph, and Sigmund Freud. Studies on Hysteria. Basic Books, 1895.
Charland, Louis C. “Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence.” Emotion
and consciousness (2005): 231–254. Guilford Press, NY: New York. Print.
---. “The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem.” Journal of
consciousness studies 12.8-10 (2005): 82–102. Print.
Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby. “Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions.”
Handbook of emotions (2000): 91–115. Guilford Press, NY: New York. Print.
De Vignemont, Frederique, and Tania Singer. “The Empathic Brain: How, When and
Why?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10.10 (2006): 435–441. CrossRef. Web.
Dimberg, U., M. Thunberg, and K. Elmehed. “Unconscious Facial Reactions to

126
Emotional Facial Expressions.” Psychological Science 11.1 (2000): 86–89.
CrossRef. Web.
Doherty, R. William. “The Emotional Contagion Scale: A Measure of Individual
Differences.” Journal of nonverbal Behavior 21.2 (1997): 131–154. Print.
Ekman, Paul. Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve
Communication and Emotional Life. New York: Times Books, 2003. Print.
Erdelyi, Matthew Hugh. Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Cognitive Psychology. WH
Freeman/Times Books/Henry Holt & Co, 1985.
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and
Social Cognition.” Annual Review of Psychology 59.1 (2008): 255–278. CrossRef.
Web.
Evans, Jonathan St.B.T. “In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.” Trends
in Cognitive Sciences 7.10 (2003): 454–459. CrossRef. Web.
Freud, S. Repression. Standard Edition, 14: 141-158. London: Hogarth Press, 1915.
Print.
Freud, Sigmund. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. WW Norton & Company, 1926.
Print.
Gallese, Vittorio, and Alvin Goldman. “Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of
Mind-Reading.” Trends in cognitive sciences 2.12 (1998): 493–501. Print.
Gelder, B De. “Nonconscious Emotions” in Barrett et Al. Handbook of emotions (2010).
Gilford Press. Print.
Goldman, Alvin. “Two Routes to Empathy.” Empathy: Philosophical and psychological
perspectives (2011): 31. Print.
Goldman, Alvin I. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of
Mindreading. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Hoffman, Martin L. “Empathy, Justice, and the Law.” Empathy: Philosophical and
Psychological Perspectives (2011): 230–54. Print.
Iacoboni, Marco. Mirroring people: The new science of how we connect with others.
Macmillan, 2009.
Ickes, William. “Empathic Accuracy.” Journal of personality 61.4 (1993): 587–610.
Print.
---. “Naturalistic Social Cognition: Empathic Accuracy in Mixed-Sex Dyads.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 59.4 (1990): 730. Print.

127
Ickes, William, and William Tooke. “The Observational Method: Studying the
Interaction of Minds and Bodies.” (1988).
Izard, Carroll E. “Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and
Emerging Issues.” Annual Review of Psychology 60.1 (2009): 1–25. CrossRef.
Web.
James, William. “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology.” Mind 33 (1884): 1–
26. Print.
Kihlstrom, John F. “Conscious versus Unconscious Cognition.” The nature of cognition
(1999): 173–203. Print.
---. “The Rediscovery of the Unconscious.” Santa Fe Institute Studies in the sciences of
complexity-Proceedings Volume-. Vol. 22. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1995.
123–123.
Kihlstrom, John F., Terrence M. Barnhardt, and Douglas J. Tataryn. “The Psychological
Unconscious: Found, Lost, and Regained.” (1992).
Knafo, Ariel et al. “The Developmental Origins of a Disposition toward Empathy:
Genetic and Environmental Contributions.” Emotion 8.6 (2008): 737. Print.
Krebs, Dennis. “Empathy and Altruism.” Journal of personality and social psychology
32.6 (1975): 1134. Print.
Lazarus, Richard S. Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Maslow, Abraham Harold, Robert Frager, and Ruth Cox. Motivation and personality.
Eds. James Fadiman, and Cynthia McReynolds. Vol. 2. New York: Harper &
Row, 1970.
McClelland, David C., and David A. Pilon. “Sources of Adult Motives in Patterns of
Parent Behavior in Early Childhood.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 44.3 (1983): 564. Print.
Neumann, Roland, and Fritz Strack. “‘Mood Contagion’: The Automatic Transfer of
Mood between Persons.” Journal of personality and social psychology 79.2
(2000): 211. Print.
Pettit, Gordon. “Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism.” Philosophical
studies 107.3 (2002): 219–237. Print.
Prinz, Jesse. "Is empathy necessary for morality?" Empathy: Philosophical and
psychological perspectives (2011): 211-229. Prinz, Jess. “The Sensory Bias of
Cognitive Phenomenology.” Cognitive Phenomenology. Ed. Tim Bayne and
Michelle Montague. Oxford University Press, 2011.

128
Prinz, Jesse. “Against Empathy.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 214–
233. CrossRef. Web.
Prinz, Jesse J. Gut Reactions a Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004. Open WorldCat. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.
Ramsey, William, Stephen Stich, and Joseph Garan. “Connectionism, Eliminativism, and
the Future of Folk Psychology.” Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry.
Springer, 1990. 117–144.
Rorty, Amélie Oskenberg. “Freud on Unconscious Affects, Mourning and the Erotic
Mind.” The Analytic Freud, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Levine P.
Miachael. London; New York: Routledge, 2000.
Rosenthal, David M. “The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality.”
Philosophical Issues 1 (1991): 15. CrossRef. Web.
Sagi, Abraham, and Martin L. Hoffman. “Empathic Distress in the Newborn.”
Developmental Psychology 12.2 (1976): 175. Print.
Semin, G. R., and Eliot R. Smith. Embodied Grounding Social, Cognitive, Affective, and
Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008. Open WorldCat. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.
Simner, Marvin L. “Newborn’s Response to the Cry of Another Infant.” Developmental
Psychology 5.1 (1971): 136. Print.
Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan. Wilson. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Print.
Suppes, Patrick, and Hermine Warren. “On the Generation and Classification of Defense
Mechanisms.” The International Journal of Psychoanalysis (1975).
Van Inwagen, Peter. “When Is the Will Free?” Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 399.
CrossRef. Web.
Westen, Drew. “Implications of Developments in Cognitive Neuroscience for
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy.” Harvard review of psychiatry 10.6 (2002): 369–
373. Print.
Wilson, Timothy. “Knowing When to Ask: Introspection and the Adaptive
Unconscious.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.9-10 (2003): 131–140. Print.
Wilson, Timothy D. Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. Print.

129
Winkielman, P. “Unconscious Affective Reactions to Masked Happy Versus Angry
Faces Influence Consumption Behavior and Judgments of Value.” Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 31.1 (2005): 121–135. CrossRef. Web.
Winkielman, Piotr, Paula M. Niedenthal, and Lindsay Oberman, others. “The Embodied
Emotional Mind.” Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective, and
neuroscientific approaches (2008): 263–288. Print.
Woody, J. Melvin, and James Phillips. “Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology after
100 Years: The Unconscious Mind in the Era of Cognitive Neuroscience.”
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2.2 (1995): 123–134. Print.
Zahn-Waxler, Carolyn, JoAnn L. Robinson, and Robert N. Emde. “The Development of
Empathy in Twins.” Developmental psychology 28.6 (1992): 1038. Print.

130

4. Towards an enlarged evolutionary psychological
explanation of empathy
4.1 An enlarged evolutionary psychology of empathy
Theories about the evolution of empathy have been proposed in many fields. In
primatology for example, de Waal argues that empathy is part of human nature by appeal
to empathy occurring in populations of non-human primates (de Waal 1996). Another
prominent evolutionary explanation is found at the intersection of philosophy and
biology. Sober and Wilson argue that natural selection promotes empathy-mediated
parental behaviour that is motivated by concern for the well-being of their children
(Sober and Wilson 1998, p 326). They expand the scope of this claim about parent
behaviour to claim that empathy in general evolved to cause agents to behave
altruistically (at least sometimes) (Sober and Wilson 1998).
In this paper, I focus on the evolutionary psychology of empathy. Of the recent accounts
of how, why, and when empathy evolved, the most influential have come from
evolutionary psychology. While there exist several evolutionary accounts of empathy
(such as those of de Waal, and Sober and Wilson mentioned above), standard
evolutionary psychological explanations of empathy differ in two important ways. First,
they share a well-developed theoretical framework; and second, they use the same
explanatory method. It is these two features of standard evolutionary psychology [SEP]
that are referred to when describing its “evolutionary meta-theory” (Buss 2008, p 403).
And it is this meta-theory (framework and method) that evolutionary psychologists apply
to all the phenomena they provide explanations for.
In the last two papers of my dissertation I developed a care account of empathy that
integrates three factors: values, motivational orientations, and environmental contexts.
This integration has consequences for evolutionary explanations of empathy. But SEP
explanations of empathy have not given these factors serious weight. In fact, the
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theoretical tenets of SEP are either antithetical to them or make it possible to not
acknowledge their importance.
My aim in this paper is to argue that my care account of empathy best fits an enlarged
theoretical evolutionary framework, and that it can begin to be evolutionarily explained
by using a revised methodology. This is because my care account makes room for
variation in terms of values, environmental contexts, and motivations over time to affect
the evolution of empathy. On the other hand, SEP specifies that we should posit
psychological mechanisms that have remained fixed since the distant past. I deny that the
framework of SEP is sufficient for explaining how and why empathy has evolved.
Accordingly, I show how it is possible that the functions and the psychological processes
of empathy can change over time as a result of organisms regulating each other’s values,
and as a result of empathy’s use in different environmental context at different times
throughout evolutionary history. To explain these possible changes, I propose that the
theoretical framework of SEP should be enlarged. As I will show, this has significant
impact on the practical method of SEP. My theoretical enlargement and methodological
revision of SEP (which I call enlarged evolutionary psychology [EEP]), does pose
significant challenges to some of SEP’s deeply held theoretical tenets and methodological
foundations, it does not aim to entirely supplant SEP. Both SEP and EEP share many
features. And although the care account and SEP accounts of empathy are similar in their
conception of what empathy is, the care account best fits EEP’s theoretical framework
and can be better explained according to EEP’s revised method. The implication here
being that SEP accounts of empathy are not as empirically well supported as they are
claimed to be.
I begin by examining SEP explanations of empathy. I present SEP’s account of empathy,
but then go on to show it to be lacking in historical complexity and empirical support.
The first step in doing this is to show how SEP explanations of empathy accord with
SEP’s evolutionary theoretical framework. I focus on three theoretical tenets of SEP:
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1) Inclusive fitness
2) Computational theory of mind
3) Slow evolution
I describe these three tenets and how they serve as a mutually supportive theoretical
framework for SEP. Then, I show how these three tenets have direct implications for
SEP’s explanatory method.
At the end of the paper, I sketch an evolutionary explanation of empathy that is consistent
with the account of empathy that I developed in the previous two papers. Attaining this
goal will require attaining two sub-goals. First, I will enlarge the evolutionary theoretical
framework of SEP to be more consistent with recent evidence from evolutionary biology
and computer science. This evidence makes it possible to see how the factors emphasized
by my care account of empathy can be explained from an evolutionary perspective. On
the other hand, SEP is often not supported by, and more importantly, is often directly at
odds with much of this evidence. I will argue that this lack of empirical support justifies a
theoretical enlargement of SEP’s three tenets to include recent evidence and theoretical
advances in biology, computer science, and philosophy.
The second sub-goal is to revise SEP’s explanatory method. This method is shaped and
constrained by the three tenets of SEP mentioned above. Accordingly, it is characterized
by the generation of hypotheses that apply universally; the identification of innately fixed
psychological mechanisms; and the attribution of biological function to those
mechanisms that were selected exclusively during a specific historical epoch—namely
the Pleistocene. I will show that the enlarged evolutionary theory of EEP entails a
revision of SEP’s explanatory method. This revised method is characterized by the
generation of hypotheses that apply universally or only locally; the added identification
of psychological mechanisms that are modifiable throughout development; and the
attribution of biological function to those mechanisms that may have evolved and been
selected during a wider range of time.
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4.2 Standard evolutionary psychology [SEP] of empathy
In the previous papers of my dissertation I have argued in favour of a care account of
empathy. If we imagine an agent walking down a street and seeing a target fall off a
bicycle, then we can imagine that the agent empathizes accurately with the target when
the agent experiences an emotional state with a matched valence (possibly fear), becomes
aware of the target’s concern (e.g. for medical assistance), and is motivated to help the
target with that concern. On my account, it is the agent’s care for a target that explains
the agent’s motivation to help the target with their concerns. If the agent did not care for
the target, the agent might still help the target with their concerns. For example, an agent
may help the target who just fell off their bicycle because the agent believes it is their
duty to do so. But it is the agent’s minimal care for the target that often accounts for why
the agent and the target share an emotional state with the same valence, and for why the
agent is motivated to help the target when empathy occurs. My account places a great
deal of emphasis on the role of values, motivational orientations (e.g. cooperation,
competition), and environmental context (e.g. time factors, settings, and roles). What is
significant about this emphasis is that these three factors influence when empathy occurs
and inform us about the conditions in which the occurrence of empathy is possible and
more likely. Also as described in the previous papers, my care account can be considered
an instance of a concern account type of empathy (Batson, 1991; Hoffman 1994) rather
than the matching account type (Ickes 1993; Prinz 2011). It is an account that involves an
agent becoming aware of a target’s concerns; and crucially, it also involves the agent
feeling motivated to help that target with their concerns.
The task of making the care account consistent with evolutionary theory is made easier
by my use of the term ‘empathy’ in that I use it to refer to the same phenomenon as that
referred to by many prominent evolutionary psychologists. For example, Simon BaronCohen (2003) states that:
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Empathizing is the drive to identify another person’s emotions and
thoughts, and to respond to them with an appropriate emotion.
Empathizing does not entail just the cold calculation of what someone else
thinks and feels (or what is sometimes called mind reading). Psychopaths
can do that much. Empathizing occurs when we feel an appropriate
emotional reaction, an emotion triggered by the other person’s emotion,
and it is done in order to understand another person, to predict their
behavior, and to connect or resonate with them emotionally.
Imagine if you could recognize that Jane is in pain but this left you
cold, or detached, or happy, or preoccupied. That would not be
empathizing. Now imagine you not only see Jane’s pain, but you also
automatically feel concern, wince, and feel a desire to run across and help
alleviate her pain. This is empathizing. (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 28)
Baron-Cohen uses ‘empathy’ to refer to the phenomenon whereby an agent identifies a
target’s concerns, experiences a similar or “appropriate” emotion, and feels motivated to
help the target with their concerns. It is not enough for the agent to match the target’s
thoughts or feelings, the agent must also feel motivated to help the target. Baron-Cohen’s
account, like mine, is a concern account.
Steven Pinker, another prominent evolutionary psychologist, also uses empathy to refer
to much the same phenomenon. When addressing the relationship between empathy and
helping behaviour, he describes empathy as inducing a state of sympathy that has a strong
motivational component:
…adopting someone’s viewpoint, whether by imagining oneself in his or
her shoes or imagining what it is like to be that person, induces a state of
sympathy for the person (which would then impel the perspective-taker to
act altruistically toward the target if the sympathy-altruism hypothesis is
true as well). (Pinker 2011, p 541)
Although Baron-Cohen and Pinker’s use of the term empathy is not shared by all
evolutionary psychologists, they have done the most research on the topic within this
field; and they both share my commitments that care for the well-being of a target and a
motivation to help are important to empathy.39 Going forward then, the possibility of
For example, Nesse and Lloyd (1992, p 611) state that empathy is “the ability to experience the feelings
of other people as if they were one's own”. Accordingly, their usage of the term is closer to a matching
account. On the other hand, Buss (2008, p 404) is explicitly follows Baron-Cohen usage and states that:
“Empathizing allows a person to both predict and to care about how others feel. Without empathizing,
39
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conceptual confusion between what I take to be the dominant view on the evolutionary
psychology of empathy and my own view can be ruled out based on these shared
commitments. Having fixed a common reference on the phenomenon of empathy, I will
now present its standard evolutionary psychological explanations.
An SEP explanation of a particular phenomenon seeks to provide an answer to the
question of why that particular phenomenon is occurring as an expression of its “evolved
architecture” or “evolved psychology” (Barkow et al. 1992). An often repeated motto of
SEP is that “our modern skulls house a stone age mind” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997).
What this means is that the evolved architecture of our mind is adapted to an
environment—a Stone Age environment—that is different from our contemporary
environment. More specifically, SEP holds that the species-typical (or universal)
processes of human psychology are adapted to the physical and social environment of the
Pleistocene (Barkow et al. 1992, p 5). Evolutionary psychologists believe that it was
during this long epoch—between approximately 2.6 million to 12 thousand years ago—
that our innate psychological processes became more complex. Human minds very
slowly changed to enable us to survive and reproduce in that specific past environment
(Ibid.).40 However, since then, our minds have essentially remained fixed.
In the environment of the Pleistocene, humans are said to have faced many
recurring adaptive problems. Examples of such problems include: detecting predators;
eating nutritious foods; finding a suitable place to live; finding and attracting the most
appropriate mate. Solving these problems is said to have been important to survival and
reproduction. And evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that a set of dedicated
psychological processes evolved to solve each of these recurring adaptive problems.
These problems have been divided into four types (Buss 2008, p 66):

understanding the beliefs and desires of others enables a person to read facial expressions and writhing
body movements to understand that ‘I can see that you are in pain.’ Empathizing allows a person to express
the notion that ‘I am upset that you are in pain.’”
40
The technical term for this past environment is environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) (Tooby
and Cosmides 1992, p 69).

136
1) Problems of survival and growth
2) Problems of mating
3) Problems of parenting
4) Problems of aiding genetic relatives
SEP aims to show that the function of each of our psychological processes is to solve an
adaptive problem.41 To take a just mentioned example, that contemporary humans have a
purportedly universal preference for sweet food is caused by an equally universal mental
process underpinning the sensation of sweetness whose adaptive function is to cause us to
seek, detect, and choose nutritious fruit in the environment of the Pleistocene (Symons
1992, p 138-139; Pinker 1997, p 525; Cosmides and Tooby 1997, p 13). This functional
explanation is justified by its appeal to contemporary statistical regularity and by its
historical plausibility. In this case, the historically plausible claim is that this mental
process was selected because in the environment of the Pleistocene, nutritious fruit was
scarce, and its sweetness correlated with a higher level of nutrition (fruits are more
nutritious when their sugar content is highest). Later, in sections 3 and 5 of this paper, I
will present an analysis of how the evolutionary theory and explanatory method of SEP
informs and shapes its functional explanations of phenomena generally. For present
purposes, I will turn to presenting SEP’s explanations of empathy.
Evolutionary psychologists argue that there exist essential psychological sex differences
that explain why females are better at empathizing than males. The most prominent
evidence of this results from the experiments of Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (BaronCohen 2003; Baron-Cohen et al. 2005; Baron-Cohen 2007; Baron-Cohen 2011). They
have developed a test for what they call the “Empathy Quotient” (EQ). The empathy
quotient construct in this test is supposed to measure individual differences in how
frequently people attempt to empathize and how accurately they do so. This test consists
of a 60 item self-report questionnaire. Forty of the questions are empathy related
“The function of an adaptation refers to the adaptive problem it evolved to solve, that is, precisely how it
contributes to survival or reproduction.” (Buss 2008, p 40)
41
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(“empathy items”), twenty are not (“filler/control items”). Participants in these
experiments are mailed the questionnaire and asked to respond to it without spending too
much time on each question (Baron-Cohen and Wheelright 2004; Lawrence et al. 2004).
Below are few self-report questions on the EQ test:
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.
10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a
discussion.
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would
happen.
31. I enjoy being the center of attention at any social gathering.
52. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively.
For each question, participants are asked to respond by circling one of four answers:
“strongly agree”, “slightly agree”, “slightly disagree”, and “strongly disagree” (Ibid.).
Answers are divided into two sets and each answer is assigned a numerical value of either
2 or 1 and summed. Participants are then assigned an empathy quotient score based on
their total. According to these empathy quotient experiments woman are much more
empathic than men. Specifically, three times as many women as men score in the higher
ranges on EQ tests (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Lawrence et al. 2004).
Baron-Cohen claims that the psychological processes responsible for empathy are better
developed in females than in males (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 39). He claims that this is
because of the behaviours that males and females performed that contributed to solving
adaptive problems during the Pleistocene. He hypothesizes that empathy had four
functions in that environment of evolutionary adaptation.42 Namely (Baron-Cohen 2003,
p 425-437):

The notion of function in use here is one describes the mental processes’ (in this case: empathy) causal
effect on behaviour. As such it is a psychological function that is also biological because it is informed by
evolutionary theory. But it can also be characterized as social function because it describes how society
was arranged during the Pleistocene, and the societal effects of the process on that arrangement.
42
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1) “Mothering”
2) “Gossip”
3) “Social Mobility”
4) “Reading Your Partner”
Each of these functions of empathy is related to a different behavioural adaptive problem.
Baron-Cohen claims that a function of empathy was to improve “mothering” by enabling
females to become more accurately aware of their children’s needs:
If one considers that good empathizing would have led to better caregiving, then since care-giving can be assumed to have been primarily a
female activity until very recent history, those mothers who had better
empathy would have succeeded better in 'tuning in' to their infant
offspring's pre-verbal emotional and physical needs, which may have led
to a higher likelihood of the infant surviving to reproductive age. Hence,
good empathy in the mother would have promoted her inclusive fitness
(Baron-Cohen 2007, p 218).
The adaptive problem that this “mothering” function of empathy is said to solve is
that of becoming aware of and responding to a child’s needs (Baron-Cohen 2003,
p 430). Baron-Cohen claims that females, as the primary care-givers to children
“until very recent history”, innately possess a good capacity for empathy which
makes them better empathizers than males (on average) (Baron-Cohen 2007, p
218). Female agents empathizing with their children leads to greater reproductive
success because empathy contributes to the child’s survival and quality of life
(Ibid.).43 Pinker also believes that that “[women] feel more empathy towards their
friends [than men]” (social mobility function); and that the original function of
empathy was its “mothering” function (Pinker 2002, p 345; Pinker 2011, p 539).

Baron-Cohen claims that empathy causes a child to feel “securely attached” and that securely attached
children learn faster, are more easily accepted by their peers, are more popular, and that they develop more
stable relationship throughout their lives (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 430).
43

139
The second function that Baron-Cohen attributes to empathy is that of “gossip”
(Baron-Cohen 2003, p 433). He claims that because females are better
empathizers they are more likely to gossip amongst themselves:
A second explanation is that females with better empathy might have
found it easier to socialize—chat, gossip, network—with other females,
thereby being more successful in creating social support for themselves
whilst engaged in being a care-giver to their infant. Social support from
other females is likely also to buffer mothers from the range of life events
(illness, poverty, loss, physical attack, etc.) that might otherwise threaten
her ability to care for her offspring, and so increase the likelihood of her
infant surviving to reproductive age, thereby increasing her inclusive
(Baron-Cohen 2007, p 218).
The “gossip” function of empathy is said to solve the adaptive problem of forming
alliances (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 434). In general, alliances are said to contribute to
reproductive success by gaining acceptance and support from others in difficult times.44
Baron-Cohen claims that females form alliances mostly by empathizing with each other.
On the other hand, he claims that male social relationships are more influenced by
dominance hierarchies (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 142).
The third function of empathy that Baron-Cohen attributes to empathy is that of “social
mobility” (Baron-Cohen 2003, p435). Here he claims that empathy helps females build
relationships with members of the population that are less genetically related than others
(Baron-Cohen, p 435):

“The survival advantages of having good friends is that you have social alliances and help when the
going gets tough. A high-empathizing female, engaged in childcare, is better equipped to create a
community of friends who could watch over her children when she is unable to keep an eye on them all the
time.” (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 427)
44
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Among humans (and other great apes), males tend to stay in their birth
group, while females tend to move to their mate’s community. Males
therefore are surrounded by their kin more often than females are, and of
course they know their kin well, and vice versa. So there may have been
less pressure on males to develop good empathy if males typically have
had to put far less effort into building and maintaining relationships.
Making relationships with individuals you are not genetically related to
requires much greater sensitivity to reciprocity and equality, since these
are relationships that you cannot take for granted. A woman with low
empathy might have had a much harder time being accepted by her inlaws, and earning their support (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 435).
The “social mobility” function of empathy is said to solve the adaptive problem of
creating good relationships with others. He states that those relations between
organisms that are relatively distantly genetically related “cannot be taken for
granted” and so require more empathy to create and maintain (Ibid.).This accords
with his description of behaviour in the Pleistocene environment where females
interacted with genetically more distant organisms more often than males.
Of note is a different “social” function of empathy that is posited by Kruger:
[E]empathy could arise as a consequence of attachment-related cues that
signaled relatively high genetic commonality in the environment of our
evolutionary adaptation. An action benefiting genes could be altruistic in
terms of the cost to the helping individual (Kruger 2001, p 2).
He states that a consequence of empathy is that it promoted helping behaviour
among organisms that were relatively more genetically related. In attributing this
“social mobility” function to empathy, Kruger cites Rushton’s genetic similarity
theory (Rushton et al. 1984; Rushton 1989; 1991). On this theory, agents give
preferential treatment to targets that are more genetically similar to themselves
because they are motivated by innate phenotypic matching mechanisms and
feature detectors (Rushton 1989, p 505). On this view, it follows that an agent is
more likely to empathize with target A rather than target B if target A has more
genes in common with the agent than target B (Rushton (1991).
The fourth and final function that Baron-Cohen attributes to empathy is “reading
your partner (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 436). His claim here is that females were
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responsible for avoiding aggression and maintaining a good relationship with their
mate:
Women who had a talent for decoding their male partner’s next move
would have had greater success in avoiding spousal aggression. Women
who were good at detecting deception would have also been more skilled
at finding sincere males to mate with, and at judging whether a man would
treat them well or just impregnate them… Being able to empathize with
one’s partner also makes one more compassionate and tolerant, which can
prolong the life of the relationship (Baron-Cohen 2003, p 436).
This function of empathy contributes to solving the adaptive problem of finding
suitable mates. Specifically those mates that are less deceptive and less
aggressive. According to Baron-Cohen, males were more aggressive than females
during the Pleistocene. And the dominant male reproductive strategy is one of
impregnating as many females as possible while disregarding their feelings
(Baron-Cohen 2003, p 134). Thus, one of the reasons why females today are
better empathizers than males is that it enabled them to “read” which partners
would be more supportive and less aggressive.
According to hypotheses generated by SEP, empathy was selected for during the
Pleistocene because its five functions had psychological, biological, and social effects
that increased reproductive success.45 The consequences of empathy were that it solved
adaptive problems such as: (1) raising children; (2) building alliances; (3) interacting with
organisms who share fewer genes; (4) benefiting organisms that share more genes; and
(5) choosing suitable mates. And SEP claims that four of empathy’s functions—
“Mothering”, “Gossip”, “Social Mobility”, and “Reading Your Partner”—explain why
females are better at empathy than males.
As mentioned at the outset, SEP explanations of empathy are not the only evolutionary
explanations of empathy that exist. But they are by far the most influential inside and
outside of empathy research. The papers about the evolution of empathy by Baron45

More specifically, Baron-Cohen claims that good empathy promoted inclusive fitness. According to SEP,
what makes any phenomenon adaptive is that it contributes to inclusive fitness. This is an important part of
the evolutionary theoretical framework of SEP. I will return to this issue in the next section when I discuss
the three theoretical tenets of SEP.
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Cohen, Kruger, and Rushton that I cite above are among the most widely cited. The 2011
book in which Pinker expounds his views on empathy is a New York Times best seller
and very widely cited. Also, SEP explanations of empathy have attracted widespread
media attention. Pinker’s views on empathy appear in the The New York Times (Pinker
2012). Baron-Cohen’s appear frequently in newspapers such as the New York Times and
the Guardian (Baron-Cohen 2005; 2011a; 2011b). But the mainstream influence of SEP
is (of course) by no means limited to its explanations of empathy. Standard evolutionary
psychological explanations of phenomena including (among many others) economic
behaviour (Hordijk 2014), sexual jealousy (Khazan 2014), fear of immigrants (Smith
2014), body image (Russell 2014), and violence (Mohan 2014) appear frequently in
major media outlets. And a cursory search reveals that the mainstream influence of SEP
explanations of any phenomenon far outweighs that of non-SEP explanations informed
by evolutionary theory. I believe that the popularity of SEP explanations is in large part
due to its stable evolutionary framework and explanatory method. The theoretical
framework of SEP has three main tenets. These tenets constrain the explanatory method
of SEP, which together make for a powerful tool allowing researchers to generate novel
and consistent explanations of contemporary behaviour.
In the next two section I turn to an examination of the three tenets of SEP and of their
relationship to SEP’s explanatory method. This will be done with the aim of enlarging the
evolutionary framework of SEP and drawing out this enlargement’s implications for a
revised explanatory method. I call this new approach enlarged evolutionary psychology. I
will then apply this approach to provide a better evolutionary explanation of empathy.

4.3 The evolutionary framework of SEP: Three tenets
The paradigm of standard evolutionary psychology is informed by three mutually
supportive theories:
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1) Inclusive fitness
2) Computational theory of mind
3) Slow evolution
Taken together, these three tenets provide a consistent framework which informs all SEP
explanations of contemporary behaviour. Tenets (1) and (3) were developed in
evolutionary biology, and (2) in cognitive science. In this section, I will describe these
three tenets and then show how they mutually support each other.

Inclusive fitness

4.3.1

Inclusive fitness is an evolutionary biological theory which predicts that an agent (or
organism) gains fitness by behaving in a way that favours the reproductive success of
targets who share the most genes relative to other targets (Hamilton 1964). On this
theory, the term ‘fitness’ refers to the chances of organism’s genes surviving into the next
generation. Furthermore, an agent is predicted to behave in such a way as to maximize
“inclusive fitness”—which means that the agent will behave to maximize the chances of
survival of copies of those same genes found in other organisms. Inclusive fitness theory
predicts which genes causing behaviours will be selected for according to the following
formula:
R>c/b
In this formula, [R] is the fraction of genes in common between an agent and a target; [c]
is the energy (or caloric) cost to the agent of a particular behaviour; and [b] is the energy
benefit to the agent of that same behaviour (Ibid). This means that genes causing
behaviours will be favored by natural selection when the coefficient of genetic
relatedness [R] will be greater than the fraction of the energy cost divided by its benefit.
Here, energy cost is a proxy for fitness in so far as benefiting closer genetic relatives
promotes survival to reproductive age and reproduction.
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Inclusive fitness has been extended to explain seemingly altruistic behaviour. This
extended theory is called reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). Altruistic behaviour can be
defined as a behaviour whose goal is to benefit the target of the behaviour as opposed to
the agent. Sometimes altruistic helping behaviour can come at a high energy cost to the
agent. For example, when an organism comes to the rescue of another or aids another in
combat (Ibid.). Reciprocal altruism is an explanation of altruistic behaviour that is
consistent with inclusive fitness. It explains altruistic behavior as an evolutionary
adaptation that maximizes fitness by causing organisms to behave altruistically when
helping behaviour is likely to be reciprocated (Ibid.). The theory claims that “selection
will discriminate against” targets of altruistic behaviour who do not reciprocate
(“cheaters”) because not reciprocating will have adverse effects on their life (e.g. reprisal
by other organisms) (Ibid.). Accordingly, seemingly altruistic behaviours—those that
appear to be performed at great cost to the agent and little cost the target—are, in fact,
instances of reciprocal altruism.46
Inclusive fitness is an entrenched tenet of SEP. Evolutionary psychologists claim that that
nearly all of the mental processes that are inherited as a result of evolutionary processes
conform to the rule of inclusive fitness:
The realm of adaptive information-processing problems is not limited to
one area of human life, such as sex, violence, or resource acquisition.
Instead, it is a dimension crosscutting all areas of human life, as weighted
by the strange, nonintuitive metric of their cross-generational statistical
effects on direct and kin reproduction (Cosmides and Tooby 2000, p 6
[my italics]).
Inclusive fitness constrains our innate preferences and motivations, which in turn cause
our behaviours. Pinker goes so far as to state: “The ultimate goal that the mind was
designed to attain is maximizing the number of copies of the genes that created it.”
(Pinker 1997, p 43) However, it is important to note that evolutionary psychologists do
not claim that contemporary humans maximize their inclusive fitness with every
contemporary behaviour. Rather, it is that our behaviours are guided overall to maximize
inclusive fitness because the psychological mechanisms we innately possess motivate us
46

Inclusive fitness is an important component of Dawkins’ theory of the “selfish gene” (Dawkins 1976).
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to do so (Buss 1995, p 10). So according to SEP, humans in the contemporary
environment are motivated by psychological mechanisms that conform to inclusive
fitness; but the behaviours that result from these motivations do not always increase
inclusive fitness. This is because the contemporary environment differs from that of the
Pleistocene (Ibid.). Accordingly, SEP describes humans not as “fitness maximizers”, but
as “fitness strivers” (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, p 420). We can begin to see how
inclusive fitness shapes the explanatory method of SEP. But I will be addressing this
issue in the next section. For now, let us turn to the second tenet of SEP.

4.3.2

The mind is like a computer

The second tenet of SEP is that the human mind is like a computer. More specifically, the
human mind is identical in principle to a classical computational device.47 I say “in
principle” because, as evolutionary psychologists point out, there are many different
computers in the world. According to SEP then, human minds operate much like those
computers, but the differences are that they are slower and more complex (Pinker 1997, p
40). In these ways, the mind is not like everyday computers. The ways in which human
minds are literally like or identical to everyday computers are in the ways that many
everyday computers instantiate specific principles of design and operation. I will address
these features in turn.
Two important elements of computer design are hardware and software. Computer
hardware is the set of physical elements that constitute the system. This set includes items
like power supplies, hard drives, processing units, and circuitry. According to SEP, the
brain is the design equivalent of a computer’s hardware (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby
1992, p 7). Software is set of symbols and rules according to which those symbols are
manipulated. These manipulations govern the operation of the hardware. For SEP, the
mind is the design equivalent of computer’s software. In this way, SEP claims that the
mind is like a computer. The computational theory of mind employed by SEP originated

47

A classical computational device is one which operates according to Turing computation as opposed to
connectionist computation (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Fodor 1989). Some researchers believe that
connectionist systems do (or can) operate according to classical computation (Chalmers 1990, 1993; Clark
1993). But no consensus has been reached on this issue (Berkeley 1997).
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in disciplines such as computer science, philosophy, and linguistics, among others
(Pinker 1997, p 24). Theorists in the disciplines that espouse these views have now
coalesced in the field of cognitive science (Adams 2003). Accordingly SEP integrates this
interdisciplinary approach which holds that the mind is an information processing system,
and that this system is functionally realized in the brain. To say that the mind is an
information processing system is to say that it receives information from the
environment; that this information is translated into a symbolic language; and that the
rule-based manipulation of these symbols causally guides behaviour in virtue of its
symbols representing environmental information (Ibid). To say that the mind is
functionally realized in the brain is to say that the symbolic language or software of the
brain is spread out across many regions of the brain, and that it can be multiply realized
in various parts of the brain. In sum, the brain is to hardware as the mind is to software.
For SEP, the software of the mind is composed of many programs. It is composed of
thousands of separate and specialized computational programs or mechanisms (Barkow,
Cosmides, and Tooby 1992, p 39). Each of these programs, also called modules, operates
in relative isolation from the others by being responsive to only certain environmental
information—modules are domain-specific. And what made them this way is our genes’
past exposure to the specific recurrent adaptive problems of Pleistocene life. Each
module’s domain of information processing is restricted as a result of our ancestors
having solved the same adaptive problems many times. Accordingly, each of the mind’s
programs is selected for its function of causing adaptive behaviour in the environmental
context of the Pleistocene. The properties of modules and their architectural arrangement
in the mind are subjects of ongoing debate (Samuels 1998). What is important to
emphasize for the present purpose is that, according to this tenet of SEP, the mind is like
a computer that runs many programs at the same time, and that these programs are
isolated (informationally) from each other. And whereas the programs of everyday
computers have been coded by programs and installed by users, SEP claims that the
programs of the human mind are coded by our genes and installed by natural selection
(Pinker 1997, p 23). Accordingly, the design and operation of our minds is specified by
an innate and universal “genetic program” that was shaped by natural selection to cause
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specific behaviours—namely, those behaviours that maximized reproductive success in
the environment where all humans are either hunters or gatherers (Pinker 1997, p 21). As
we shall see, this characterization of the Pleistocene’s environment as being populated by
hunters and gathers will be relevant to SEP’s claims about essential sex differences in
empathic capacity. It will turn out that because males were mostly hunters and females
were mostly gatherers, their minds were, and continue to be different.
That the mind is like a computer is a central tenet of SEP. Evolutionary psychologists
claim that the entire mind operates according to the principles of design and operation of
a computer. Pinker goes so far as to state that:
Without the computational theory, it is impossible to make sense of the
evolution of the mind… A program is an intricate recipe of logical and
statistical operations directed by comparisons, tests, branches, loops, and
subroutines embedded in subroutines… Human thought and behavior, no
matter how subtle and flexible, could be the product of a very complicated
program, and that program may have been our endowment from natural
selection (Pinker 1997, p 27).
According to SEP, the program that is the mind has very specific properties. It is innately
specified. Each human is born with a genetic code that causes the mechanisms of the
mind to develop into a fixed state. And this fixed state is historically stable. The way the
mind’s mechanisms operate and are arranged has remained the same ever since their
selection during the Pleistocene. In section (5) of this paper, I will argue that this tenet of
SEP should be enlarged to include recent developments in computer science. These
developments shed new light on the possible operation on the mind, and they allow for
new explanations of how it evolved. But first I will turn to the last theoretical tenet of
SEP.

4.3.3

Evolution is slow

According to SEP, the strongest process of biological and hence psychological change
throughout history is natural selection. It is an evolutionary process in virtue of which
heritable variations continue to exist. For SEP, these variations are individual genetic
differences that are passed on from parents to children during reproduction. Thus, genes
are the units upon which natural selection effects its selectivity by changing their
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frequency within a species. Other evolutionary processes such as mutation and drift are
also responsible for changes in heritable differences, but their effect is minimal. Changes
in our genetic code that determine the universally stable state of our psychological
development are the result of natural selection. And, according to SEP, evolution by
natural selection is extremely slow.
SEP claims that evolutionary change occurs in small increments over millions of years
(Buss 2010). It is said to occur primarily by natural selection: a process by which genes
are selected based on their contribution to behaviour causing inclusive fitness (the second
tenet) and hence reproductive success during a long period of time in the past. But
whether a particular behaviour will in fact maximize inclusive fitness in the present is
indeterminate. To compensate for this lack of guarantee, natural selection is said to select
for genes that produce psychological mechanisms that are sensitive to environmental cues
that are probabilistically associated with maximizing fitness in the past (Tooby and
Cosmides 1990, p 406). Natural selection does not select for genes based on their
performance in the current environment. Rather, it extracts statistical relationships that
are unobservable, and that organisms are generally not consciously aware of (Cosmides
and Tooby 2000, p 9). Thus, our mental mechanisms are said to “reflect most closely the
actual long-term statistical structure of the ancestral world.” (Ibid.) This long-term
statistical structure includes relationships like that between skin color and group identity
(Machery and Faucher 2004), skin color and ovulation (Buss 2008, p 154), snakes and
their lethality (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992, p 72), sweet foods and their
nutritional value (Cosmides and Tooby 1997, p 13), and so on. It takes thousands of
generations for evolutionary change to occur because natural selection continually selects
genes that lead to the development of psychological mechanisms which reflect such
statistical relationships which held in the distant past (Pinker 1997, p 42). In essence,
natural selection continues to select for genes that reflect the past insofar as it continues
to select for genes are that are probabilistically associated with maximizing inclusive
fitness in the past; and according to SEP, ninety-nine percent of the human past was spent
living in a stable environment with a stable social arrangement of hunters and gatherers
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(Ibid.). Hence the dictum of SEP: “our modern skulls house a stone age mind.”
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1997, p 10).

4.4 Mutually supportive tenets
The three tenets of SEP—(1) inclusive fitness, (2) computational theory of mind, (3) slow
evolution—support each other. Tenet (3) of SEP implies that natural selection is the only
process that can build functional organization into organisms (Cosmides and Tooby 2000,
p 4). This is supported by tenet (2) which states that the mind is like a computer, in that
computers are functionally organized systems. Each program of the mind contributes to
its own naturally selected function. Accordingly, the tenet that the mind is shaped
primarily by natural selection (3) and the view that the mind is like a computer (2)
mutually support each other. That evolution is slow then (3), also supports the view that
mind is a certain type of computer. Specifically, it is a type of computer with an innately
specified program. If evolution is slow, then the mind will be a like a computer that has a
historically and developmentally fixed program. This program will not have changed for
millions of years, nor will it change throughout an organism’s life.
Figure 4: Mutually supportive tenets of SEP

Tenet (1), which holds that all of our mental programs cause us to strive to increase
inclusive fitness, provides an explanation of the selective process (natural selection)
which makes our minds like this type of computer (2). Inclusive fitness describes the
constraints and goals of the mind’s program; it describes why it operates the way it does.
Additionally, inclusive fitness allows for the operation of the mind to be mathematically
formalized (in principle). For example, if we accept that empathy is an important cause of
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helping behaviour, and that the program responsible for empathy conforms to the rule of
inclusive fitness, then we can, in principle, determine the conditions in which an agent is
more likely to empathize with and subsequently help a target. These conditions will
involve (A) considerations having to do with how closely problems or goals in the current
environment of the organism resemble the problems and goals that organisms’ ancestors
faced in the distant past environment (e.g. mating, predators, resource availability) and
(B) the quantity of genes likely to be shared between the agent and the target relative to
other targets.
In this mutually supporting way, SEP provides a unified theoretical framework for
explaining human behaviour as a function of programs or mechanisms that were selected
to maximize inclusive fitness in the distant past. The theoretical framework of SEP has
important implications for its explanatory method. In the next section, I draw these out.

4.5 The method of SEP
SEP is consistent in its use of the same explanatory method. It is a method that involves
generating hypotheses and justifying them in way that is consistent with its three
theoretical tenets. I describe the explanatory method of SEP as follows:
1) Choose a widespread phenomenon.
2) Posit innate, universal, and historically fixed mechanisms that cause the
phenomenon in (1).
3) Generate and test hypotheses about how the mechanisms in (2) functioned to
cause behaviour that solved recurring adaptive problems during the
Pleistocene.
4) Justify the supposition that the mechanisms in (2) exist by appeal to statistical
normality in (1) and historical plausibility in (3).
SEP calls this method reverse engineering (Barkow et al. 1992, p 55; Pinker 1997, p 43;
Buss 2005, p 25). The goal of this explanatory method is to explain contemporary human
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behaviour. The many evolved programs of the human mind underwrite our abilities and
motivate our behaviour. But humans do not have direct access to the computational
algorithms of these processes. For example, most human beings have a capacity to see.
But we do not have access to the innate functional mechanisms that compose the visual
system. Similarly, according to SEP, male sexual interest in their wives diminishes
significantly in the first years of marriage; and throughout life, males are very easily
aroused by possible female sexual partners other than their wives (Pinker 1997, p 471).
But males do not have direct access to all of the causes of these behaviours. SEP explains
these behaviours by claiming that males possess psychological mechanisms that cause an
“insatiable” desire for sexual variety, and that the function of this mechanism is to
increase the number of their offspring (Pinker 1997, p 473; Buss 1994, p 76). The goal
then of SEP’s method is to pull aside the curtain of illusory motivations of contemporary
human behaviour to reveal the true evolutionary ones. It claims that our contemporary
behaviours and social organizations are, in a very real sense, the consequence of fixed
mechanisms.
The mechanisms posited by SEP to explain a current widespread phenomenon are fixed,
innate, and universal. This second step of SEP’s method is constrained by the third tenet
(evolution is slow) and the second tenet (the mind is like a computer) of its theoretical
framework. That evolutionary change occurs slowly contributes to the explanation of
why it took so long for our psychological mechanisms to be genetically assimilated. Our
non-human ancestors lived for two millions in the stable environment of the Pleistocene.
It is only recently that humans migrated from the savannah plains of Africa and that we
changed from being hunters and gathers into famers (Barkow 1992, p 5). Accordingly,
SEP claims that it is unlikely that novel change in our psychology could occur in this
relatively short period since the end of the Pleistocene (only 13 000 years). As
mentioned, this is because SEP believes that such changes occur almost exclusively by
means of natural selection which is taken to be a very slow and gradual process. Changes
in our way of thinking occurred slowly during the Pleistocene and were passed from one
generation to the next until they became universal. In this way, the tenet that evolution is
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slow constrains SEP to explanations of behaviour that are caused by mechanisms that
have been fixed since the Pleistocene, innate, and universal.
The second theoretical tenet of SEP—that the mind is like a computer—similarly
constrains its method. As described above, this tenet holds that the human mind is like a
computer whose code has been programmed and installed by evolutionary processes. But
the type of computer that SEP claims to mind is like here is of crucial importance. As
mentioned, the mind is like a classical everyday computer that is slower but more
complicated. Such computers use fixed software that has been installed by an outside
user. And the software on a computer typically remains unchanged unless it is updated by
the user. The point I would like to emphasize is that the type of computer SEP claims the
mind to be like is one whose code is installed during the manufacturing process and then
left unchanged. The human mind’s code then is similarly installed at conception and then
remains fixed throughout development. It is a type of computer that is static. And it is
programmed for the environment of the Pleistocene. It follows that the way it processes
contemporary environmental input is always by means of these fixed programs which
reflect historical statistical relationships (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990). SEP’s theory of
what type of computer the mind is like (tenet 2) constrains the type of mechanisms that
can be posited by its explanatory method. This does not conflict with the supposition that
the mind’s program is very complex and responsive, with (as Pinker puts it) a great many
conditional subroutines activated by specific internal or external conditions.
The third step of SEP explanatory method involves generating hypotheses about how our
current psychological mechanisms functioned to solve adaptive problems during the
Pleistocene. Here again we see that the view of evolution being very slow informs SEP’s
claim that our current psychological mechanisms have remained unchanged since the
Pleistocene. The goal then is to “reverse engineer” them in order to determine their
evolutionary function in the past. Also, we see here the influence of the first tenet
(inclusive fitness). If our current psychological mechanisms were selected during the
Pleistocene, then they were selected because they were adaptive. And for them to have
been adaptive, according to SEP, implies that they conformed to the rule of inclusive
fitness. Accordingly, any statistically normal behaviour under investigation will be

153
explained by appeal to psychological mechanisms that were selected because they
motivated organisms to prioritize their own survival and reproduction and the survival of
other organisms with whom they shared the most genes. Furthermore, even if these
behaviours no longer contribute to increasing inclusive fitness in the present, SEP’s
adherence to this tenet constrains its explanatory method to mostly posit psychological
mechanisms that increased inclusive fitness during the Pleistocene.
The fourth step in the explanatory method of SEP is a justificatory one. It justifies its
claims in step two about the functions of those mechanisms causing contemporary
behaviour in two ways. The first way is by appeal to the tenet which holds that evolution
is slow. It is because evolution is slow that it would take a long time for the development
of any particular psychological mechanism to be transmitted throughout and selected
within the entire population. Furthermore, any psychological mechanism must have been
repeatedly selected throughout history for the functions it performed during the
Pleistocene because the Pleistocene is the longest epoch in human history. The second
way that this fourth step justifies the functions of the mechanisms it posits is by
combining the tenet which holds that evolution is slow with the first tenet (inclusive
fitness). This allows SEP to make the function under investigation evolutionarily
plausible. For a function to be evolutionarily plausible, the criterion to meet is that it
would have contributed to inclusive fitness given the social roles, ways of life, and other
biotic and abiotic environmental factors posited by SEP’s description of the Pleistocene.
We can now more clearly see how the theoretical tenets and the explanatory method of
SEP affect its explanation of when, why, and how empathy evolved. First, SEP choses a
widespread phenomenon: empathy. Many animals care about the well-being of certain
other organisms. They become aware of those organisms’ concerns, and they feel
motivated to help those organisms with their concerns. In the second step, SEP then
posits that the causes of this phenomenon are psychological mechanisms. These
mechanisms are assumed to be innate (developmentally fixed), and universal. They are
responsible for causing the way in which organisms are sensitive to their environment,
and their activation in the presence of certain inputs will cause empathy. In the third step,
SEP generates hypotheses about the adaptive consequences (or functions) of empathy
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during the Pleistocene. As we have seen, SEP hypothesizes that the functions of empathy
in the past were that it contributed to raising children (mothering), forming alliances
(gossip), creating and maintaining relationships with organisms having fewer genes in
common than other organisms (social mobility), and avoiding male aggression (reading
your partner). The generation of these hypotheses is constrained by SEP’s first tenet:
inclusive fitness. Thus, each of empathy’s functions will have increased inclusive fitness.
Experiments are then devised to then test whether the distant historical functions of
empathy are still having consequences in the contemporary environment. As described
above, Baron-Cohen’s experiments involve a set of self-report questions.48 Within the
theoretical framework of SEP, the results of these experiments provide evidence for
widespread innate sex differences in the psychological mechanisms causing empathy.
These differences in the innate psychological mechanism are justified in step (4) by
appeal to their historical plausibility. Here, the tenet that evolution is slow and that the
mind is like a computer support the claim of historical plausibility. The distant historical
environment remained relatively unchanged for a long time. Thus, the psychological
mechanisms that caused behaviour also became fixed over time. The “innate structure of
the evolved neural machinery” became more complex little by little (Buss 2005, p 30).

4.6 An enlargement of theory
The outcome of SEP’s method is that for any phenomenon it seeks to explain in the
contemporary environment, it will posit the existence of innately fixed psychological
mechanisms that cause this behaviour. This method allows us to generate explanations
for why humans are motivated to behave the way they do. And it is indeed informed by
evolutionary theory. But I have aimed to show that the tenets that SEP adheres to, and the
way these tenets shape its method, results in a consistent but very a specific type of
evolutionary explanation. First, SEP explanations of behaviour are strongly
individualistic. The sensitivity to particular features of the environment, the preferences,
and the motivations that humans possess all originate from the individual’s psychological
mechanisms and their arrangement or architecture. Second, these psychological
These self-report questions are generated seemingly independently from any relationship to SEP’s tenets
or method.
48
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mechanisms motivate behaviours that promoted inclusive fitness in the past. And third,
this universal structure of the human mind is developmentally and historically fixed. The
structure of the human mind that SEP posits is present in a human’s genetic code at the
moment conception. This structure causes psychological mechanisms to develop, on
average, into a fixed state regardless of changes in the environment and individual
experience. The functions that these mechanisms are selected to perform throughout
history are also fixed, and they have been shared by humans throughout history.
Accordingly, these mechanisms constitute an unchanging and “essential” human nature
(Baron-Cohen 2003, p 306).
There exist many important critiques of SEP. The most influential of these is that of
Buller (2005). He is critical of all three of SEP theoretical tenets and concludes that SEP
“is wrong in almost every detail.” (Buller 2005, p 481). Buller challenges the data
supporting the view that parental love and care is merely a function of genetic relatedness
(Buller 2005, Ch. 7). He is critical of the claim that the mind is composed of modular
components that are universally fixed throughout development (Buller 2005, Ch. 4). And
he is critical of the claim that, because evolution is slow, the minds of contemporary
humans is for the most part entirely the same as that of humans that who lived during the
Pleistocene (Buller 2005, p 142). Buller is also critical of SEP’s method. Specifically he
claims that we cannot know enough about our very distant evolutionary past to enable us
to specify precisely the recurring adaptive problems that humans faced (Buller 2005, p
93).
Similarly, Stotz and Griffiths have argued that SEP’s claims about the functions of
mental mechanisms during the Pleistocene are tenuous (Stotz and Griffiths 2002, p 13).
They argue that SEP cannot adequately describe the functions of mental mechanisms in
the environmental niches of Pleistocene humans without first knowing about the structure
their minds (Stotz and Griffiths 2002, p 14). And knowing about this structure requires
knowing about the “lifestyle” of humans that lived during that time. Thus, without
accurate knowledge of Pleistocene ways of life, there will not be accurate knowledge of
the Pleistocene environment (Ibid.). And, like Buller, they point out that this evidence
may not yet or ever be available.
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Feminist evolutionists are also critical of SEP along these lines. For example, Liesen
argues that the gender roles posited by SEP’s description of the Pleistocene are
unjustified (Liesen 2011, p 1). For example, she claims that female preferences for mates
with high status and resources are better explained by appeal to environmental variables
and social structures rather than innate psychological mechanisms (Liesen 2007 cf. Buss
and Malamuth 1996, p 12).
I have just referenced three important critiques of SEP (Buller 2005; Stotz and Griffiths
2002; Liesen 2007, 2011). But there are many others.49 They are each critical of some
elements of SEP’s theoretical framework, and in their own right, address important
conceptual ambiguities and epistemological challenges faced by SEP. Some of these
criticisms argue that evolutionary psychological explanations should reject or shift
emphasis from a gene-centered nativist approach to one that is more sensitive to
developmental processes (Greene 2004; Stotz and Griffiths 2002; Griffiths 2007), while
others argue that the theoretical framework of SEP should be enlarged in order to include
new developments in evolutionary theory such as niche construction (Stotz and Griffiths
2002; Sterelny 2003).50 Throughout however, the impetus is towards the conclusion that
SEP is leaving something out. These criticisms suggest (1) a renewed emphasis on
context (both cellular and outside the organism), and (2) a new focus on the interactive
relations between organisms and their environments at different time scales (Caporeal
and Brewer 2000, p 25; Barker et al. 2014). However, while some of these criticisms
argue that the theoretical framework of SEP should be enlarged, the theoretical
framework of SEP has remained entirely intact (Machery and Berrett 2006; Buss and
Schmitt 2011). In other words, outright rejections of SEP have failed to convince its
practitioners to abandon the paradigm, and attempts at theoretical enlargement have left
the basic tenets of SEP unchanged.
I believe that there are two important reasons for this intransigency in the theory and
method of SEP despite its many critics. The first is that the three tenets of SEP form a
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For example, see the anthology by Scher and Rauscher (2003).
I will address this development specifically below.
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consistent and mutually supportive whole (as shown in section 4.3). Existing attempts at
enlargement, though largely correct in my view, do not show how new developments in
evolutionary theory either integrate with or replace the existing tenets of SEP in a
consistent manner; they do not sufficiently describe the new theoretical relationships that
enlargement would entail. Furthermore, for a particular enlargement proposal to be
accepted, it would have to present theoretical tenets that were at least as mutually
supportive as SEP’s current tenets. Existing attempts at enlargement do not describe how
the elements of its proposed enlargement would provide a mutually supportive metatheory for SEP. The second reason I believe existing enlargement proposals and
criticisms of SEP have failed is that they have not clearly drawn out the implications that
enlarging or rejecting elements of SEP’s theory have for its explanatory method. As I
showed in section 4.4, the three tenets of SEP shape and constrain its explanatory
method. Current criticisms of SEP and attempts at theoretical enlargement have not
shown how their proposed modifications would impact the explanatory method of SEP in
practice.
In the next section I propose a theoretical enlargement of the theoretical framework of
SEP. While parts of this proposal have been argued for in existing criticisms of SEP,
others are new.51 I will show how the enlarged theory of SEP that I propose constitutes a
consistent and mutually supportive evolutionary meta-theory for an enlarged
evolutionary psychology. Then, I will show how this enlarged theory has significant
implications for evolutionary psychology as it is standardly practiced. In light of these, I
will revise the method of SEP in such a way that can be used by practicing evolutionary
psychologists. In doing so, I will show how EEP provides better evolutionary
explanations of empathy than SEP.

4.6.1

Niche construction and mutualism

The first enlargement to the theoretical framework of SEP that I propose includes niche
construction theory [NCT]. NCT is a recent development in evolutionary biology that
emphasizes the capacity that organisms have to modify natural selection in their
51
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environment and thereby affect their own, and other species’ evolution. Niche
construction occurs when organisms modify their own and/or each other’s environments
(niches) by their metabolism, their activities and their choices (Odling-Smee et al. 2003,
p 419). Rather than treating the environment as a fixed place that recurrently presents a
limited set of problems to which organisms passively adapt, NCT treats the environment
as a modifiable; organisms construct and modify their environments in order to solve
existing problems which in turn creates new problems as an effect (Laland and O’Brien
2010, p 2). An important theoretical insight of NCT is that selection pressures are not
only to be found in the environment independent from organismal activity. Causal effects
feeding forward from organisms into their environments and back from these modified
environments into the same or other organisms create new selection pressures and
adaptations. Accordingly, NCT is a selective process, a major cause of evolutionary
change.
Examples of niche construction include the many ways in which organisms define and
alter their environments. For example, excreting waste products (Laland et al. 2000, p
165); migration or dispersal (Laland and Brown 2006, p 98); fungi manufacturing
decomposing organic matter (Odling-Smee et al. 2003); pupal cases (Gullan and
Cranston 2009); nests and burrows (Brown 2014). The significance of these examples
should not be underestimated. Niche construction is so frequent that it is surprising it
took so long for its effects on natural selection to be appreciated. For example, there are
9500 types of ants and 2,000 types of termites that build nests; 20,000 types of solitary
bees and many social bees also construct nests; 7000 types of fly are known to construct
shelters; 1,800 types of earwigs build nests; 140,000 types of butterflies and moths build
pupal cocoons (Laland and Sterelny 2006). And the list of niche constructing insects goes
on. But the insects are certainly not the only niche constructers. The vast majority of
birds construct nests; fish also construct nests, and spawning sites; lizards, moles, rabbits,
and countless other vertebrates actively modify natural selection by modifying their
environment (Ibid.). As Laland and Sterelny (2006) put it, “[t]he ubiquity and impact of
niche construction is no longer open to question.” (Ibid.)
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The importance of niche construction can be seen in its physiological and social impact.
Not all of an organism’s activities should be considered niche construction. Only those
activities that have significant evolutionary consequences should be included. Such
activities affect the physiology of organisms as well as the biotic and social environment
in which they live. The niche construction activities of one generation of organisms affect
an environment which may in turn affect subsequent generations of those organisms or
other types of organisms which come upon this constructed environment during the same
or later time period (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). For example, the limbs of certain
borrowing frogs have become increasingly specialized as a consequence of the presence
of burrows left by their ancestors (Ibid.). These frogs began constructing small burrows.
The burrows were then encountered and further constructed by subsequent generations of
frogs. The presence of these burrows created a new selection pressure which resulted in
the frogs developing different limb structures that allowed them to burrow more
efficiently and create more complex shelters. This is clear example of causal feedback
between the organisms modifying their environment and the environment having a
modifying effect on the morphology of those organisms. A different example lends
credence to the claim that niche construction also has modifying effects on the operation
of an organisms’ brain and hence its psychology. Certain spiders exhibit specialized
behaviour for threat detection and communication which occur only on their webs (Ibid.).
It is plausible to hypothesize that these behaviours and the psychological processes that
make them possible became increasingly specialized as a result of being born with a
propensity to create webs in an environment where complex webs were already present.
By modifying their abiotic environment, organisms modify the selection pressures they
face, which results in evolutionary changes in their biology. But organisms also modify
selection pressures by modifying the biotic environment in which they live through
mutualistic interactions. Organisms are usually born in an environment populated by
other organisms of the same species or type. Throughout their lives, they compete and cooperate through shifting alliances and social organizations that affect their survival and
reproduction (Barker 2008). For example, many organisms exhibit cooperative
behaviours (e.g. pelicans hunting with other pelicans of no close kin relation) (Clutton-
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Brock 2009). But in many instances, organisms interact with other organisms of a
different type in equally evolutionarily significant ways. Giant Moray eels and Groupers
are known to frequently develop hunting associations (Bshary et al. 2006). So do Blackbacked jackals and honey badgers, and wolves and honey badgers (Clutton-Brock 2009).
Furthermore, foraging associations among non-kin and organisms of different species are
well documented (Dickman 1992). These examples show that organisms modify the
organism relations in their environments in order to solve shared adaptive problems. That
they do so suggests they possess evolved psychological processes enabling such
interspecific communication and flexible coordination evolved as a result organisms
modifying their social environment.
What NCT importantly shows for present purposes is that natural selection does not
operate only according to inclusive fitness (the first tenets of SEP). Inclusive fitness
theory states that genes causing behaviours are selected to contribute to the reproductive
success of those genes according to a rule which quantifies over the variables of genetic
relatedness and energy costs (R > c / b). Selective pressure originates in the environment
and is exerted on organisms which adapt according to this rule. Doing so increases the
likelihood that their own genes (or other copies of them) will be transmitted to the next
generation. However, NCT shows that evolutionary change is not this simple. Selective
pressure is not always exerted independently of the activities of organisms. Organisms
modify their environment in ways that create causal feedback loops which exert selective
pressure on them, other organisms, and subsequent generations of organisms. And, as
seen in the case of mutualistic interactions, they shape their social environment in ways
that promote survival and reproduction, but that do not appear to conform to inclusive
fitness.
Within the theoretical framework of SEP, we could assume that mutualistic interactions
are cases of reciprocal altruism. Accordingly, interspecific hunting associations among
distantly related jackals and badgers, for example, would be considered equally costly to
both parties in terms of energy or reproductive success. But assuming this is to leave
unanswered the question of whether one or many of the organisms involved in a hunting
association are actively modifying their social environment to benefit themselves more
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than the other organisms, or to benefit the other organisms more than themselves. This
presents a theoretical challenge because these associations can be interpreted in many
ways. In any particular case, it will be difficult to determine whether an organism
engaging in what looks like mutualistic interaction will be acting in favor of its own
reproductive success, whether it is being deceived or manipulated by another organism to
act to diminish its own reproductive success, or whether it is acting entirely altruistically
to benefit another organisms’ reproductive success at the moment or over the long term.
Indeed, some cases will be cases of reciprocal altruism. But we cannot assume that they
all are independent of empirical observation.
Furthermore, every case of mutualistic interspecific interaction creates a difficult
accounting problem for SEP. How are energy expenditures during a long-term mutual
interaction to be measured? Assuming this is possible, how are we to determine that the
mental processes guiding the behaviours of these organisms are conforming to the rule of
inclusive fitness or whether they are being influenced by environmental conditions that
are the result of niche construction? For example, the niche constructing activities of
organisms can have positive results on reproductive success. Often, however, these
activities will cause the environment to become poorer in terms of energy resources. This
in turn would put an energy strain on organisms in that environment and may result in a
reduction of reproductive success. In both resource-rich and resource-poor environments,
the factors that lead organisms to continue or cease modifying their environment through
the construction of shelters, or migration, or by developing new associations, or breaking
old alliances should be taken into consideration. NCT shows us that we cannot establish a
priori that an organism’s behaviour, especially its mutualistic interactions, conform to the
rule of inclusive fitness. A detailed observation and analysis of an organisms’ niche
constructing activities and the effects of these activities will be required to more fully
understand the selective processes that shape the psychological processes that are
motivating its behaviour.
SEP’s tenet of inclusive fitness focuses our attention on selective processes that influence
the psychology of organisms from within. It is narrowly individualistic. By enlarging the
theoretical framework to include NCT, we can examine the dynamic relationships
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between organisms and their environment. This will allow us to identify otherwise
ignored selective processes that shape the evolution of our psychology. I will have more
to say about the implications of this theoretical enlargement on the explanatory method
EEP below. For now, I will turn to the second proposed enlargement.

4.6.2

The mind is like a self-adaptive computer

According to the second tenet of SEP, the human brain’s intelligence is like the
intelligence embodied in a computer (Pinker 1997, p 26-27). SEP supports this tenet by
appeal the computational theory of mind. As described in section 4.2.2 above, this theory
holds that the mind operates according to classically computational principles such as the
rule based manipulation of symbols. The similarity relation here being that the mind is
like a computer in that it too manipulates its internal representations according to
computational principles. The structure of this computational implementation is realized
in the mind’s complicated program. This program is coded in our genes as a result of
evolutionary processes, and it manifests itself in the architecture of the mind which is a
system of self-contained algorithms.
Human behaviour is subtle and flexible. And according to SEP, the subtlety and
flexibility of human thought is the result of a complex algorithmic structure. This is why
SEP posits the existence of hundreds or thousands of mental programs called modules. It
is the complexity of modular programs and their interconnections—such as a program for
vision and a program for snake avoidance—which results in the flexibility of behaviour.
Each of these modules was selected for its causal contribution to solving a specific
adaptive problem which occurred in during the Pleistocene.
Contrary to this view, I believe that the flexibility of behaviour and thought cannot be
fully explained by appeal to the complexity of a fixed mental program. This is not to say
that crucially important portions of human mental architecture are not fixed. I believe that
certain mental programs have evolved as a results of natural selection and that we retain
these portions partially due to genetic causal contribution. However, I believe that the
flexibility of behaviour is made possible by evolutionarily fixed processes which enable,
regulate, and maintain the flexibility of thought. This is a self-adaptive computational
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theory of mind. In support of this theory, EEP like SEP, can maintain that the mind
operates according to classical computational principles. However, unlike SEP, it must
enlarge its theoretical framework to accommodate the claim that the mind is composed
not just of static, albeit very complex, software, but of self-adaptive software. According
to EEP, the mind is like a self-adaptive computer. It is composed of software that is
designed by natural selection to be sensitive to its environmental goals and to its own
internal processes. And it is designed to effect changes to those goals and internal
processes. These claims draw support from the recent development of self-adaptive
software [SAS] in computer science (Laddaga 2000; Ganek and Corbi 2003; Salehi and
Tahbildari 2009). SAS is inspired by the realization that biological systems survive and
reproduce in their changing environments by being sensitive to them and adapting or
changing themselves in them.
At this point, we may pause and ask whether the mind’s changing sensitivity and ability
to adapt is not, as SEP argues, a product of a very complex but static internal program? If
evolution occurred over a long period of time, surely the static program of the human
mind reflects all of the evolutionarily significant contingencies that organisms need to
survive and reproduce. The environment is complex, but so is the mind’s software.
Contrary to this however, SAS shows that SEP’s exclusive focus on complexity is
misplaced. The environment is indeed complex. But it is also constantly changing. As we
saw in the previous section, organisms modify their environment, and they encounter
ever changing environments as a result of migration, their interaction with other
organisms, and as a result of the changes that other organisms have made to the
environment. Complexity then is not the only important factor to be included in our
understanding of the mind’s architecture. Novelty by modification is key. If organisms
have a mind that enables them to modify their environments, then it stands to reason that
they also have a mind that enables them to modify their own mind in order to adapt to
that environment. Self-adaptive software contributes to a theoretical framework for
understanding how mind effects self-adaptive changes to itself in a changing
environment.

164
The design of self-adaptive software started around the turn of the century. It was spurred
by a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiative seeking the creation of
software that is capable of real-time self-regulation as opposed to preprogramed
adaptation (Laddaga 2000). That is, rather than have programmers code static software
into a computer, self-adaptive software projects have programmers code self-variable
software processes. A computer running SAS is now able to modify both its internal selfproperties and external context-properties (Salehi and Tahbildari 2009). In the former
case, it does so via a real-time detailed description of its components (its modules). It is
able to self-configure and reconfigure the arrangement and connections between modules
(Taentzer et al. 2000). And it is able to effectuate fine grained changes to the adaptive
algorithms internal to its modules (Ibid.). In the latter case of context-properties, SAS is
aware of its environment (e.g. other computers on a network) and it is able to modify that
environment by interacting in a cooperative or a self-protective manner (Ganek and Corbi
2003, p 6). This is facilitated by its ability to make predictions (Ibid.). SAS strives to
implement these processes of internal and external sensation and change while hiding the
complexity of these processes from the end computer user, and by aiming to decrease the
number of changes effected from external programmers. It aims to develop a system that
is both sensitive to its changing environment and autonomously modifiable. This accords
with our understanding of the human mind. Although a detailed description of our mind’s
modular architecture may exist, we do not have access to it consciously. Thus, the mind
hides the complexity of modular organizational and algorithmic modification from us
(the end user). And the processes enabling such modifications do not have to be learnt.
Rather, an important part of what is innately given to us by our genetic code are
processes enabling us to adaptively self-modify our own minds.
Enlarging the theoretical framework of SEP allows us to notice that the mind’s software
is less like static software, and more like self-adaptive software. Our minds develop by
means of environmentally sensitive processes and processes that enable us to modify
ourselves and our environment. The most important and impressive adaptation that
natural selection has designed is a mind that is able to achieve adaptations in real-time.
This does not imply that the mind like a “blank slate”—a view staunchly admonished by
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SEP. To say that the mind’s software is self-adaptive software does not imply that there is
no software “coded” in our genes. Nor does it imply, as Buller’s criticism of SEP would
have it, that the mind is entirely composed of domain-general as opposed to domainspecific (modular) processes. Modular processes exist. But their structure may not remain
fixed throughout an organism’s life. It is plausible that natural selection has also coded
processes that regulate the modification of modular architecture and algorithms. As these
modifying processes become better understood, they are becoming better implemented in
computer science. Computer engineers posit the existence of sensors to monitor and
reflect the state of a system’s internal and external environment, and effectors which
apply changes and realize adaptive actions in real-time (Salehi and Tahbildari 2009).
That the human mind can monitor its environment and significantly modify itself in order
to adapt to that changing environment is important because evolutionary psychologists
believe that the properties of particular modules depend on the specific function they
carry out. On the other hand, SAS shows how the human mind likely modifies its
modular properties in the face of novel functional problem requirements. This raises two
difficulties for the view that the mind is composed of static modules. First, modular
properties that are selected for the function that the module performed in the past are
indeterminate. This is because a static modular account cannot tell the difference between
those properties that may have been selected for their functional consequences in distant
past (e.g. the Pleistocene) and those that may have been selected for their function in the
more recent past (e.g. ancient Rome). The second difficulty is that modular properties
that have remained fixed since the distant past because they served a specific function
may have served different functions at different times. And perhaps more significantly,
they may have served different functions throughout any particular organism’s lifetime.
The likely possibility that innate modular properties selected for one function are
recruited for (or exapted) to perform a different function, or significantly modified to
perform a completely novel function in light of changing environmental problem
requirements is not explained on thestandard evolutionary psychological view that the
mind’s software is static rather than self-adaptive.
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If we include SAS into the theoretical framework of enlarged evolutionary psychology,
the extent to which human minds have modified themselves throughout evolutionary
history and throughout any particular organism’s lifetime becomes largely unknown. And
though the evolutionary imperatives of survival and reproduction are surely limits on the
selection for self-reflective and self-adaptive processes in past generations and past
environments, a question about the speed of evolution arises. It is to this question that I
turn next.

4.6.3

Evolution is faster than we thought: feminist
evolutionists and biological leverage

As described in section 4.2.3 above, the third tenet of SEP is that evolution is slow. SEP
holds that our evolved psychology—our basic preferences, motivations, and capacities—
were selected for in the distant past or “deep time” (Buss 2010, p 3). And though the
structure of our psychology is very complex, it is said to have remained fixed since deep
time because evolution is “a glacially slow process that occurs in small increments over
thousands and millions of years.” (Ibid.) SEP holds that individual variations spread
throughout the human population during the Pleistocene via inherited genes. This resulted
in psychological traits that were universal to that population and are now universal to our
population because they evolved during a very long period during which human ways of
life are said to have remained the same (Barkow et al. 1992, p 5). The considered view of
SEP is that there simply has not been enough time since the end of the Pleistocene for
any significant evolutionary changes to our psychology to have occurred. However,
contradictory evidence is mounting in evolutionary biology.
Many types of organisms exhibit evolutionarily significant morphological variations
within short time scales. For example, the species-typical traits of Sockeye salmon have
been documented as being directionally selected after just 13 generations (56 years) of
isolated reproduction (Hendry et al. 2000). Likewise, notable body size increases have
been documented in isolated populations of house sparrows in less than 100 generations
(100 years) (Baker 1980). Empirical evidence of evolved physiological variation is also
being published. Examples include salinity tolerance in copepods, heavy metal tolerance
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in plants and animals, insecticide resistance in insects, and thermal tolerance in fish
(Reznick and Ghalambor 2001, p 185). This accumulation of evidence is pointing
towards the existence of a newly characterized phenomenon called “contemporary
evolution” (Hendry and Kinnison 1999). Increasingly, studies are reporting that
morphological and physiological evolution by natural selection occurs within short time
scales of less than a few centuries (Hendry and Kinnison 1999; Reznick and Ghalambor
2001).
That evolution is more rapid than previously thought is gaining widespread empirical
support across all of evolutionary theory. To better account for the rapid speed of
evolution, EEP’s theoretical framework enlarges to include feminist evolutionary theory
and biological leverage theory. Evolutionary explanations in ecology, primatology, and
evolutionary biology that make use of feminist evolutionary theory emphasize social
organization and the influences of environmental variables (Haraway 1989; Hrdy 1997;
Liesen 2007). This is a shift away from SEP’s exclusive explanatory focus on processes
internal to individuals. For example, SEP explains female sexual partner choice by appeal
to psychological process leading them to “favor men who possess status and resources
and to disfavor men who lack these assets.” (Buss 1994, p 212) On the other hand,
feminist evolutionary theory highlights historical and situation-dependent variables such
as marriage systems and inheritance customs that enabled and supported the possession
of wealth by males in medieval Europe (Hrdy 1997). At the very least, such historical and
situation-dependent variables contribute to an explanation of why the psychological
processes posited by SEP continue to be selected. They explain why selected
psychological processes are sustained and become resistant to change. With regard to any
particular behaviour under investigation, these variables by themselves may not explain
why that behaviour occurs. This is not to say that genes play no causal role in causing
psychological development and behaviour. But I think that including historical and
situation-dependent variables is crucial to explain why a behaviour persisted in a
particular time and place in the past (and perhaps why it persists today). It becomes an
open question then whether historical and situational variables are causally responsible
for the original occurrence and spread of the behaviour.

168
Historical and situation-dependent factors at least support the continued selection of
innate mechanisms. Including them in explanation allows us to see that they influence the
selection certain psychological processes as compared to others. Thus, feminist
evolutionary theory reveals not only the possible structure of mechanisms internal to
individuals, but the environmental structure that directs the natural selection of those
mechanisms. Of particular note is experimental work demonstrating fast natural selection
that is presently “ongoing in real-time” (Gowaty 2003; Gowaty et al. 2003; 2004; Moore
and Moore 1999; Moore et al. 2003). Experiments on flies, cockroaches, and mice have
been performed in which constraints on (female) organisms’ choice of sexual partner
have been manipulated. Those organisms who reproduced with partners of their choosing
exhibited greater reproductive success than those that were constrained to mate with nonpreferred partners. Their offspring were often greater in number and healthier. It is
reasonable to infer then that organisms who were freer to mate with partners of their
choosing were also likely to have had more and healthier offspring. What these
experiments show is that current and past ecological constraints on the reproductive
choices of organisms are evolutionarily significant. Thus, by including the perspective of
feminist evolutionary theory, EEP is better equipped to “understand and test alternative
hypotheses” for the origins of human psychology (Gowaty 2013, p 3).
Also with the aim of better accounting for rapid and on-going natural selection, EEP
includes biological leverage in its enlarged theoretical framework (Barker 2008). Rapidly
changing relationships among organisms can have significant evolutionary effects as in
the case of mutualisms described in section 5.1. In such cases, an organism regulates the
behaviour of another through open communication and indicators for coordinated action.
In other cases, organisms can regulate another’s behaviour in deceptive, manipulative, or
coercive relationships. In such cases, an organism will regulate the behaviour of another
for its own benefit. One way that organisms do this is by changing an indicator or by
changing a references state which causally influences an adaptive process in another
organism (Ibid.). For example, lycaenid butterfly larvae produce substances that attract
ant workers and induce adaptive processes causing brood-care behaviour (Henning
1983). The butterfly larvae do this by providing the ants with a sweet honeydew-like
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reward along with the chemicals that deceive their adaptive processes (Ibid.). This results
in the butterfly larvae being carried back to the ants’ nests (Ibid.). After some time in a
nest, the butterfly larva acquire chemicals from the host ants which allows them to
remain camouflaged while they prey on them. When the butterfly larvae enter the nest of
the ants, they are redirecting (or co-opting) two of the regulative processes of the worker
ants to their own regulative ends by presenting the ants with false indicators. The first of
these is the process that regulates which organisms the ants care for. And the second
regulates their communications. Once co-opted, these control systems can act as
biological levers in that they are “a causal structure that transforms a small initial cause
(acting on the reference or the indicator) into a much larger effect.” (Barker 2008, p 12)
The initial cause here (the butterfly larvae changing the indicator state of the ant larvae)
is transformed into a much larger cause (widespread communication and helping
behaviour). In turn, these large effects are highly consequential for the reproductive
success of both the butterfly and the ants. They allow the butterflies to gain resources
such as food and shelter. And they exert a selection pressure on the ants’ communication
processes, brood-care processes, and nest-building.
In human and primate cases, as in this insect example, dynamic and contested
relationships of co-optive regulation by small initial changes can have widespread effects
of great evolutionary importance. For example, as I discussed in my first paper, changes
in whether two organisms share or perceive themselves to share the same values may
change the motivational orientation they adopt towards each other. Doing so may also
change whether an organism cares for another, and hence, whether an organism
empathizes with that other organism. The parallels between the biological levers in the
above ant and larvae case and possible human cases of mimicry, deception, and
exploitation in contested zones are striking. I will elaborate on some of these parallels
towards the end of this paper when I discuss the role that biological levers play in the
new methodology of EEP and when I sketch an alternative EEP explanation of how
empathy evolved. For now, I will turn to showing how the tenets of EEP’s enlarged
framework are mutually supportive, and then to drawing out the implications that this
framework has for the revised method of EEP.
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4.7 A mutually supportive theoretical enlargement
The three tenets of standard evolutionary psychology are:
1) Inclusive fitness
2) Computational theory of mind
3) Slow evolution
As the name suggests, enlarged evolutionary psychology enlarges each of these tenets to
include:
4) Niche construction and mutualism
5) Self-adaptive software
6) Feminist evolutionary theory and biological leverage
I take the EEP to be providing a theoretical enlargement of SEP. But with regard to some
of EEP’s theoretical tenets, “enlargement” does not only imply extending SEP’s metatheory. EEP’s enlargement also requires rejecting some of SEP’s deeply held befliefs. No
element of the enlarged theoretical framework of SEP necessarily implies the falsity of
the original three tenets of SEP. But all elements of the enlarged theoretical framework
imply that the three tenets of SEP’s original framework cannot be maintained
exclusively. For example, SEP can no longer hold that evolution is always very slow
given the recent empirical evidence from feminist evolutionists and the theoretical
support from biological leverage. The tenet that evolution is very slow cannot be
maintained to the exclusion that evolution can occur over much smaller time scales. To
take another example, the inclusion of niche construction theory does not imply that we
do not sometimes (or often) behave in ways that favour the reproductive success of
targets with whom we share the most genes. However, it does allow us to form different
hypotheses about why some of our behaviour often conforms to inclusive fitness theory.
It may turn out that in many cases we have constructed our environment in ways that
directs our behaviour according to the predictions of inclusive fitness theory. That the
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majority of parents in North America live together with their children in shelters that
territorially exclude other parents and other children is not merely because our
psychological mechanisms aim towards the maximization of inclusive fitness. Rather, it
is because, in North America, we have constructed and continue to construct our shelters
and our family relationships in such ways. Different shelters and family arrangements
have been the norm in North American history and continue to exist elsewhere in the
world. Humans, like other organisms, have constantly modified their environments. And,
in turn, we have constantly adapted to our modified environments. If we had not, then we
would likely not have survived to the present today.
We construct our environment, and our environment influences our behaviour. But our
environment also influences the evolution of our psychology. More specifically, the
creativity and variety of our environmental modifications and the fact that we have
adapted to environmental modifications are reasons to believe the mind is more like a
self-adaptive computer than a computer whose program has been fixed for a very long
time. The inclusion of niche construction theory into the theoretical framework of
evolutionary psychology both supports and is supported by a self-adaptive computational
theory of mind. This theory states that the flexibility of human behaviour is made possible
by the flexibility of human mental structures. Throughout life, the human mind, like a
self-adaptive computer, effects changes to its goals and internal psychological algorithms
or processes as a function of the adaptive problems it faces in its environment. This again
is not to deny that certain fixed structures of the mind continue to be selected because
they contributed to the solution of recurring adaptive problems in the past (as would
follow from SEP’s tenet that the mind is like a classical computer with fixed algorithms).
Natural selection continues to select for certain fixed structures that play a role in the
processes of visual perception. But this does not imply that vision is and always has been
the same. EEP denies the claim that all of our psychological processes have been
developmentally fixed since the Pleistocene. Clearly, the mind’s processes of visual
perception are self-modified throughout one human lifetime. An infant does not see in the
same way as an adult. Furthermore, a painter may not see in the same way as before they
began to paint. I think this provides some reason to believe that even the processes of
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visual perception have evolved throughout human history. Humans today may perceive
some elements of the environment in the same way as humans who lived during the
Pleistocene. But if the mind is like a self-adaptive computer and not a pre-adapted
computer, it seems increasingly likely that we see differently from humans who lived in
the distant past.
But for now, this is an aside. The important point is that, when taken together, niche
construction theory and self-adaptive software provide us with a new ways of describing
how human minds evolve. Specifically, they evolve in virtue of the natural selection of
processes enabling sensitivity to and modification of environments (including the mind’s
own psychological architecture or environment). Such a description urges us to accept
that evolution by natural selection operates much faster than we previously thought. And
if we accept that evolution is rapid and ongoing, then this supports the inclusion of both
feminist evolutionary theory and biological leverage theory. The former integrates social
and historical factors into our evolutionary explanations, whereas the latter enables us to
describe regulative interactions that are otherwise difficult to formalize, such as
mutualism, mimicry, deception, and manipulation.
The three enlarged tenets of EEP are mutually supportive in a way that makes holding
SEP’s three tenets to the exclusion EEP’s enlarged tenets inconsistent. And EEP like
SEP, provides a unified theoretical framework for explaining human behaviour as a
function of biological processes; some of which were selected in the past, and some of
which are subject to ongoing evolution by natural selection. But this new and enlarged
framework also adds a lot of complexity to evolutionary psychological explanations.
While, as mentioned, this added complexity does not necessarily negate any of the
previously held tenets of SEP, it does present important challenges to its methodological
assumptions.
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Figure 5: Mutually supportive tenets of EEP

In the next section I elaborate these challenges, and present a revision of SEP’s
explanatory method that accords with the enlarged theoretical framework of EEP. I then
conclude the paper by generating a hypothesis about the evolution of empathy from this
revised method.

4.8 The revised method of EEP
1) As outlined in section 4.4, the explanatory method of standard evolutionary
psychology —the way it generates and tests hypotheses about contemporary
phenomena—is as follows:Choose a widespread phenomenon.
2) Posit innate, universal, and historically fixed mechanisms that cause the
phenomenon in (1).
3) Generate and test hypotheses about how the mechanisms in (2) functioned to
cause behaviour that solved recurring adaptive problems during the
Pleistocene.
4) Justify the existence of the mechanisms in (2) by appeal to statistical
normality in (1) and historical plausibility in (3).
The method of EEP leaves the first step as is. This is because SEP and EEP share the
same main explanatory goal: to explain widespread phenomena in terms of the causal
processes accounting for what exists (Buss 1996, p 297). However, the enlarged
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theoretical framework of EEP does suggest a revision of the second step of SEP’s
method.
SEP looks to explain the cause of the phenomenon under investigation in (1) in terms of a
specific type of causal process, namely, psychological processes. This is well and good.
Psychology is and should be about accounting for what psychological processes exist,
and accounting for how they work. And, as discussed above, the psychological processes
posited by SEP are those that are innate because they solved adaptive problems humans
faced in the distant past. The reason why SEP posits innate psychological processes is
because it holds that they were selected in the past because of the consequences they
functioned to produce. These evolutionary functions reveal the form of the mind today:
In evolved systems, form follows function. The physical structure is there
because it embodies a set of programs; the programs are there because
they solved a particular problem in the past. (Cosmides and Tooby 1997,
p. 13)
“Form follows function” where ‘function’ refers to the consequences a process
functioned to produce in the past, and ‘form’ refers to the stimuli the process is triggered
by and its algorithmic structure in the present. Accordingly, in step (2), SEP posits the
existence of processes that “follow” the “function” of solving adaptive problems.
Like SEP, EEP allows for form to follow function. But, importantly, it holds that form
also assists function. The forms or processes of our minds are there because they
performed a function in the past. But our psychological processes also motivated us to
modify the environments in which we lived in order to contribute to the functions that our
minds were selected to perform. We found and made shelters, tools, and clothing. We
created abstract social relationships such as clans, tribes, and marriage. We regulated
each other’s goals and preferences in order to achieve co-operative or competitive
benefits. Such environmental modifications, along with psychological processes, causally
contributed the functions that our minds performed in order for us to survive and
reproduce.52 In turn, these environmental modifications affect the algorithms of our mind

52

Sterelny calls such reproductive successes-assisting environmental modifications “scaffolding”
(Sterelny 2003). In the extended mind debate, they are called “spreading the cognitive load” or
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in virtue of the mind’s self-adaptive nature. That is, environmental modifications have
been produced by the psychological processes that enable them. Thus, the functions that
we needed to perform in order to survive and reproduce have changed over evolutionary
time. So too have the psychological processes that causally contribute to those functions.
The goal here for EEP will be to clearly identify when there has been (or could be) a
change in the process or underlying mechanisms as opposed to merely a change in
realization of the same process type. To this end, existing research on the self-modifying
capabilities of self-adaptive software may elucidate the self-modifying capacities of the
human mind. In the self-adaptive software literature, self-modifications processes include
distributed graph transformations (Taentzer et al. 2000), many types of reflective
middleware (Huang 2003), and architecture description languages (Salehi and Tahbildari
2009, p 13).
Provisionally, however, if we accept that mind modifies its environment and itself to
assist in performing evolutionary functions, then we should first seek to explain any
widespread phenomenon under investigation in terms of the psychological processes that
follow from and assist the functions that these processes perform in the contemporary
environment. This is a crucially important step if we are to understand why and how (if in
any way) the functions of our psychological processes have evolved.
This challenges the assumption in step (2) that the mind is composed of functional
processes that have remained fixed. Accordingly, the revised method of EEP does not
begin by positing the existence of processes that have remained fixed because of their
functions during Pleistocene. Again, this is not to say that such historically fixed
processes do not exist. But within the theoretical framework of EEP, rather than
assuming their existence, they must be discovered. To discover whether a process has
remained fixed since ancient time then, we should begin by distinguishing the possible
ancient functions of such a process from its possible contemporary functions. This will
involve identifying the causal feedback loops or dynamic causal links between the causes
and effects of a biological phenomenon (Oyama 2000; Oyama et al. 2001). In other
“cognitive off-loading” (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2007; Clark 2008; Wilson and Clark
2009).
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words, it will involve identifying the functions of the phenomenon by the many roles it
plays in a specific environment thereby contributing to the maintenance of that
environment’s continuity or change. Insofar as a psychological process causally
contributes to a phenomenon under investigation, the question to ask then becomes: what
is the function of the psychological processes causing the phenomenon in terms of its
consequences that either sustain or change the selection of organisms in the environment?
Thus, the revised method of EEP replaces step (2) of the standard method with:

2) Describe the current functions of the phenomenon in (1).

As just mentioned, an explanatorily fruitful way of describing the contemporary function
of a psychological process is in terms of the causal feedback loops it participates in.
These feedback loops either contribute to sustaining or changing the environment in
which organisms are selected. This way of characterizing the present functions of process
allows for it to appear in a complex environmental context and as part of the larger
dynamic systems of which it is a part (Jax 2005, p 1). This way of describing a process’s
current functions is almost the same way that SEP describes the past functions of the
psychological processes it posits. The notions of function and the means of identifying a
processes’ functional consequences are available to both methods. The only significant
difference is the environment being referred to. Whereas in step (2) of SEP’s explanatory
method, the environment being referred to is that of the Pleistocene, in step (2) of EEP’s
revised method, the environment being referred to is the contemporary environment. This
bring us to step (3).
Step (3) of SEP is to generate hypotheses about the functions of psychological processes
causing a particular phenomenon in the environment of the Pleistocene. The method of
EEP leaves this step as is. The question of this third step then is: what are the functions of
the psychological processes that contributed to behaviours which solved recurring
adaptive problems during the period approximately 1.8 million years ago to 13 000 years
ago? Identifying the adaptive problems that humans faced during this period requires
identifying the “adaptation-relevant properties of the ancestral environments encountered
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by members of ancestral populations” (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, p 386). These
adaptation-relevant properties or statistical “invariances” are properties that can be
“described as sets of conditionals of any degree of complexity, from the very simple… to
any degree of conditional and structural complexity that is reflected in the adaptation.”
(Tooby and Cosmides 1990, p 389). And the way to identify these properties is by
inferring them from the present (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, p 390). For example, “[t]he
presence of psychological mechanisms producing male sexual jealousy tells one that
female infidelity was part of the human and ring dove EEAs [environment of
evolutionary adaptedness].” (Ibid.)
Many critics of SEP have presented a variety arguments for why describing the
environment of the Pleistocene is epistemologically difficult (Stotz and Griffiths 2002;
Sterelny 2003; Buller 2005; Griffiths 2007; Liesen 2007). Some of these arguments are
more compelling than others. And as mentioned, the enlarged framework of EEP which
includes niche-construction theory, feminist evolutionary theory, and biological leverage
presents challenges to the tenet that all innate human psychological processes motivate us
to maximize reproductive success. But I will not rehearse these arguments at present
because the revised method of EEP, like that of SEP, makes room for the possibility that
many of our psychological processes are innate and that they contributed to the
performance of evolutionarily significant functions in the distant past.53 Thus, the third
step is:

3) Generate hypotheses about the functions of the behaviours in (1)
during the Pleistocene and posit that the psychological processes
causing them are innate.

This third step follows the second step in an explanatorily beneficial way. This is because
SEP specifies that hypotheses about the functions of behaviours during the Pleistocene
should be generated from information available in the present, which is precisely what
53

This is not to say that these processes are innate because they performed an evolutionarily significant
function in the distant past. If we accept that evolution is fast, then it is not unlikely that innate
psychological processes continue to be selected because of their functions in the nearer past.
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EEP’s step (2) provides. The information gathered in step (2) (specifying the current
functions of a behaviour) serves as a base for the generation of hypotheses about their
functions in the distant past. These hypotheses, as in the case of male sexual jealousy
above, may take the following form: If psychological processes contribute to causing X
in the current environment, and the function of X in the current environment is Y, then X
may have been present in the EEA. Thus, the question of this step remains: what was the
function of X in the EEA? However, the revised method of EEP allows us to immediately
notice whether the function of X (the phenomenon under investigation) was the same in
the current environment as it was in the EEA. This is an improvement on SEP’s method
because whether the function of a psychological process causing a phenomenon has
remained fixed since the Pleistocene can now be discovered and evaluated rather than
assumed. Evaluating this possibility was previously impossible without a functional
description of the phenomenon in the current environment being part of the explanatory
method. We can now in step (4) compare the function posited in (2) with that posited in
(3) to identify whether they are the same or not:

4) Compare the functions in (2) with those in (3).

This brings us to the step (5).
In the two last steps we generated hypotheses about the functions of a phenomenon
caused by psychological processes in both the current environment of observation and the
distant past environment. And we compared those functions to identify whether there
were any in common. This allows us to examine whether the functions of the
psychological processes causing a phenomenon will be different in the present as
compared to in the past. For example, the function of male sexual jealousy in the current
environment may turn out to be different from the function of male sexual jealousy in the
distant past environment of the Pleistocene. This presents a challenge in the final step of
SEP’s explanatory method. In the final step of SEP’s method, the existence of an innate
psychological processes was justified by appeal to both the statistical regularity of the
phenomenon it caused in the current environment and the historical plausibility of it
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causing the same phenomenon in the distant past. But as we have just seen, the same
phenomenon (caused by psychological processes) will sometimes have different
functions in these two environments. Why is this the case? SEP’s answer is that the
environment has become much more complex, and that it is this environmental
complexity that has changed the function of the phenomenon (and hence the
psychological processes causing it). According to SEP, even though the environment
changed, our psychology stayed the same. On the other hand, the enlarged theoretical
framework of EEP allows us to answer differently. EEP proposes:

5) Track similarities and differences between current functions and
historical functions and identify possible correlations with significant
environmental changes or biological levers.

The revised method of EEP does not assume that a current behaviour can be explained
only in terms of the psychological processes that cause it. Such processes are integral
causal components, but EEP views the continued existence of a behaviour as the outcome
of psychological processes and its current functional consequences. The same goes for
explaining a phenomenon in the distant past. The phenomenon must be explained by
positing psychological processes that caused behaviours whose consequences enabled
their continued selection. If form (psychological processes) follows function
(evolutionarily significant consequences), then the question becomes: what were the
functions that our psychological processes contributed to throughout evolutionary
history? This is the fundamental question of any evolutionary psychology.
To answer this question, step (5) of EEP’s method proposes that we track how a
phenomenon’s function has changed over time (if it has changed), and correlate those
functional changes with significant environmental modifications or biological levers.54 It
is likely that in many cases, it will be impossible to carry out this historical tracking in
detail. But in successful cases, the method specifies that if a functional change can be
54

Environmental changes will be evolutionarily significant when they are caused by niche-construction,
social arrangements, or other natural changes, such as disasters or changes in climate that sharply affect
reproductive success.
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correlated with a significant environmental change or biological lever, then these
correlations are evidence for possible changes to a population’s psychological processes
over time. A change in a phenomenon’s function that is sustained over several
generations by a change in the environment or that is having large scale effects due to
biological leverage may be evidence of a significant change in our psychology.
Accordingly, the comparative method of EEP allows for evolutionary changes in human
psychology to be discovered. Rather than assuming that behaviour is caused by an
unchanging structure, EEP allows us to track when and how a structure that was fixed in
the past may have changed and whether it has become fixed again.
This brings us to the last step of EEP’s comparative method:

6) Justify the existence of the distant historical psychological processes
in (3) by appeal to statistical normality in (2) and significant
evolutionary changes or continuities in (5).

In this final step, we can assess whether the distant historical functions (and form) of the
psychological processes we posited at the outset have continually been selected (i.e. have
remained fixed) or whether they have changed. A strength of this comparative method is
that it allows us to provide evidence for when we expect a functional change to be
accompanied by a change in psychological form (or algorithmic structure) as opposed to
merely being the result of increased environmental complexity. As mentioned above, this
is because in step (5) we will have correlated possible functional changes with
environmental changes and inter-organismic psychological regulations that will likely
have had important effects on reproductive success (e.g. niche-construction, biological
levers).
To summarize, the explanatory methods of SEP and EEP are as follows:
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Table 2. The method of SEP and EEP

Standard Evolutionary Psychology:

Enlarged Evolutionary Psychology:

1) Choose a widespread behavioural

1) Choose a widespread behavioural

phenomenon.

2) Posit innate, universal, and historically fixed
processes whose past function causes the

phenomenon.

2) Describe the current functions of
the phenomenon in (1).

phenomenon in (1).

3) Generate and test hypotheses about how the

3) Generate hypotheses about the

mechanisms in (2) functioned to cause

functions of the behaviours in (1)

behaviour that solved recurring adaptive

during the Pleistocene and posit

problems during the Pleistocene.

that the processes causing them are
innate.

4) Justify the existence of the processes in (2)
by appeal to statistical normality in (1) and

4) Compare the functions in (2) with
those in (3).

historical plausibility in (3).
5) Track similarities and differences
between current functions and
historical functions and identify
possible correlations with
significant environmental changes
or biological levers.

6) Justify the existence of the distant
historical processes in (3) by appeal
to statistical normality in (2) and
significant evolutionary changes or
continuities in (5).
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The two most significant revisions to the method of SEP proposed by the comparative method of
EEP are step (2) (the description of current functions) and step (6) (ontological justification by
appeal to the evolutionarily informed historical comparisons). Step (2) is one which has not been
entirely ignored by SEP, but it is one which has heretofore not been integrated into its
explanatory method. Often, evolutionary psychologists will describe the function of a
phenomenon caused by current psychological processes. But their theoretical assumptions then
very quickly lead them to posit innate processes that have remained fixed since the unspecified
distant past to explain this current function, despite the fact that it functioned differently in the
past.
The significance of step (6) is that it allows us to preserve some of the universal ontology of SEP
while also allowing us to discover if and when that ontology became universal and how it might
have spread. If some of the current functions of a phenomenon under investigation have
remained the same since the very distant past (e.g. the Pleistocene), then this will provide
evidence which can be used to justify the claim that this phenomenon is caused by an innate
psychological process. However, if the current functions of a phenomenon are very different
from those that we hypothesize were its functions in the distant past, then this will be a clue for
us to investigate and follow the comparative steps of EEP. We can examine this clue (the
difference between current functions and distant historical functions) and search for more recent
historical factors that may have led to widespread selective variation across a population. Given
the more recent occurrence of these factors, they should be correlated with environmental
changes or biological levers affecting selection. This will then provide evidence which can be
used to justify the claim that a phenomenon is caused by an innate psychological processes in a
given population. At that point, developmental and cross-cultural analysis could be performed to
assess whether the phenomenon—e.g. marriage—is universally caused by innate psychological
processes.
The comparative method of EEP allows for new possibilities of discovering how our minds have
evolved. But it also raises many questions that have not been sufficiently addressed by
evolutionary psychology. Such questions include: how does a change in psychological process
becomes reliably heritable? Under what conditions and how long does it take for a psychological
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change via biological leverage to spread across a population? If, over many generations, an
environmental stimulus results in a psychological change across processes in more than one
specific domain, what implications does this have for explanations that appeal to a single domain
specific processes causing our responses to such stimuli? Answers to these questions about the
explanatory method of EEP and other questions about its theoretical framework will require
further research.

4.9 Enlarged evolutionary psychology of empathy
As we saw in section 4.1, SEP posits innate psychological processes that cause females to
empathize more frequently and more accurately than males. It claims females possess these
processes because the consequences of empathy—its functions—were mostly caused by females
in the environment of the Pleistocene. As mentioned earlier, these functions include: 1)
“mothering”; 2) “gossip”; 3) “social mobility”; 4) “reading your partner”. The empirical findings
of SEP support the claims that, in today’s environment, females are on universal average more
sensitive than males to the needs of their children; that females are more likely to gossip amongst
themselves than males; that females usually have to adapt to living with the extended family of
their male partners; and that females are better at becoming aware of the needs of their male
partners. According to SEP, these are some of the contemporary functions of empathy, and they
explain essential differences in the occurrence of empathy because these functions contributed to
the reproductive success of a population over a long period in the distant past.
In accordance with step (2) of EEP’s explanatory method, we can accept these four current
functions of empathy. However, in step (3), it is possible to infer from these current functions
that empathy would have been equally important to the reproductive success of males as it was to
that of females. As I have argued in my first paper, empathy is more likely to occur in a
cooperative motivational orientation. Hunting is a paradigmatic example of such a behaviour
which is often assumed to have been performed mostly by males. It is a reasonable then to
generate the following hypothesis: that one of the functions of empathy in the Pleistocene was to
favour cooperation (reading one’s partner) and helping behaviour while hunting. Males may
have benefited from becoming aware of the concerns of their hunting associates. These empathic
hunters would have been keenly motivated to pay attention to and help their injured associates
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and been able to solicit help in dangerous circumstances once injured. When we compare the
current functions of empathy with its possible historical functions (step 4), we notice that not all
of the plausible historical functions of empathy are supported by current empirical findings in
SEP. To see why this is the case, we must proceed to step (5).
In this step we attempt to track the similarities and difference between the current functions and
historical functions of empathy. And then we attempt to correlate these with significant
environmental changes or biological levers. So far, we can see that the items in the set of current
functions of empathy that we have posited are very similar to those in the set of historical
functions. Mothering, gossip, social mobility, and reading your partner are both current
functions and distant historical functions. This does not mean that the set of current functions is
full. There are likely to be many other functions of empathy in the contemporary environment.
For example, one of the current functions of empathy is motivating people to give money to
charities. And there are likely to be many additional distant historical functions that we have not
yet discovered. But let us stay with our current addition to the previous four distant historical
functions, namely hunting.
Can a change in empathy’s hunting function be correlated with an evolutionarily significant
environmental change or biological lever? One such change is the development of agriculture,
approximately 520 generations ago. Agriculture can be considered a form of niche-construction
that possibly evolved from forest gardening—the practice of identifying and protecting certain
desirable and useful plants. As populations increasingly modified their environment in order to
regulate consumable plant and animal growth, males shifted away from hunting. Whereas
hunting required people to quickly become aware of their associates’ concerns and to respond
rapidly with helping behaviour when appropriate, agriculture was a much slower and safer
activity. However, a psychological effect of increased agriculture may have been decreased male
empathy. As hunting decreased, so too did the hunting function of empathy. This correlation
between a change in empathy’s function and a significant environmental change due to nicheconstruction could serve as evidence that agriculture resulted in population-wide psychological
changes that we have hitherto not discovered. For example, it may be that empathy is more
frequent and accurate among populations that still practice hunting and gathering regularly and
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that this is partially caused by a difference in psychological processes. This is a question that
cannot be answered at the moment for lack of empirical evidence. But the weaker claim that
agriculture led to a decrease in the degree of male empathy can be defended on historical
grounds.
This claim can be supported by correlating the decrease of empathy’s role in male hunting with a
biological lever. Agriculture had many effects on organism relationships, including a change in
the relationships between males and females. Prinz notes that early farming equipment was hefty
and operated mostly by males (Prinz 2007, p 298). He argues that this led to male control of
wealth, commerce, and later literacy, and political power (Ibid). This account of how agriculture
affected the dynamic interactions of males and females is plausible, but I think lacking in some
key details. Even if we provisionally accept Prinz’ account, it seems unlikely that the control of
resources, education, and political power by one subgrouping of the population was acquired
while the rest of the population acquiesced. After agriculture, resources and social arrangements
took on new dimensions of contestation. To gain and maintain control of these resources in this
new environment, males may have acted so as to cause females to be more sensitive to the
concerns of males. One way that this may have been achieved is by a change in the regulated
indicator of who to empathize most often with, namely to adult males. In biological terms, let us
assume that females possessed evolved psychological processes whose functional goal was
regulate empathy with other organisms (Barker 2008, p 10). The indicator value which was used
to sense whether and with whom empathy was occurring may have been, as SEP suggests, one
which favoured certain organisms rather others. For instance, females may have up to that point
evolved to regulate empathy by checking whether they were empathizing with young humans
more often (and perhaps more accurately) than with older humans. The indicator in this evolved
psychological process would have been open to both co-operative and exploitive co-optation
(Barker 2008, p22). In this evolutionary scenario, certain males may have succeeded in
modifying the behavioural indicators of females through teaching, modeling, aggression, or other
means. Accordingly, modifying the psychological process of empathy may have been a
biological lever. This small change in the evolved structure female empathic psychological
processing would have led to much larger effects. Once the indicator change was effected, not
empathizing with males more often or more accurately would have been taken by females to be
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an error. In this way, the concerns of males and female motivation to help males with their
concerns would become more evolutionarily significant. This small indicator change alone
would have affected the dynamic behavioural interactions of males and females, their social
roles, the types of institutions and environmental structures they created, the distribution of
resources, system of laws etc. The scope of these possible causal feedback loops are beyond the
scope of the present analysis. It remains an important and complex question whether in
populations which regularly hunt, gather, and forest garden, females are more, less, or equally
empathic as compared to males. But if a biological lever leading to increased female empathy for
the concerns of males can be correlated with the development of agriculture (an environmental
change), then according to EEP, this is a place to look for psychological modifications (and selfmodifications) that may have had large-scale effects and that may now be part of our innate
human psychology.
This brings us to the final step of EEP’s method: justify the existence of psychological processes
in females causing more frequent and accurate empathy in a specific population by appeal to
contemporary empirical findings in support of the functions of empathy in the current
environment, and two significant evolutionary changes—namely, the niche-constructing activity
of agriculture, and the biological leverage of the indicator value of empathy determining
potential targets of empathy. The former may have had the effect of decreased empathy in males,
and the latter increased empathy by female agents for male targets. We can also predict that these
differences between male and female empathy will not be as great as they could be because, as
we have seen, many of the current functions of empathy have remained the same since the
Pleistocene. However, it is important to note that these functions have also undergone significant
evolutionary changes during certain times.
The implication of this for Baron-Cohen and Pinker’s accounts of empathy is that their relatively
restricted meta-theory results in a method that is potentially inductively weaker than it purports
to be. There are variables that can more precisely explain the evolution of empathy that have not
been justifiably eliminated. As I have sketched above, these variables (e.g. niche construction,
psychological self-adaptation, biological levers) can be applied. But to know whether doing so
will yield empirical results that will support my sketch, we must await experimentation. In the
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meantime, however, I believe that future experimentation on the evolutionary psychology of
empathy should adopt the enlarged perspective that I have argued for if only to determine
whether SEP, as it has been practiced up now, is as inductively strong as it purports to be.
Empathy’s psychological functions of childcare, education, communication, social organization,
and awareness of the concerns of others could all possibly be better explained by the
comparative method of EEP. I hope to have shown that by enlarging the theoretical framework
and revising the method of standard evolutionary psychology, we will be able to more precisely
identify the evolved psychological traits of contemporary human beings while more accurately
explaining why, when, and how they evolved.

4.10

Concluding remarks

The most influential accounts of how and why empathy evolved come from standard
evolutionary psychology. These accounts have yielded impressive results and have gained
widespread acceptance because they are supported by a coherent evolutionary meta-theory and
an established methodology. This methodology leads SEP researchers seeking to explain
contemporary behaviour to posit the existence of psychological processes that have remained
functionally fixed since Pleistocene. But doing so excludes the possibility of more recent
evolutionary changes for which there is increasing theoretical support. Moreover, SEP presents a
view of the mind according to which it is adapted to a specific environment in the distant past.
The implications for the evolution of empathy are clear. Its current functions have remained
fixed, and its implementation is aimed at conforming to historical imperatives of an environment
in which there were recurrent adaptive problems and fixed social roles.
In this paper I have argued for an alternative explanation of empathy’s evolution. This
explanation is informed by an enlarged evolutionary meta-theory and a revised methodology,
which together I have called enlarged evolutionary psychology. EEP integrates the recent
theoretical developments of niche construction theory and mutualism, self-adaptive software,
feminist evolutionary theory, and biological leverage. This enlargement allowed me develop a
new comparative method for EEP. According to this comparative method, a researcher seeking
to explain contemporary behaviour must first develop a hypothesis about the contemporary
functions of the psychological processes that the behaviour is partially caused by. The researcher
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can then compare these possible contemporary functions to the possible distant historical
functions and attempt to track changes in the operation of an evolved psychological process by
correlating relevant environmental changes and modifications with biological levers and other
possible means of psychological self-adaptation. Then I sketched how EEP can be used to
provide an alternative explanation of empathy’s evolution according to which there may have
been significant evolutionary changes in our psychological processes that have occurred since
the development of agriculture. This alternative evolutionary explanation of empathy is
consistent with the care account of empathy presented in my first two papers. The explanatory
role of changes in environmental contexts is supported by the inclusion of niche construction
theory. And the self-modification and co-regulation of values and motivations is supported by
the inclusion of self-adaptive software, feminist evolutionary theory, and biological levers. In
this way, the care account better fits the theoretical framework of EEP. However, the alternative
explanation here sketched supports but does not establish the truth of the care account. Nor does
it establish the truth of EEP in opposition to SEP. However, the framework and method of EEP
is at odds with that of SEP because it posits that human minds modify themselves by modifying
their environment and by using their self-adaptive capacities, which in turn can result in largescale functional changes to those processes over short time periods. It is a significant
consequence of this that SEP may, to the peril of its objectives, be neglecting significant
evolutionary changes in our psychological processes and much of the complexity of how and
why empathy evolved.
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Historical Appendix

Researchers often take it for granted that the conceptual origin of empathy is in ancient Greek
discussions of sympathy. They do so because of the similarities between Hume (1739) and
Smith’s (1759) treatment of sympathy and our current understanding of what empathy is.
Namely, we generally take empathy to be a phenomenon whereby we place ourselves in
another’s shoes (taking their perspective) or of becoming aware of what it is like to be in
another’s situation. But while Hume and Smith’s treatment of sympathy involves many
processes that we now associate with empathy, they did not use the word ‘empathy’.
The etymology of empathy can be traced to ancient Greek discussions of ‘empatheia’. Ancient
Greeks used ‘empatheia’ to refer to an intense individual passion or emotional experience
(Depew 2005). The prefix em- means into. Accordingly, Plotinus treats empathy as the opposite
of apathy (apatheia) —a “being into” a target, as opposed to not caring about it (Ibid.). For
ancient Greek philosophers then, ‘empatheia’ meant caring about something or someone. This is
very important because the first modern treatments of empathy explicitly argued for a conceptual
connection to ‘empatheia’.
It was Lipps who, in his works on aesthetics and psychology, argued that empatheia and the
German word ‘einfühlung’ could be understood as usefully similar (Lipps 1903a, 1903b, 1906).55
The word ‘Einfülung’ had been coined in German by Robert Vischer in his doctoral dissertation
in philosophy three decades prior (Vischer 1873).56 For both Vischer and Lipps, einfülung was
the creation by an agent of feelings and emotions in a target (Vischer 1873; Lipps 1903). It was a
process of projecting or feeling into inanimate objects, plants, animals, or other humans (Lips
1903).
Not much later, Titchener (a psychologist) translated ‘einfühlung’ into English. He called it
‘empathy’:
55

Lipps (1906) describes the connection between empatheia and einfühlung most explicitly.
Depew 2005 cites Listowel (1967) as claiming that Lotze (1869) may have used the word ‘einfühlung’ prior to
Vischer. However, Vischer et al. (1994, p 20) persuasively show that Lotze referred to a similar phenomenon, but
did not coin a new term to characterize it.
56
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All that I have to remark now is that the various visual images, which I have
referred to as possible vehicles of logical meaning, oftentimes share their task
with kinaesthesis. Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy
and stateliness, but I feel or act them in the mind's muscles. This is, I suppose, a
simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a rendering of Einfuhlung;
there is nothing curious or idiosyncratic about it; but it is a fact that must be
mentioned (Titchener 1909, p 21-22).
Not long after Titchener’s translation of ‘einfühlung’ into ‘empathy’, the tie between empathy
and aesthetics became weaker. By the 1920’s, empathy researchers were using the term to refer
to process occurring mainly among humans, rather than among humans and paintings (or
sculptures, willow trees, or birds).57 For psychologists of the early twentieth century, empathy
was understood to be a phenomenon whereby an agent places themselves in a target’s
psychological position and experiences similar feelings and emotions as the target.

57

Why this change occurred is not well known. See Depew (2005) for some detail.
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